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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, and 
BINGHAM and GARFIELD RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This is a certiorari proceeding to review the lawful-
ness of a decision of defendant, dated July 23,1953, that 
there is owing by plaintiff deficiencies of corporation 
franchise tax for the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, of 
$3,568,041.92. Interest calculated on such deficiencies to 
June 15, 1953 was in the amount of $1,283,647.81, a total 
of $4,851,689.73. 
Case No. 
8091 
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Plaintiffs' brief does not mention what the deficien-
cies in tax should be under plaintiffs' theory of the case. 
However, on page 3 of plaintiffs' brief before the Tax 
Commission it is stated ". . . the taxpayer's contention 
as to the correct determination of the tax is set forth in 
Schedule 2 of Petitioner's Exhibit 56 (2)." Turning to 
this Exhibit, we find plaintiff admitted a corrected tax 
liability for the period here involved of $4,028,608.40. 
Tax paid under the returns as filed was in the total 
amount of $2,952,562.91. This would thus leave defi-
ciencies owing, according to plaintiff, of $1,076,045.49, 
excluding interest. 
From the correct deficiencies finally determined to 
be due, including interest thereon, by the Court on this 
appeal will be taken into account certain cash amounts 
heretofore deposited by plaintiff with defendant in con-
nection with perfecting its appeal in Case No. 7298, 
involving the year 1942 and again involved here, together 
with the amount heretofore paid to defendant under stipu-
lation filed with this court following the hearing by this 
Court on plaintiff's motion to enlarge the time within 
which to file its brief on the ground that it did not know 
what, if any, issues in the case it was required to brief 
and argue before the Court. 
In reviewing the case, the Court will be called upon 
to decide whether the decision of defendant in its dollar 
and cent amount should be affirmed or modified. Plain-
tiff in its writ asks that the decision be modified by 
r^iBS * . def ies to zero wd gmting , c k k . 
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refund against the state in the sum of $3,205,443.06 be-
cause the imposition of any franchise tax whatsoever on 
plaintiff contravenes the commerce clause of the Federal 
Constitution. Presumably, if overruled on this point 
which is not pressed in its brief, plaintiff asks for a 
modification of the decision to an amount equal to 3 per 
cent of the net income shown on its Exhibit 56 (2). 
Defendant on this appeal asks the court to affirm its 
decision but if modified that the deficiencies be increased 
to an amount equal to 3% of 100% of plaintiff's Utah 
division net income in accordance with the reservation 
of jurisdiction and claim therefor asserted at the hearing 
under the provisions of Sec. 80-13-39, U.C.A. 1943. Such 
total income in the amount of $232,570,086.66 (line 1 Tax 
Computation Schedule) at 3% would give a total tax 
liability of $6,977,102.60. Subtracting the total taxes 
paid under the returns as filed in the amount of $2,952,-
562.91 would make deficiencies presently owing for the 
years involved in the amount of $4,024,539.69, excluding 
interest. 
The primary issue presented on this appeal is 
whether under the mandate of the court and the appli-
cable statutes and authorities, plaintiff may apportion 
any net income of its Utah Division outside Utah and, if 
so, how much. Secondary questions relate to the propriety 
of defendant's calculation of plaintiff's depletion deduc-
tions, whether plaintiff in any event is entitled for the 
year 1942 to apportion 66.926 per cent to Utah and 33.074 
per cent outside under the Court's mandate in Case No. 
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7298 and finally whether the assessment of interest at 
the statutory 6 per cent rate on any deficiencies to be 
found herein constitutes an unlawful abuse of discretion 
on the part of defendant. 
Put simply, the Court in No. 7298 decided, first, with 
one judge dissenting, that plaintiff's tax is to be calcu-
lated not on the basis of the statutory formula, but on 
the basis of the separate accounts of the Utah Division, 
and, second, that in computing plaintiff's depletion deduc-
tions some of its net income must be allocated to post-
mining operations. The case was then remanded with 
instructions to determine and enter a deficiency judg-
ment in accordance with the views expressed in the 
opinion. 
No. 7298 was presented to the Court by both plaintiff 
and defendant on the basis that "principles" were to be 
adjudicated, not figures. The Court accepted that 
approach and, after deciding the principles, remanded 
the case to determine the deficiency. The mandate thus 
required a continuation of the hearing on the matter to 
get more facts pertaining to how much, if any, of the net 
income reflected on the separate accounts of the Utah 
Division was attributable to business done outside Utah 
and how much of the net income should be allocated to 
post-mining operations before computing depletion. 
The Court is respectfully requested on this occasion, 
if it be possible to do so, and based on the more complete 
record before it to anchor all principles to be readju-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dicated herein down into specific dollars and cents. 
A judgment with figures would appear to have a better 
chance of finally disposing of this seemingly never-ending 
controversy. 
Under the heading "Varying Positions Taken by the 
Commission" in its brief (pp. 14-19), plaintiff outlines 
somewhat chronologically "the various and inconsistent 
positions which the Commission has taken with Kenne-
cott over a period of years." The events described merely 
represent the difficulties which are involved in any tax 
litigation of this magnitude. The record will show that as 
the controversy has developed, new facts have come to 
light. The only matter of importance is the correct 
determination of the tax imposed annually by law for 
plaintiff's privilege as a corporation of operating at 
Bingham, Utah, the world's largest copper mine. This 
mine, with a capacity of 500,000,000 pounds of copper 
a year, accounts for around 30 per cent of the total annual 
production of copper in the United States and approxi-
mately 10 per cent of the reported annual primary pro-
duction of copper in the world. From the Bingham ore 
is produced, not only copper, but gold, silver, platinum, 
palladium and molybdenite as well. Plaintiff's various 
operations make it the largest producer of copper, the 
second largest producer of gold, the third or fourth 
largest producer of silver, and the second largest pro-
ducer of molybdenite, in the United States. 
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The backbone of plaintiff's vast industrial enterprise 
is the Utah Mines Division. Some conception of the size 
of this division's operation can be gained when it is noted 
that the total gross revenues from the metals produced 
from the ores of the Bingham Mine, before any expenses, 
during the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, were greatly 
in excess of the total gross revenues of the State of Utah, 
including all taxes collected by the State Tax Commission 
and all property taxes collected in the state by munici-
palities, counties and school districts. 
The tax returns filed annually since 1931 by plaintiff 
seem, in the light of the facts now of record, to have been 
consistently understated with respect to the net income 
attributable to plaintiff's Utah operations. On the basis 
of these facts they appear to have been incorrect to begin 
with as to the Utah Copper Company and incorrect after 
1936 as to plaintiff. 
Both the individual income and corporation franchise 
tax laws of the state are based on the fundamental princi-
ple of self-assessment. This means that each taxpayer, 
familiar with the facts of his own business and with the 
law, is required to compute his tax correctly in the first 
place. Where this is not done, it would appear quite 
immaterial how many changes of position the taxing 
authority must take to secure a correct computation. 
With all of the forces at its command, plaintiff over the 
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years since 1931 appears to have been quite skillful in 
resisting any computation of tax other than of its own 
interpretation of the statute. The lack of consideration of 
important facts, ability to prolong the controversy, lack 
of any penalty in the process, periodic changes in defend-
ant's personnel, the need for revenue in the Uniform 
School Fund, are merely some of the factors which have 
operated in plaintiff's favor to make its strategy success-
ful. 
To get a rough idea of what plaintiff did in filing 
its returns, let us turn to the Utah Division 1942 return 
as an example. Showing a gross income from its Utah 
Division operations of about 86 millions, plaintiff sub-
tracted 44 millions of total direct and indirect expenses 
of operations. This left a net income of 42 millions to 
the Utah Division before Federal taxes, depletion, and 
exclusion of net income attributable to out-of-state 
activities, if any. 
From this 42 millions of Utah Division net income, 
plaintiff subtracted 20 millions of Federal taxes (plain-
tiff as a whole paid 22 millions). This cut the 42 millions 
down to 22 millions of net income. 
Plaintiff next subtracted about 13 millions for deple-
tion. This cut the 22 millions down to 9 millions of net 
income. 
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Plaintiff next cut the 9 millions down one-third by 
applying an "apportionment formula" to the nine millions 
of 66.926 per cent. This cut the 9 millions down to 6 
millions of net income (actually about 5.8 millions). 
These three adjustments which adjusted 42 millions 
of net income of the separate Utah Division, after all 
direct and indirect expenses of operations, down to less 
than 6 millions of adjusted taxable income to Utah, repre-
sent the problem which faced the Court in No. 7298. The 
Court was also faced with plaintiff's request that any 
attempt by defendant to adjust the above adjustments of 
plaintiff, entitled plaintiff to file an amended return 
for 1942 on the statutory formula covering all of its 
operations and not merely those of its Utah Division. 
Under this amended return as filed 3.4 millions were 
assigned by plaintiff to Utah (Ex. QQ(2) ). 
Defendant's decision here on appeal assigns 16.8 
millions of net income to Utah for 1942, using an appor-
tionment fraction slightly over 93 per cent. A 100 per 
cent apportionment would assign 18 millions to Utah. 
As compared with its original 1942 Utah Division 
return assigning 5.8 millions and its amended corporate 
return on the statutory formula assigning 3.4 millions to 
Utah, plaintiff in Petitioner's Ex. 56(2) at the hearing 
conceded a total net income assignable to Utah (Line 7) 
of 10.4 millions for 1942, using an apportionment fraction 
of 64.676 per cent. However, on this appeal and listed as 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a separate contention is the argument that this Court 
by its mandate in Case No. 7298 directed defendant to 
use the arbitrary 66.926 per cent apportionment fraction 
which had been used by defendant in filing its 1942 Utah 
Division return. 
Plaintiff's appeal in Case No. 7298 covering 1942 had 
been preceded by an earlier appeal to this Court in Case 
No. 6324 covering the years 1935 and 1936. This latter 
appeal was dismissed as a part of the settlement 
compromising all of the years 1935 to 1941, inclusive. 
This compromise is now past history and comment there-
on at this time is unnecessary. It is material to 
point out, however, that the arbitrary apportionment 
fraction of 66.926 per cent was used in this compromise. 
This figure seems to have been arrived at somewhat on 
the following basis: 
Plaintiff had very stubbornly insisted from the 
beginning on its right under the statute to use the statu-
tory formula on its Utah Division separate accounts and 
to consider no payment to the state which did not recog-
nize that all of its gross receipts from sales should be 
allocated outside the State. Allocating 100 per cent of 
the property of the Utah Division to Utah and 100 per 
cent of the payroll of the Utah Division to Utah and 100 
per cent of the gross receipts of the Utah Division outside 
Utah, gives a straight fraction of 66% per cent. Under 
the compromise, in return for the Commission's conces-
sion that all sales receipts could be allocated outside the 
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State, plaintiff conceded that all of the property and 
payroll of the Utah Division could be allocated to Utah, 
together with certain miscellaneous small receipts ad-
mitted by plaintiff to be assignable to the state. These 
miscellaneous small receipts account for the difference 
between 66% per cent and the 66.926 per cent figure. 
Also, under the compromise, plaintiff was allowed 
to take depletion deductions from gross income equal to 
one-third of the total Utah Division net income for the 
period. Such amount was arrived at before any deduc-
tion for Federal taxes and without any reference to a 
value on plaintiff's mill concentrates which would take 
into account the principle that some net income must be 
allocated to post-mining operations before computing 
depletion. 
It is out of this background that plaintiff's argument 
of long-standing administrative construction emerges in 
its effort to validate the franchise tax returns involved 
here. 
Perhaps, at this point, a few remarks concerning the 
course of the trial or hearing below might be helpful to 
the Court. Following receipt of the remittitur and the 
Court's mandate in No. 7298, defendant was faced with 
the necessity of making a computation of tax for 1942 
and the intervening years. 
On the one hand, the Court had decided the tax 
should be calculated not on the statutory formula as 
applied to plaintiff as a whole, but on the basis of the 
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separate Utah Division accounts under the so-called sub-
division (8) provision of the law. (Sec. 80-13-21 (8) 
U.C.A. 1943). Under this provision, defendant is required 
in lieu of the statutory formula to make such allocation 
as is fairly calculated to assign to this state the portion 
of net income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the tax-
payer to double taxation. At the same time, the Court 
had decided that in computing the depletion deduction 
some net income must be allocated to plaintiff's post-
mining operations. On the brief and sketchy record 
before it, the Court was in no position to determine what 
portion of the net income of the Utah Division was 
attributable to business done outside the State, nor was 
it prepared without more to put its final stamp of 
approval on the cost allocation formula used by defend-
ant in allocating some of plaintiff's net income to post-
mining operations for depletion purposes. Extensive 
discussions with plaintiff, following the remittitur, 
seemed to indicate plaintiff took quite a contrary view 
from defendant of what the Court had decided in Case 
No. 7298. Plaintiff continued to insist that it derived no 
net income from post-mining operations for depletion 
purposes and that no adjustments should be made to the 
separate Utah divisional accounts which did not allocate 
(1) some property outside (inventory), (2) some payroll 
outside (New York administrative expense) and (3) all 
sales outside. 
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Defendant had hired Messrs. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co., independent certified public accountants, to assist 
it in computing the tax. Solely from the accounting 
standpoint, this firm did not regard as unreasonable 
apportioning the net income of the Utah Division ratably 
to the costs of the successive stages of mining, smelting, 
transportation, refining and selling for both depletion 
and allocation. This basis had several features to coin-
mend it. In the first place, profit or net income is 
what is left over after the costs or expenses of the busi-
ness are paid or incurred. In a practical way, either profit 
or loss is tied down to all the costs incurred, not just to 
some costs. In the second place, it made an assessment 
inwardly consistent in that "net income from the prop-
erty" (mining) could be used for the depletion deduction 
and it only became necessary to add to this figure the 
net income attributable to the next activity in Utah 
(smelting) to get the total net income assignable to Utah. 
The net income assignable to the transportation, refining 
and selling outside the State became out-of-state non-
taxable income. Depletion "net income" was thus incapa-
ble of overrunning the state line and exceeding the net 
income assignable to the State. Roughly speaking, this 
method allocated about 70 per cent of the net income of 
the Utah Division to the mine for the depletion deduction 
and 80 per cent to Utah for taxation. In the third place, 
this basis had some practical precedent in the construc-
tion business where a building job may require two or 
more annual periods to complete. In these circumstances, 
an acceptable basis for tax reporting prior to completion 
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is to apportion that proportion of the estimated total 
profit to be realized to a particular year that the costs 
of the particular year bear to the total estimated costs 
of the whole job. In fact, the formula worked even better 
in the present case for the reason that defendant was 
not apportioning an estimated future profit but a defi-
nite, presently known and ascertained profit. 
This apparently liberal formula was to plaintiff very 
objectionable. As the hearings got under way, plaintiff's 
witnesses analyzed the formula and criticized its legal 
applicability to the case. I t was algebraic; it gave a dis-
torted picture because the higher the costs, the higher the 
profit; it had no warrant in the statute, etc, A large par t 
of this criticism was valid and persuasive and impressed 
the Commission insofar as it was directed against the 
apportionment of net income within and without the 
State. I t became clearly apparent that the determination 
of the "net income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state" for apportionment purposes was 
one thing and determination of the "net income from the 
property" for depletion purposes another thing. They 
rested on different footings in the statute. 
Aside from the numerous prejudicial imperfections 
of the formula pointed out by plaintiff, the Commission 
also realized as the facts developed that its use for 
apportionment purposes could not be justified under 
the Court's mandate of computing the tax on the Utah 
Division's separate accounts. The effect of the formula 
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was to automatically apportion net income reflected on 
the Utah Division accounts to an out-of-state source 
merely because out-of-state expense was being incurred 
and irrespective of whether such out-of-state expense 
constituted out-of-state business. For example, a Utah 
ranch company may ship cattle to the Omaha market 
unloading the stock intransit in Colorado for feed and 
water. The incurring of such transportation and feeding 
expense may be out-of-state expense but it is not attribut-
able to out-of-state business requiring an apportionment 
of income within and without the state. The expense 
is outside but the business is inside. Furthermore, the 
formula, from another point of view, was in effect con-
verting a franchise tax law on the privilege of doing 
business into an income tax and making source of the 
income rather than value of the corporate franchise the 
criteria for the tax. 
On the other hand, the formula had a legally useful 
application on the depletion question. The problem here 
was not to determine where the business was being done 
but merely to determine the gross income from the mine 
before the mill product entered the post-mining furnace 
and metallurgical treatment stages. The mining expenses 
were known so that to compute the net income from the 
property, the gross income need only be determined. This 
represented primarily a valuation problem which would 
take into account the Court's mandate of allocating some 
net income to the post-mining operations. The formula 
was retained but viewed by the Commission through the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
Court's opinion with considerable caution and merely as 
a means for getting at a correct figure. The formula, it 
must be admitted, allocated some net income to post-
mining operations. Whether it allocated too much or too 
little remained to be determined. The Commission waited 
patiently for plaintiff to come forward with its own 
experts or formulas and allocate some income, even a 
little bit, to post-mining operations. It is still waiting. 
The reams of testimony of plaintiff on the depletion 
question were directed solely to showing the Court's 
decision in No. 7298 to be erroneous. The testimony, 
however, merely fortifies the good common sense of the 
Court's judgment. In fact, the evidence leaves one with 
the impression that a formula which puts a value on a 
mineral product of 70 per cent of the total net income 
ultimately derived after this product is smelted, trans-
ported, refined and sold, is excessive. This is perhaps 
because statutory depletion and Federal taxes were al-
lowed and included by defendant as mining costs under 
the formula. Defendant, in these circumstances, had no 
other recourse than to sit tight on its depletion values. 
The apportionment problem, on the other hand, took 
an interesting turn during the trial because the evidence 
as it developed had taken an odd and surprising turn. 
Abandonment of the cost allocation formula for appor-
tionment purposes on the persuasive testimony and in-
sistence of plaintiff required a redetermination of the 
net income of plaintiff's Utah Division reasonably 
attributable to the business done within Utah which would 
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fit the new facts in the record. The deficiency letters 
using the cost formula had initially been sent out in a 
preliminary way and on the best information and advice 
then available to defendant following the remand of No. 
7298. The hearings, however, had developed a lot of 
facts, some of them very interesting indeed. 
At the outset, plaintiff, vigorously rejecting the 
cost formula's apportionment of a mere 20 per cent of 
net income of the Utah division outside the State, claimed 
the right to use the statutory formula on its Utah divi-
sional accounts. Under its interpretation of the formula, 
which it insisted was applicable, from 91.270 to 98.106 
per cent of property is assigned to Utah, the balance 
outside; from 96.582 to 98.150 per cent of payroll is 
assigned to Utah, the balance outside; from 00.004 to 
00.779 per cent of gross receipts is assigned to Utah, the 
balance outside. Average of the three factors thus ranges 
from 63.192 to 65.198 per cent to Utah. Thus, approxi-
mately 36 per cent of the net income of the Utah division 
is claimed to be attributable to out-of-state business. 
To justify exclusion of 36 per cent of the Utah 
divisional net income from the Utah tax base, plaintiff 
felt called upon at first to present a picture of large and 
extensive business activities in the New York Equitable 
Building Office. These activities were described under 
the headings of operational, development, purchasing and 
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selling matters. No stress was placed on activities at the 
mine, nor on the supervisory activities of plaintiff's 
administrative staff in the Salt Lake Kearns Building 
Office. 
This testimony went on at considerable length 
describing plaintiff's operations everywhere, including 
those in and out of Utah, as one continuous, indivisible, 
closely integrated operating unit with indivisible, con-
tinuous and uninterrupted operations from the mining 
of the crude ores through the smelting and refining stages 
to the ultimate sale, distribution and delivery of the 
marketable products to the customer. The income from 
such a unified business was claimed to be incapable of 
separate partition and was exactly what the statutory or 
Massachusetts formula was invented to cover. Activities 
of plaintiff's sales office in New York were given especial 
importance and significance as contributing to the pro-
duction of plaintiff's income because without sales, no 
cash. Everything prior to the sale was merely expenses. 
The sale was the important thing. It put the income in 
the bank and the sale was not made in Utah. 
However true the picture of the one indivisible, 
continuous, uninterrupted, integrated operating unit may 
be in a broad economic sense, it collapsed completely 
under the facts pertinent to our statute. 
In the first place, it appeared that plaintiff never 
sold any copper or molybdenite at all but merely pro-
duced them. Plaintiff's sales subsidiary, Kennecott Sales 
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Corporation, made all sales to customers in the regular 
course of the subsidiary's business and in the name of the 
subsidiary. The customer paid his money and dealt with 
the sales subsidiary exclusively. 
In the second place, it appeared that title to the 
copper and molybdenite was transferred from producer 
parent to sales subsidiary, contemporaneously with the 
sale from subsidiary to customer, under an intercompany 
contract at the actual market price realized by the sub-
sidiary less certain expenses and a commission of $1.00 
per net ton of copper and $3.50 per net ton of molybde-
nite. The evidence clearly showed that this inter-company 
contract price was arms-length, fair and reasonable. 
In the third place, it appeared that not being legally 
entitled to file a consolidated return with its sales sub-
sidiary because such subsidiary has never done or quali-
fied to do business in Utah, plaintiff's Utah tax returns 
have nevertheless ignored completely both the separate 
corporate identity of and the fair and reasonable inter-
company contract with the sales subsidiary. The separate 
net income derived by the sales subsidiary under its 
intercompany contract was treated in the Utah tax 
returns of plaintiff as the net income of plaintiff even 
though consolidated returns were not and could not be 
filed and notwi ths tanding that such separate net income 
was the source of the payment of dividends aggregating 
$1,240,000.00 by the sales subsidiary to plaintiff during 
the years here involved. 
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In the fourth place, it appeared that 25 per cent of 
the total copper produced by the Utah Division was not 
sold out on the market, but was transferred on an inter-
company basis through the sales subsidiary at fair 
market prices to plaintiff's fabricating subsidiaries, 
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott Wire 
and Cable Company for fabrication and sale by the 
fabricating subsidiaries to their customers. As in the 
case of the sales subsidiary, neither fabricating sub-
sidiary did or was qualified to do business in Utah. 
In the fifth place, it appeared that the one-third of 
the net income of the Utah Division which plaintiff was 
seeking to apportion outside Utah as attributable to 
business done in New York was not being and never had 
been picked up for taxation by New York as business 
done in New York under its similar franchise tax statute. 
No question of double taxation was therefore involved 
under the subdivision (8) provision of our statute. 
In the sixth place, it appeared that the business of 
refining Utah blister copper by American Smelting and 
Eefining Company under contract at its Baltimore, Mary-
land refinery or elsewhere, was not business done by 
plaintiff at Baltimore, but business done by A. S. & E. at 
Baltimore for plaintiff. 
In the seventh place, it appeared that historically 
speaking the producing function has always been sepa-
rated from the selling function. In the years prior to 
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1920, A. S. & K. did the selling. From 1920 to 1934, 
Guggenheim Bros, did the selling. From 1934 to the 
present, the sales subsidiary has done the selling. 
In the eighth place, it appeared that the sales sub-
sidiary maintained joint offices with plaintiff, its parent, 
in New York and actually paid its full proportionate 
share of the rent and other New York office expenses. 
In the ninth place, it appeared that from 1931, when 
the Utah tax law became effective, to 1936, when Utah 
Copper Company was dissolved to become the Utah 
Division of plaintiff, Utah Copper Company's New York 
Office was at 25 Broad Street, whereas the offices of 
Guggenheim Bros, and Kennecott Sales Corporation 
were at 120 Broadway. Thus, to begin with and covering 
the period involved in No. 6324 before this Court 
(covering 1935 and 1936 and later compromised and dis-
missed), plaintiff did not even have the benefit of the 
producing company or division sharing joint office prem-
ises with the selling firm or company to give argumenta-
tive support to its present position that the sales sub-
sidiary is an "-agent" operating in plaintiff's behalf in 
premises owned or rented by plaintiff outside Utah. 
In the tenth place, it appeared that the separate 
books of account of the Utah Division of plaintiff, the 
sales subsidiary and the fabricating subsidiaries properly 
and truly reflected the net income from the business and 
operations of the Utah Division and each of the sales 
and fabricating subsidiaries. 
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In the eleventh place, it appeared that the Utah 
Division was charged with its fair and proportionate part 
of plaintiff's New York office administrative expense, 
including salaries and office expenses, and that such 
sums were deducted as expense on the Utah tax returns. 
These significant facts, among many others, set forth 
in the Findings, put an entirely different complexion on 
the case. In fact, in its bare essentials, all there is here 
is a company producing fruit in Utah, having it sorted, 
packed and graded under contract by an independant 
firm in Idaho and sold to an independent broker, com-
mission merchant or distributing company in Wyoming 
for resale outside Utah. The fact that the Utah pro-
ducer also establishes an office in the same state, or in 
the same town, or in the same office building, or on the 
same floor does not make the broker's or commission 
merchant's activities his activities. The only inquiry 
under our statute is to ascertain the nature and extent 
of the out-of-state office activities of the taxpayer in the 
light of its intercorporate arrangements and the way it 
keeps its books of account to determine whether such 
out-of-state activities, if any, require an apportionment 
of Utah net income out-of-state in addition to being 
allowed as an expense deduction to the business done 
within the state. 
Unless the separate corporate entity *and selling 
operations of the sales subsidiary are ignored, all the 
Court is faced with here is the existence of an out-of-state 
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management office in New York concerned with world-
wide operations, superimposed on a management office 
in Salt Lake more directly concerned with operating 
problems of the Western Divisions, including the Utah 
Division. The activities of the New York office are 
extremely important, of course, and should not be mini-
mized. Corporate housekeeping duties, plans and poli-
cies, investments, financial matters, directors' and stock-
holders' meetings are important corporate functions. 
The problem here, however, is the extent to which these 
out-of-state over-all management services require an 
out-of-state apportionment of the income of its Utah 
Division where already a fair share of the applicable 
expense of these services has been deducted on the divi-
sion's separate accounts and served to reduce by that 
amount the net income attributable to the business of the 
Utah Division. The allowance of the substantial expense 
of the New York management services as a deduction on 
the Utah returns itself allocates outside Utah, on this 
record, the full value of such services to the production 
of net income by the Utah Division. Furthermore, it has 
to be remembered that the income being earned by the 
Utah Division is not from New York housekeeping duties 
or management services but from the production of metal 
by the Utah Division. 
We ask the Court to keep constantly in mind the fact 
that the Utah copper and molybdenite product is trans-
ferred from the Utah Division directly to the sales sub-
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sidiary at a fair price (market less fair and reasonable 
commissions, together with certain expenses). The Utah 
Division is credited with its fair price by the sales 
subsidiary. 
The molybdenite, which accounts for approximately 
8 per cent of total sales, is fully marketable in Utah, 
requires no further processing, and is moved directly 
out of Utah to out-of-state customers by the sales sub-
sidiary. Plaintiff conducts no activity or business outside 
Utah with respect to molybdenite whatsoever. It is pro-
duced here and sold outside by another company. 
What about the copper, platinum, palladium, gold 
and silver? Is any of the net income derived from these 
products earned from or attributable to out-of-state 
business. No, even though a slightly different factual 
situation is presented from that pertaining to the 
molybdenite. 
Plaintiff's Utah mills turn out along with the 
marketable molybdenite, copper concentrates which are 
smelted in Utah for plaintiff's account by A. S. & E. 
These copper concentrates were smelted by A. S. & B. at 
cost plus a fee of $1.35, then $1.00 and now 85c per ton 
of dry product to produce blister copper. This blister, 
although 99 plus per cent pure copper, has mixed up with 
it small but very valuable amounts of gold, silver, 
platinum and palladium. These "impurities" were re-
fined out of the blister by A. S. & E. at its Baltimore or 
other refinery at cost plus a fee of $1.50 per ton of 
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returnable refined copper. The refined copper as pro-
duced was sold by the sales subsidiary to customers out 
of A. S. & E.'s yard at the refinery. Copper is thus in 
exactly the same boat as molybdenite except that the 
Utah blister on its way to market must be stopped in 
transit in Maryland for some additional processing, not 
by plaintiff or by the sales subsidiary, but by an inde-
pendent third party, A. S. & E. This out-of-state proc-
essing of the Utah product is not out-of-state business of 
plaintiff, but the business of A. S. & E. 
The platinum and palladium product is again in the 
same boat as the molybdenite and the copper but with 
the difference that this product is sold not by the sales 
subsidiary, but by A. S. & E. for an agreed fee not to 
exceed $5.00 per ounce less certain costs and expenses. 
Plaintiff does not ask, as in the case of its sales sub-
sidiary, that the separate corporate entity of A. S. & E. 
be set aside. These receipts are merely so small in the 
over-all picture as to require no comment. 
Defendant in its final decision allocated all receipts 
from gold and silver outside the Sta:te after having at 
the hearing in Ex. PPP (2) attributed them to Utah 
business. Was this out-of-state assignment proper? The 
deficiencies were cut down substantially by this action 
because these receipts account for about 12 per cent of 
total sales. For one month (May, 1950,) for example, 
they ran over $900,000. 
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The problem on the gold and silver is somewhat 
unique. As set forth in Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper 
Co., 93 Fed. (2) 127 (1937) (CCA10), in the years from 
1909 to 1932, the Copper Company shipped its copper 
concentrates to the smelter where they were sampled, 
assayed, purchased and paid for by the smelter except 
for the copper which was returned in kind out-of-state 
on payment of the smelting and refining toll charges, the 
smelter being unable to purchase such large quantities 
of copper. Effective January 1, 1933, the Copper Com-
pany made a new smelting contract wThereby gold and 
silver were no longer purchased in Utah by the smelter, 
but were thereafter delivered back in kind out-of-state 
to the copper company along with the blister copper. 
The early testimony at the trial below on the gold 
and silver was, to say the least, garbled, contradictory 
and confused with respect to what happens after the 
delivery back in kind. (See F. pp. 83 et seq.) The fair 
conclusion at this time, however, was that the "sales" 
to the Federal government wTere effected by A. S. & R. 
as an independent sales agent, and not by plaintiff or by 
the sales subsidiary, on about the same basis as the 
platinum and palladium. For this reason they were 
claimed in Ex. PPP(2) as Utah business. Also, to be 
noted is that, at that time, there was in evidence the basic 
agreement of November 29, 1940, (Ex. 111(2)) between 
plaintiff and A. S. & E. calling for the delivery back in 
kind of the copper and the gold and silver as well. The 
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witnesses were clear enough on what happened to the 
copper but the circumstances surrounding the delivery of 
the gold and silver to the government were not clear. 
This mystery was solved at later hearings by Mr. 
Gervin, assistant to plaintiff's president, who introduced 
in the evidence another agreement, hitherto unheard of, 
and dated the 29th of November, 1940, under which plain-
tiff did not on taking delivery sell the gold and silver to 
the government itself. After being constructively de-
livered up in kind by A. S. & R. at the refinery to plain-
tiff, plaintiff concurrently and constructively delivered 
back and sold the gold and silver to A. S. & R. On its 
face, this contract had been negotiated and executed in 
the New York offices of plaintiff and A. S, & R. 
The sale price to A. S. & R. for the month of May, 
1950 of $908,416.12 of Utah Division gold and silver 
was $901,185.28, A. S. & R. thus realizing a net gain on the 
purchase and resale of $7,230.84, or roughly eight-tenths 
of one per cent. 
It might be asked whether this sale of gold and silver 
is not in substance exactly the same situation as prevailed 
on a net smelter return basis prior to January 1, 1933. 
For example, what difference did the new arrangement 
make in shifting from a sale of the gold and silver in the 
concentrates on a net smelter return basis in Utah to a 
delivery up in kind to plaintiff outside Utah if simultan-
eously with the new delivery up in kind agreement there 
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was executed a separate agreement under which 
A. S. & K. from the moment of the delivery of the concen-
trates in Utah became legally entitled by contract to the 
product, merely postponing passage of title and payment 
until the gold and silver were stripped out of the blister 
outside the state by A. S. & R. Again, for example, what 
difference would it make taxwise if wool on the sheep is 
sheared after the sheep are driven across the state line if 
grown on the sheep in Utah. Furthermore, if, as here, 
the out-of-state shearing is done by the purchaser, the 
shearing is not out-of-state business of the Utah ranch 
owner and the net income attributable to the growing of 
the wool in Utah would be attributable in full to Utah 
business. 
Other features pertaining to the gold and silver gave 
defendant considerable difficulty. For example, Mr. 
Lenz, President of the Sales Subsidiary, testified (F. p. 
85): 
uYou see, to me — while they are precious 
metals — they have in my opinion no commercial 
value. In other words, we spend no time on the 
sale of them, it is automatic." 
In other words, no sales effort or marketing problem is 
involved with respect to gold and silver. The "sale" to the 
Federal government does not contribute to the earning 
of the income. From this testimony it conclusively 
appears that the income is solely in the production of the 
metal. 
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Another thing was whether the one letter contract of 
sale, dated November 29, 1940, negotiated and executed, 
it is true, in the respective New York Offices of A. S. & R. 
and plaintiff at 120 Broadway, but covering the complete 
inter-company transfer of all future production of gold 
and silver, was of such a character that all gross receipts 
from such transfers year after year should be attribut-
able to New York business solely by reason of initial for-
mal execution of the agreement in New York. This diffi-
culty was accentuated when it is borne in mind that the 
full amount of the gross receipts from the transfers of 
gold and silver in the Utah blister to A. S. & R. at the 
Baltimore refinery wrere reflected in the separate ac-
counts of the Utah Division and attributed to the business 
of the Utah Division. Again and of paramount import-
ance is the fact that in substance and effect the transfers 
of the gold and silver to A. S. & R. differ not one whit 
from the transfers of platinum and palladium to A. S. 
& R. and the transfers of copper and molybdenite to the 
sales subsidiary. All are for resale. The Utah Division 
is merely a producer. A. S. & R. and the sales subsidiary 
are the marketing instrumentalities. 
Notwithstanding the Court's mandate to compute 
the tax under subdivision (8) on the separate accounts 
of the Utah Division and not on the basis of the statutory 
three-factor formula as applied to plaintiff and not-
withstanding that jurisdiction had been reserved and 
claim made at the hearing to assess the tax on the full 
net income shown and reflected on such separate ac-
counts, Defendant 
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(a) Allocated in the gross receipts fraction all 
receipts of gold and silver outside the State, such 
receipts comprising about 12 per cent of total 
sales. 
(b) Allocated in the payroll fraction all New 
York administrative expense as payroll outside 
the State, such expense comprising roughly about 
3 per cent of total payroll. 
(c) Allocated in the property fraction all inven-
tories in transit or in process or on hand at the 
refinery awaiting sale as tangible property outside 
the State, such outside property comprising 
roughly about 6.5 per cent of total property. 
(d) All property and payroll in Utah were allo-
cated to Utah. All receipts from sales of copper 
and molybdenite collected by plaintiff from the 
sales subsidiary following sales by the latter to 
customers and from platinum and palladium col-
lected from A. S. & E. following sales by the latter 
to customers, were included as Utah business for 
the reason that such sales were not made by and 
in the name of plaintiff but by and in the name of 
the sales subsidiary and A. S. & R. and in the 
regular course of the latters ' business and from 
the latters ' premises. 
This decision may be erroneous. I t is erroneous, 
however, only if the tax should be laid under the man-
date of this Court on the full separate net income of the 
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Utah Division and in accordance with Sec. 80-13-16 (1), 
U. C. A. 1943, which requires the net income to be com-
puted upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting 
period in accordance with the method of accounting regu-
larly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer. 
The net income from the intercompany transfers to 
A. S. & E. of Utah gold, silver, platinum and palladium 
is earned from Utah business. The net income from 
intercompany transfers of Utah copper and molybdenite 
to the sales subsidiary at a fair price is earned from 
Utah business. The full value of the New York manage-
ment services has been allowed as an expense deduction 
against Utah business and inventory in transit outside 
the State to market may be interstate business but it is 
not out-of-state business requiring apportionment. 
Defendant, in its decision, faced the choice of assess-
ing the tax on the full net income of the Utah Division or, 
on the theory that these separate accounts reflected in 
part net income from some out-of-state business, applying 
the formula to the separate accounts merely as a discre-
tionary adjustment under subdivision (8) and not as a 
matter of statutory right to the taxpayer. The discre-
tionary adjustment to the accounts first made by plain-
tiff based on the cost allocation formula did not assign 
enough (only about 20 per cent) net income outside the 
state according to plaintiff. Application of the formula 
as an adjustment, however, applied literally, assigned 
from 6 to 10 per cent outside. 
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An interesting, and perhaps amusing, sidelight of 
the attack on the original cost allocation assignment by 
defendant is that even if the sales subsidiary's business 
is treated as plaintiff's business and the formula applied 
as plaintiff insists here, the receipts from the sales of 
25 per cent of total production of Utah copper to the 
fabricating subsidiaries in no event should be excluded 
from the sales numerator. Such intercompany sales, 
under the regular practice of the Commission, cannot 
for obvious reasons have the formula applied to them. 
This is Utah business, separately accounted for. If the 
sales numerator here instead of being substantially zero, 
as plaintiff contends, includes the receipts from the 25 
per cent of copper production to the fabricating sub-
sidiaries, it is interesting to note how close the figure 
comes to the assignment of income to Utah under defend-
ant's original cost allocation formula which proved to be 
such anathema to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff in its brief devotes pages 4 to 13, inclusive, 
and more particularly pages 6 to 13, to the "facts" and 
pages 14 to 19 to the "Varying Positions Taken by the 
Commission". The "facts" set forth are not the facts 
in the Findings or in the record. This is apparently be-
cause of plaintiff's desire, contrary to the rules of this 
Court, not to "burden this Court by pointing out the 
many instances where the findings of fact by defendant 
are not supported by the testimony and evidence pre-
sented before it." How better to present the picture 
of the one continuous, indivisible, uninterrupted, inte-
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grated operation than to ignore completely the Findings 
and record which show that the production, sales and 
fabricating functions have been separately broken down 
and incorporated, corporate-wise and accounting-wise. 
The record below made it abundantly clear to defend-
ant that plaintiff has been playing both ends against the 
middle. The sales subsidiary was incorporated and has 
been utilized for valid business purposes as a marketing 
or sales outlet for plaintiff's entire production of copper 
and molybdenite. The value at which this production 
was transferred from plaintiff, as producer, to sales 
subsidiary, as seller, by intercompany contract was fair 
and reasonable. Nothing in the record would permit de-
fendant to move in on this contract and have it set aside 
by this Court as a fraudulent device to siphon out of Utah 
income earned here. Defendant must recognize and ac-
cept i t ; plaintiff also. Use of a sales subsidiary gave 
plaintiff the practical benefits of limited liability and, 
more especially, prevented plaintiff from subjecting its 
tremendous income to the risk of income or franchise 
taxation in New York and in the various states and for-
eign countries where the product is sold every day. By 
giving the sales subsidiary a relatively small but at the 
same time fair and reasonable profit on the sales, it 
was the subsidiary's profit, not plaintiff's, which became 
subject to the risk of an apportionment of income to the 
place of sale. Furthermore, the allocation of a larger 
profit to the subsidiary or having plaintiff do its own 
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selling, would have taken a larger share of income now 
allocated by plaintiff to Utah out of Utah but at the same 
time allocated it to New York. This would be jumping 
from the frying pan into the fire because New York with 
a franchise tax rate of 5% per cent before Federal taxes 
has a much stiffer rate than the modest Utah rate of 3 
per cent after the heavy Federal tax has been deducted. 
The authorities establish the right of a state to rest 
the tax on the income apportioned by the taxpayer to 
business done within the state on the taxpayer's separate 
books of account. Indeed, if such allocation made by 
the taxpayer properly reflects net income and excludes 
the net income of operations in other states, the state 
must accept it. Allocation by separate accounting fairly 
and accurately made precludes the use of the statu-
tory formula. In the absence of a showing of the income 
attributable to the business done within the state by 
separate or segregated accounts, the formula merely rep-
resents a crude, rough approximation which Courts 
have been reluctant to set aside except where it reaches a 
palpably arbitrary and unreasonable result. No taxpayer 
is entitled of right to the statutory meat-chopper where 
his own segregated bookkeeping system meticulously, 
precisely and fairly with a sharp pen-knife carves out of 
the whole of the taxpayer's net income everywhere de-
rived, that portion which reasonably reflects the true ex-
tent of business done within the taxing state. 
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The present case is the most important case ever to 
come before the defendant below. It involves a large sum 
of money it is true, but even more important is the fact 
that it involves the relationship of the State to the State's 
largest business enterprise and a matter of principle of 
general application, that is to say, the tax status of 
production within and sale without the State. Ad-
judication of the question involved here will have large 
and far reaching significance involving as it does pro-
duction in Utah by one company and the sale of the 
product outside the State by other independent mar-
keting instrumentalities. Utah with its natural re-
sources and small population is, and for many years 
will probably remain, a producing rather than a 
consuming state. I ts tax laws, as we will see, have been 
designed around and take cognizance of these economic 
facts. Much of the state's agricultural and livestock pro-
duction is marketed outside the state through brokers, 
commission merchants or other independent marketing 
instrumentalities. Our statute does not contemplate attri-
buting sales outside the state to out-of-state business 
where the selling function has been by contract taken over 
by some third person acting independently and in the 
regular course of his own business. To exclude the out-
of-state sale from Utah business, it is necessary that the 
taxpayer producing the article of sale sell his product out-
side the state out of his own office by his own agents or 
employees and in his own name and behalf and in the 
regular course of his own business. 
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The picture is made even more clear when looked 
at in the reverse. We find, for example, that if the Bing-
ham pit were in New York and if plaintiff and its sales 
subsidiary occupied joint offices not in the Equitable 
Building, New York City, but in the Kearns Building in 
Salt Lake City, our statute would not in the case of plain-
tiff purport to allocate to Utah the gross receipts from 
sales of metal produced out-of-state but marketed here 
nation-wide by the sales subsidiary, a separate corpora-
tion from plaintiff. The sales here by the sales subsidiary 
would not be the plaintiff's sales. Utah would have the 
right, of course, to assess a franchise tax on the sales 
subsidiary but it would be a tax based upon the separate 
net income of the sales subsidiary realized under its con-
tract with its parent. 
In order to prevent any possible misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation of defendant's position on this 
appeal, may we restate the position as follows: 
Defendant first asks that its decision be affirmed. 
It makes this suggestion to the Court on the ground that 
there is not the slightest showing here that defendant has 
reached outside the state to tax $1.00 of net income of 
the Utah Division attributable to business done by this 
Division outside the State. At the same time, it asks 
the Court to consider the facts of record and contained 
in the Findings in the light of the pertinent legal authori-
ties hereafter to be discussed and increase the tax to the 
applicable 3 per cent rate of the full net income shown 
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and reflected on the separate accounts of plaintiff's Utah 
Division, if in the Court's judgment such authorities so 
require. Jurisdiction and claim to make this increase 
of deficiency were appropriately reserved at the hearing 
and defendant asks the Court to exercise this jurisdiction 
and direct the assessment of tax on such basis if the law 
so requires. This Court under the statute in these cir-
cumstances, has the authority and jurisdiction to inquire 
into and determine the lawfulness of defendant's decision 
and to modify such decision to the extent required by 
the law and the facts, whether such modification result 
in an increase or a decrease of the deficiency in tax. 
SUMMABY OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, a New York Corporation, owns and oper-
ates four mining properties in the United States and 
through a wholly owned subsidiary, Braden Copper 
Company, a fifth property in the Republic of Chile. The 
four United States properties are known as the Western 
Mining Divisions and consist of Utah Mines Division, 
Nevada Mines Division, Chino Mines Division (New 
Mexico) and Ray Mines Division (Arizona). In Nevada, 
New Mexico and Chile (through Braden Copper Com-
pany), plaintiff operates its own smelters. Mill concen-
trates produced by plaintiff in Arizona are smelted under 
contract by American Smelting and Refining Company 
at the latter's smelter in Arizona. The mill concentrates 
produced by the Utah Division are smelted under con-
tract by A. S. & R, at its Garfield Utah Smelter. 
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The blister copper produced by the Utah, Nevada, 
Chino and Kay Mines Divisions, during the period here 
involved, was shipped back to A. S. & B.'s Baltimore, 
Maryland refinery or other out-of-state refinery where 
the copper was all smelted up together and refined. From 
this refining process are produced copper, gold, silver, 
platinum and palladium. In the case of the Utah Divi-
sion, during plaintiff's mill operation to produce copper 
mill concentrate for shipment to the A. S. & E. smelter in 
Utah, is also produced a fully marketable molybdenite 
concentrate requiring no further processing prior to sale. 
The foregoing divisions of plaintiff are operated as 
separate departments and separate books of account are 
kept and maintained for each division which segregate 
and properly reflect the business done by and the net in-
come of each division. 
Plaintiff has three wholly owned subsidiary com-
panies, among others, known as Kennecott Sales Corpo-
ration, Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kenne-
cott Wire and Cable Company. 
Kennecott Sales Corporation, the sales subsidiary, 
is engaged in the business of selling all of the copper 
and molybdenite produced by the four United States min-
ing divisions and the copper produced by plaintiff's sub-
sidiary, Braden Copper Company, in Chile. The sales 
subsidiary's offices are in New York City, shared jointly 
with plaintiff, and all sales are made by and in the name 
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of and in the regular course of business of the sales sub-
sidiary. Plaintiff itself makes no sales of copper and 
molybdenite but transfers the same to the sales subsidi-
ary, at the time of sale by the sales subsidiary to the 
customer, at the market price actually realized less cer-
tain expenses and a commission of $1.00 per net ton of 
copper sold and $3.50 per net ton of molybdenite sold. 
The price received by plaintiff from its sales subsidiary 
by such intercompany contract is fair and reasonable and 
the terms of such contract were arrived at upon an arms-
length basis. 
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott 
Wire and Copper Company are wholly owned subsidi-
aries engaged in fabricating refined copper into various 
marketable fabricated forms. 25% of the total production 
of the four United States Mining Divisions and more par-
ticularly 25% of the production of copper of the Utah 
Division are transferred by the sales subsidiary to the 
fabricating subsidiaries at the prevailing market prices 
at time of transfer. 
Separate books of account for each of the fabricating 
subsidiaries and the sales subsidiary are kept and main-
tained which segregate and properly reflect the busi-
ness done by and the net income of each such wholly 
owned subsidiary. 
The sales subsidiary occupied joint offices with its 
parent, plaintiff, in the Equitable Building, 120 Broad-
way, New York City under lease arrangements entered 
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into by plaintiff with the Equitable Office Building 
Corporation, authorizing premises to be used and occu-
pied by plaintiff "as Executive and Sales Offices for it-
self and subsidiaries." For convenience all disburse-
ments and records pertaining to the New York office 
were handled by the "Disbursing Department" of plain-
tiff. The Disbursing Department each month sent a bill 
to the sales subsidiary for the subsidiary's proportionate 
share of the New York Office expense, including rent as 
a separate item. 
The sales and fabricating subsidiaries were operated 
as separate, distinct and independent corporations. Plain-
tiff from time to time received dividends from its sub-
sidiaries and in the case of the sales subsidiary during 
the period here involved received dividends aggregating 
$1,240,000.00. 
Plaintiff maintained a subordinate administrative 
office in the Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, su-
pervising generally the operations of its Western Mining 
Divisions and supervising more particularly operations 
of its Utah Division. The Utah Division had approxi-
mately 5,000 employees. Plaintiff owned and operated 
by virtue of its franchise from the State of Utah large 
and extensive properties, which include mines, mills, 
improvements, equipment and machinery, town sites, 
power plants, dumps, tailing ponds, etc. Real estate 
owned is about 30,000 acres. 
The copper mill concentrates produced by the Utah 
Division were smelted by A. S. & E. on a toll or cost-plus 
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a fixed fee basis. The smelting charge was on the 
basis of cost plus $1.35 per ton of dry product for the 
period up to January 1, 1948, such fee being reduced to 
cost plus $1.00 per ton for the period 1948 to 1952 and 
being reduced further to cost plus 85c per ton beginning 
January 1, 1953. The smelting facilities of A. S. & E. 
in Utah are substantially all dedicated to the smelting 
of plaintiff's concentrates, there being no other substan-
tial production of high grade copper ores or concentrates 
in the area, Payments by plaintiff to A. S, & E. are called 
for convenience "Smelting Charge," "Freight Charge," 
"Lighterage Charge," "Eefining Charge," and certain 
amortization charges covering costs of plant improve-
ments payable monthly. The freight charge represents 
the reimbursements to A. S. & E. of freight paid by 
A. S. & E. on Utah blister shipped from A. S. & E.'s Gar-
field smelter to its Baltimore, or other refinery, includ-
ing insurance. The lighterage charge covers certain 
charges in connection with movements of Utah blister to 
the Baltimore Eef inery by water. On shipping the blister 
to its Baltimore Refinery the bills of lading are stamped 
by A. S. & E. with plaintiff's name and plaintiff is shown 
as both shipper and consignee. 
Upon receipt of the blister at the refinery, the gold, 
silver, platinum and palladium are separated from the 
copper by electrolytic means. A. S. & E. charges plain-
tiff a refining charge equal to cost plus a fee of $1.50 per 
ton of returnable refined copper. 
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By arrangements between plaintiff, its sales sub-
sidiary and A. S. & B., all copper is made available to 
the sales subsidiary for sale to customers by the latter 
in the regular course of its own business and in its own 
name and behalf. (See F. page 71, for form of contract 
of sale.) The platinum and palladium are transferred by 
plaintiff to A. S. & E, for sale by the latter for plaintiff's 
account at the best price obtainable less an agreed com-
mission not exceeding $5.00 per ounce and certain other 
costs and expenses (See F., page 79). Such proceeds 
realized by A. S. & B. of such prices are periodically paid 
by A. S. & E. to plaintiff covering the production of 
platinum and palladium. The gold and silver are trans-
ferred by plaintiff to A. S. & E. for resale by the latter 
to the Mint. The amounts paid for such gold and silver 
are determined under a formula tied into the official Mint 
prices less certain agreed deductions. (See F., page 93.) 
During the month of May, 1950, for example, $908,416.12 
of Utah gold and silver were transferred by plaintiff 
to A. S. & E. for $901,185.25, A. S. & E. thus realizing a 
net gain on the month's transaction of $7,230.84, or 
roughly eight-tenths of one percent. 
Thus, under the arrangements described in the 
record and set forth in the Findings, plaintiff transfers 
all platinum and palladium and gold and silver to A. S. 
& E. for resale by the latter in the regular course of 
the latter's business. Such intercompany transfers from 
plaintiff's Utah Division to A. S. & E. are at fair and 
reasonable prices. Also, all copper and molybdenite pro-
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duced by plaintiff's Utah Division are transferred to the 
sales subsidiary for resale by the latter in its own name 
and behalf and in the regular course of its own business. 
The amounts paid by the sales subsidiary to plaintiff 
for copper and molybdenite produced by the Utah Divi-
sion under the intercompany contracts in force were fair 
and reasonable. 25 per cent of the copper produced by the 
Utah Division was in turn resold by the sales subsidiary 
at fair market prices to the fabricating subsidiaries, 
Chase Brass and Copper Company and Kennecott Wire 
and Cable Company. Neither the sales subsidiary nor the 
fabricating subsidiaries have done nor have they been 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. The sales 
and fabricating subsidiaries file separate Federal income 
tax returns. 
Plaintiff in filing its Utah corporation franchise tax 
return ignored the separate corporate entity of the sales 
subsidiary and the intercompany contractual arrange-
ments in force between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary. 
Although the separate books of account of the Utah 
Division reflected the regular and systematic deduction 
of the full amount of commissions paid to the sales sub-
sidiary, in filing its Utah returns such commissions were 
added back for tax purposes into the net income of the 
Utah Division. In lieu of such commissions actually 
paid, there were deducted instead amounts which were 
estimated to have been the expenses incurred by the 
sales subsidiary in selling the copper and molybdenite 
produced by the Utah Division. This 'adjustment' was at 
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variance with the regular practice followed and main-
tained in keeping the separate books of account of the 
Utah Division. It was apparently done in an effort to 
put plaintiff in a better argumentative position to claim 
that the out-of-state sales of copper and molybdenite were 
negotiated and effected by plaintiff itself instead of by 
the sales subsidiary as was actually the case. 
The Utah tax returns as filed for the years 1942 to 
1948, inclusive, purported to be and were consolidated 
returns of plaintiff's Utah Division and plaintiff's wholly 
owned subsidiary, Bingham and Garfield Eailway Com-
pany. The returns from 1949 to 1950, because of the 
dissolution of the railway company in 1948, purported to 
be and were the separate return of plaintiff's Utah Divi-
sion. None of the returns for the period here involved 
were or purported to be, nor could they be, consolidated 
returns of plaintiff's Utah Division, the separate sales 
subsidiary or the separate fabricating subsidiaries. 
Neither the sales or fabricating subsidiaries have done 
or qualified to do business in Utah. The Utah Division's 
proportionate share of the New York administrative ex-
pense was deducted as expense on the Utah Division's 
separate books of account. Such expense was also de-
ducted on its Utah tax returns and allowed by defendant 
The separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary 
and the intercompany contract between plaintiff and 
sales subsidiary covering the transfer of copper and 
molybdenite, were not recognized or given any force or 
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effect on the Utah tax returns. This was done notwith-
standing the copper and molybdenite products of the 
Utah Division were transferred to the sales subsidiary 
at a fair value (market price less fair and reasonable 
commissions and certain expenses). 
The only out-of-state activity with respect to the 
molybdenite produced and fully marketable in Utah, was 
the out-of-state sale by the sales subsidiary. The only 
out-of-state activity with respect to the blister copper, 
produced entirely in Utah, was the out-of-state sale of 
the refined copper by the sales subsidiary following the 
out-of-state separation by A. S. & K. of the commingled 
gold, silver, platinum and palladium. This out-of-state 
separation by A. S. & R. of the products commingled in 
the blister copper merely constituted out-of-state process-
ing of products in transit to market. The out-of-state 
business of separating the commingled products was the 
business of A. S. & R. done for but not by plaintiff or its 
Utah Division. This out-of-state refining or separation 
expense including freight, was deducted as expense on 
the Utah divisional accounts and was deducted and 
allowed also on the Utah tax returns. 
As in the case of the copper and molybdenite product 
transferred to the sales subsidiary at a fair value for 
resale, the gold, silver, platinum and palladium products 
were transferred to A. S. & R. also at a fair value for 
resale. Thus, the entire product, consisting of copper, 
molybdenite, gold, silver, platinum and palladium pro-
duced by plaintiff's Utah Division, was transferred to 
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the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. at fair value for resale 
by and in the name of and in behalf of and in the regular 
course of business of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. 
The full amount of the gross proceeds as collected by 
plaintiff from the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. was 
credited on the separate accounts as gross income of the 
Utah division. Such gross proceeds less the out-of-state 
freight, refining, administrative and selling expense 
properly reflect the fair market value of the molybdenite 
and blister copper produced in Utah by the Utah Divi-
sion prior to departure from the State destined for out-
of-state markets in inter-state commerce. Such proceeds 
less all of the mining, milling, freight and smelting ex-
penses within the state and the freight, refining, adminis-
trative, and selling expenses outside the state (together 
with other deductions allowed by the statute) constitute 
and reflect the separate taxable net income of the Utah 
Division. Such net income attributable entirely to busi-
ness done within the state reflects the value to plaintiff of 
exercising its corporate franchise in Utah. 
The transfer of 25 per cent of the copper produced 
by the Utah Division from plaintiff to the sales subsidi-
ary at a fair value and from the sales subsidiary to the 
fabricating subsidiaries at a fair value must also be 
classed as arms' length transactions. The separate entity 
and intercompany arrangements between plaintiff and 
sales subsidiary are to be recognized to the same extent 
as plaintiff, on its returns, recognized the separate entity 
and arrangements with the fabricating subsidiaries. The 
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profits allocated by intercompany contracts between pro-
ducer, seller and fabricator reflect the profits and true 
net income of each. 
Each of the Western Divisions, including the Utah 
Division, is a separate department or unit to itself. Each 
is engaged in the integrated business of mining, smelting 
and refining of copper and other products. Each is a 
producing unit. Neither plaintiff nor any of these divi-
sions, however, undertakes to sell the products. The 
operation is a unity up to but not including the sale. The 
sales are handled by A. S. & R. and the sales subsidiary, 
separate and distinct corporations from plaintiff and its 
producing units. Production is in one compartment, sales 
in another compartment and fabrication in still another 
compartment. Each compartment has been separately 
incorporated and represents an independent function. 
The separate accounts for each function reflect the 
proper net income attributable to each function. The 
compartments deal with each other at arms' length and 
on fair and reasonable terms. 
Plaintiff in this proceeding makes no claim that any 
par t of the full net income shown and reflected on its 
Utah Division separate accounts would be or is taxable 
as business done or earned in New York or any other 
state or foreign country. 
QUESTIONS P R E S E N T E D 
On pages 2 to 4 of its brief, plaintiff sets forth five 
questions which it feels are presented to the Court on 
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this appeal. Defendant raises no objection to the form 
of questions 2, 4 and 5. Question 2 is whether the taxes 
imposed are constitutional. Question 4 is whether defend-
ant is required for the year 1942 to use the arbitrary 
allocation factor of 66.926 per cent under the Court's 
mandate in Case No. 7298. Question 5 is whether defend-
ant is empowered to assess statutory interest on any 
deficiencies to be found herein as a result of this appeal. 
Objection is taken, however, to the phrasing of ques-
tion 3 relating to the depletion deduction. Plaintiff states 
the question to be whether the term "net income from 
the property" means the net income derived from the 
sale of the mineral production obtained from the prop-
erty, less all costs and expenses incurred in the produc-
tion and sale of such products. This may have been the 
question in Case No. 7298 but it is not the question now. 
The question now is whether in allocating some net 
income to post-mining operations in the calculation of the 
depletion deduction, as required in the next to the last 
paragraph of this Court's opinion in Case No. 7298, 
defendant allocated too much or too little or just the 
right amount of net income. On the other hand, if we con-
strue the question as a petition for rehearing for the 
year 1942 and as a request to relitigate the issue for sub-
sequent years, the question as phrased is still objection-
able in that it refers to the matter as a sale of "mineral 
production." Except for the molybdenite mineral mill 
concentrate, plaintiff sells none of its crude ore or mill 
concentrates which is the "mineral" production. The 
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thing sold is not the mineral mined but the metals ex-
tracted from the mineral in the post-mining smelting and 
electrolytic refining stages. Mineral is associated with 
mining and metal with the post-mining operations. As 
this Court has already decided, depletion is on the 
mineral, not on the metal. 
Objection is also taken to the phrasing of question 1 
which seeks to limit the question on appeal here to 
whether defendant may attribute to Utah as the amount 
of plaintiff's gross receipts from business assignable to 
Utah the gross receipts from sales of copper, molybde-
nite, platinum and palladium produced by its Utah Cop-
per Division and sold outside of Utah. This question as 
phrased is merely one aspect of the larger question 
involved here of whether defendant's decision on the law 
and the facts has imposed a tax which is too low, too high 
or in the right amount. The case is here for an overall 
appraisal and plaintiff cannot, it is suggested, accept the 
favorable rulings on the property and payroll fractions 
and exclusion of receipts from gold and silver and then 
isolate for attack what defendant did with respect to the 
copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium. The deci-
sion of the Commission must be reviewed as a whole. 
Also involved is whether this court is required under the 
facts and pertinent authorities to modify defendant's 
decision by imposing the tax on the full net income of the 
Utah Division as reflected on the separate accounts of 
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such division. In other words, the lawfulness of the whole 
decision is here, not just the portion plaintiff wishes to 
contest. 
We take up the case from the standpoint, first, of 
the constitutionality of a franchise tax measured by the 
fair value of the molybdenite and blister copper product 
produced in Utah but sold outside the state, second, 
whether any net income of the Utah Division may be 
apportioned outside the state, third, whether if some 
must be apportioned outside the state, defendant's deci-
sion is erroneous, fourth, whether defendant's depletion 
values were arbitrary, fifth, whether for 1942 this Court's 
decision in No. 7298 requires the apportionment of 33.074 
per cent of the net income of the Utah Division outside 
the state and finally, sixth, whether the assessment of 
interest on deficiencies is proper. 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
Eeferences are to Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as 
amended. 
80-13-1 (2) 
"The term 'taxpayer* means any bank or 
corporation as hereinafter defined subject to the 
tax imposed by this chapter." 
80-13-1 (5) 
"The term 'doing business' includes any 
transaction or transactions in the course of its 
business by a bank or corporation created under 
the laws of this state, or by a foreign corporation 
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qualified to do or doing intrastate business in this 
state, and shall include the right to do business 
through such incorporation or qualification." 
80-13-3 
"Every bank or corporation, other than a 
national bank and corporation exempted in Sec-
tion 80-13-5, for the privilege of exercising its 
corporate franchise or for the privilege of doing 
business in the state, shall annually pay to the 
state a tax equal to three per cent of its net income 
for the preceding taxable year computed and allo-
cated to this state in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided, or one-twentieth of one per cent of the fair 
value during the next preceding taxable year of 
its tangible property in this state, which ever is 
greater; but in no case shall the tax be less than 
$ 1 0 ; * * * . " 
80-13-6 (1) 
" 'Gross income' includes gains, profits and 
income derived from services, of whatever kind in 
whatever form paid, or from trades, businesses, 
commerce or sales, or dealings in property, 
whether real or personal, growing out of the 
ownership or use of or interest in such property; 
also from interest, rent, dividends or securities, 
or the transaction of any business carried on for 
gain or profit, or gains or profits and income de-
rived from any source whatever." 
80-13-8 {9) {b) 
"The allowance for depletion shall be thirty-
three and one-third per cent of the net income 
from the property during the taxable year, com-
puted without allowance for depletion, or on the 
basis provided in subsection (9) (a) , as the tax-
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payer may elect. The basis which the taxpayer 
elects under this subsection shall be the basis 
used in subsequent accounting periods and shall 
be changed thereafter only with the consent of 
the tax commission." 
80-13-16 (1) 
"The net income shall be computed upon the 
basis of the taxpayer's annual accounting period 
(fiscal year or calendar year as the case may be) 
in accordance with the method of accounting 
regularly employed in keeping the boohs of such 
taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has 
been so employed, or if the method employed does 
not clearly reflect the income, the computation 
shall be made in accordance with such method as 
in the opinion of the tax commission does clearly 
reflect the income. If the taxpayer's annual ac-
counting period is other than a fiscal year, or if 
the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or 
does not keep books, the net income shall be com-
puted on the basis of the calendar year." 
80-13-18 
"In any case of two or more corporations 
{whether or not organized or doing business in 
this state, and whether or not affiliated) owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by the same inter-
ests, the tax commission is authorized to distrib-
ute, apportion or allocate gross income or deduc-
tions between or among such corporation, if it 
determines that such distribution, apportionment 
or allocation is necessary in order to prevent 
evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income 
of any of such corporations." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
52 
80-13-21 
"The portion of net income assignable to 
business done within this state, and which shall 
be the basis and measure of the tax imposed by 
this chapter, may be determined by an allocation 
upon the basis of the following rules: 
(1) Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from business done outside this state less related 
expenses shall not be allocated to this state. 
(2) Gains from the sale or exchange of 
capital assets consisting of real or tangible per-
sonal property situated outside this state less 
losses from the sale or exchange of such assets 
situated outside this state shall not be allocated 
to this state. 
(3) Rents, interest and dividends derived 
from business done in this state less related ex-
penses shall be allocated to this state. 
(4) Gains from the sale or exchange of 
capital assets consisting of real or tangible per-
sonal property situated within this state less 
losses from the sale or exchange of such assets 
situated in this state shall be allocated to this 
state. 
(5) If the bank or other corporation carries 
on no business outside this state, the whole of the 
remainder of net income may be allocated to this 
state. 
(6) If the bank or other corporation carries 
on any business outside this state, the said re-
mainder may be divided into three equal parts: 
(a) Of one third, such portion shall be at-
tributed to business carried on within this state 
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as shall be found by multiplying said third by a 
fraction whose numerator is the value of the cor-
poration's tangible property situated within this 
state and whose denominator is the value of all 
the corporation's tangible property wherever 
situated. 
(b) Of another third, such portion shall 
be attributed to business carried on within this 
state as shall be found by multiplying said third 
by a fraction whose numerator is the total amount 
expended by the corporation for wages, salaries, 
commissions or other compensation to its em-
ployees and assignable to this state and whose 
denominator is the total expenditures of the cor-
poration for wages, salaries, commissions or other 
compensation to all of its employees. 
(c) Of the remaining third, such portion 
shall be attributed to business carried on within 
this state as shall be found by multiplying said 
third by a fraction whose numerator is the amount 
of the corporation's gross receipts from business 
assignable to this state, and whose denominator 
is the amount of the corporation's gross receipts 
from all its business. 
(d) The amount assignable to this state 
of expenditures of the corporation for wages, 
salaries, commissions or other compensation to its 
employees shall be such expenditures for the tax-
able year as represents the compensation of em-
ployees not chiefly situated at, connected with or 
sent out from, premises for the transaction of 
business owned or rented by the corporation out-
side this state. 
(e) The amount of the corporation's gross 
receipts from business assignable to this state 
shall be the amount of its gross receipts for the 
taxable year from 
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(1st) Sales, except those negotiated or 
effected in behalf of the corporation by agents or 
agencies chiefly situated at, connected with or 
sent out from premises for the transaction of 
business owned or rented by the corporation out-
side this state, and sales otherwise determined by 
the tax commission to be attributable to the busi-
ness conducted on such premises, 
(2nd) Kentals or royalties from property 
situated, or from the use of patents, within this 
state. 
(f) The value of the corporation's tangi-
ble property for the purpose of this section shall 
be the average value of such property during the 
taxable year. 
(7) In the allocation of net income, gain or 
loss shall be recognized and shall be computed on 
the same basis and in the same manner as is pro-
vided in this chapter for the determination of net 
income. 
(8) If in the judgment of the tax commis-
sion the application of the foregoing rules does 
not allocate to this state the proportion of net 
income fairly and equitably attributable to this 
state, it may with such information as it may be 
able to obtain make such allocation as is fairly 
calculated to assign to this state the portion of net 
income reasonably attributable to the business 
done within this state and to avoid subjecting the 
taxpayer to double taxation, 
80-13-23 (1) 
"Every corporation subject to taxation under 
this chapter shall make a return, stating specifi-
cally the items of its gross income and the deduc-
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tions allowed by this chapter. The return shall be 
sworn to by the president, vice president or other 
principal officer and by the treasurer or assistant 
treasurer. * * #" 
80-13-24 
(1) "An affiliated group of banks and/or 
other corporations shall, subject to the provisions 
of this section, have the privilege of making a con-
solidated return for any taxable year in lieu of 
separate returns. The making of a consolidated 
return shall be upon the condition that all the 
corporations which have been members of the 
affiliated group at any time during the taxable 
year for which the return is made consent to all 
the regulations under subsection (2) of this sec-
tion prescribed prior to the making of such re-
turn; and the making of a consolidated return 
shall be considered as such consent. In the case 
of a bank or other corporation which is a member 
of the affiliated group for a fractional part of 
the year, the consolidated return shall include the 
income of such bank and/or other corporation 
for such part of the year as it is a member of 
the affiliated group. 
(2) "The tax commission shall prescribe 
such regulations as it may deem necessary in 
order that the tax liability of an affiliated group 
of banks and/or corporations making a consoli-
dated return and of each corporation in the group, 
both during and after the period of affiliation, 
may be determined, computed, assessed, collected 
and adjusted in such manner as clearly to reflect 
the income and to prevent avoidance of tax lia-
bility. 
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(3) "In any case m which a consolidated 
return is made the tax shall be determined, com-
puted, assessed, collected and adjusted in accord-
ance with the regulations under subsection (2) of 
this section prescribed prior to the date on which 
such return is made." 
80-13-39 
"The tax commission shall have jurisdiction 
to redetermine the correct amount of the defi-
ciency even if the amount so redetermined is 
greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice 
of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to 
determine whether any penalty, additional amount 
or addition to the tax should be assessed; pro-
vided, that at the hearing or prior thereto claim 
therefor is asserted" 
80-13-46 
"Every decision of the tax commission shall 
be in writing, and notice thereof shall be mailed 
to the taxpayer within ten days, and all such 
decisions shall become final upon the expiration 
of thirty days after notice of such decision shall 
have been mailed to the taxpayer, unless proceed-
mgs are thereafter taken for review by the su-
preme court upon writ of certiorari as herein-
after provided, in which case it shall become final, 
(1) when affirmed or modified by the judgment 
of the supreme court; (2) if the supreme court 
remands the case to the tax commission for re-
hearing, when it is thereafter determined as here-
inabove provided with respect to the initial pro-
ceedings" 
80-13-47 
"Within thirty days after notice of any deci-
sion of the tax commission, any party affected 
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thereby may apply to the supreme court for a 
writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of 
having the lawfulness of such decision inquired 
into and determined. Such writ shall be made 
returnable not later than thirty days after the 
date of the issuance thereof, and shall direct the 
tax commission to certify its record, which shall 
include all the proceedings and the evidence taken 
in the case, to the court. Upon the hearing no 
new or additional evidence may be introduced, but 
the cause shall be heard on the record before the 
tax commission as certified to by it. The decision 
of the tax commission may be reviewed both upon 
the law and the facts, and the provisions of the 
code of civil procedure relating to proceedings 
in the supreme court shall, so far as applicable 
and not in conflict with this chapter, apply to the 
proceedings in the supreme court under the pro-
visions of this section" 
80-13-48 
"No court of this state, except the supreme 
court, shall have jurisdiction to review, reverse 
or annul any decision of the tax commission, or to 
suspend or delay the operation or execution there-
of." 
80-13-58 
"Upon making a record of its reasons there-
for, the tax commission shall have the power, in 
its discretion, to waive or reduce any of the penal-
ties or interest provided in this chapter or to 
compromise the same." 
80-13-63 
"Any person who attempts or purports to 
exercise any of the rights, privileges or powers of 
any such domestic corporation, or who transacts 
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or attempts to transact any intrastate business in 
this state in behalf of any such foreign corpora-
tion, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be 
punished by a fine of not less than $250 and not 
exceeding $1,000, or by imprisonment in the 
county jail not less than fifty days or more than 
five hundred days, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment. Jurisdiction of such offense shall be 
held to be in any county in which any part of such 
attempted exercise of such powers, or any par t 
of such transaction of business, occurred. Every 
contract made in violation of this section is" unen-
forceable by such corporation or person." 
Regulation No. 4 
Article 2 (b) 
"The term 'affiliated group' includes the com-
mon parent corporation and every other corpora-
tion for the period during which such corporation 
is a member of the affiliated group within the 
meaning of section 80-13-24 (4) of the Act; but it 
does not include any corporation which is not 
subject to tax under the Act, nor does it include 
a corporation commencing to do business in this 
state for the period which is the basis of comput-
ing its first and second years ' taxes under section 
80-13-22." 
Article 10 (a) 
"The privilege of making a consolidated re-
turn for any taxable year of the affiliated group 
must be exercised at the time of filing the return 
of the parent corporation. Under no circum-
stances can such privilege be exercised at any time 
thereafter, If the privilege is exercised, separate 
returns cannot thereafter be filed for such year 
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(see, however, Article 16 (b), relating to the im-
proper inclusion in the consolidated return of the 
income of a corporation)." 
Article 12 (Jo) 
"Each of the subsidiary corporations must 
prepare two duplicate originals of Form 22, con-
senting to these regulations and authorizing the 
filing of a consolidated return on its behalf for 
the taxable year and authorizing the filing of a 
consolidated return on its behalf (as long as it 
remains a member of the group) for each year 
thereafter for which, under Article 11, the filing 
of a consolidated return is required. One of such 
forms shall be attached to the consolidated return 
as a part thereof and the other shall be filed, at 
or before the time the consolidated return is filed. 
No such consent can be withdrawn or revoked at 
any time after the consolidated return is filed." 
Article 16 (b) 
"If a consolidated return includes a corpora-
tion not a member of the affiliated group as de-
fined herein during the consolidated return per-
iod, the tax liability of such corporation will be 
determined upon the basis of a separate return. 
If a corporation commencing to do business in 
this state has been included in a consolidated 
return, its liability will be separately computed 
in accordance with sections 80-13-22 of the Act. 
(See Article 2 (b) ). The consolidated return shall 
be considered as including only the corporations 
which were members of the affiliated group dur-
ing such period, and the income and deductions 
of the corporation whose liability is separately 
computed shall be entirely excluded in arriving at 
the consolidated net income of the affiliated group 
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for the consolidated return period (See Article 
31 (a) ). Transactions with the excluded sub-
sidiary for the consolidated return period shall 
not be considered as 'intercompany transactions' 
within the meaning of the regulation." 
AEGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
A STATE MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPOSE A FRAN-
CHISE OR OCCUPATION TAX ON THE PRIVILEGE OF DO-
ING A LOCAL BUSINESS MEASURED BY THE GROSS OR 
NET VALUE OF THE GOODS PRODUCED WITHIN THE 
STATE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT ALL OR SUBSTAN-
TIALLY ALL OF SUCH GOODS ARE SHIPPED AND SOLD 
OUT OF THE STATE IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE. 
The question whether a state in the imposition of a 
tax has imposed a burden on interstate commerce and 
denied the taxpayer equal protection and due process 
of law, in contravention of the Federal constitution, has 
come before the Courts in a great variety of situations. 
The cases involve many different types and kinds of 
taxes such as ad valorem general property taxes, sales 
taxes, use taxes, gross receipts taxes, capital stock taxes, 
corporate net income taxes, excise, franchise, privilege 
or occupation taxes, etc. The cases also involve many 
different types and kinds of businesses such as merchan-
dising concerns, banks, finance companies, manufacturing 
establishments, pipe lines, air lines, railroads, ferries, 
mining companies, telegraph and telephone companies, 
etc., etc. We also see the cases involving situations in 
which the company may be engaged exclusively in inter-
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state commerce or, on the other hand, doing some local 
business in addition to its interstate business. In these 
circumstances, to prevent the discussion from wandering 
into fields not pertinent to the issue here, we refer the 
Court to those cases involving primarily the question of 
production within and sale outside the state, involving 
also an occupation tax or a franchise tax measure by 
value of or the net income from the products produced 
within the state and the extent to which an apportionment 
of the value or net income within and without the state 
is necessary to meet the requirements of both the com-
merce and due process clauses of the constitution. 
Plaintiff makes no suggestion that Utah's corpora-
tion franchise tax law is unconstitutional as it stands 
in the books. The claim is merely that the statute as ap-
plied to plaintiff is unconstitutional. The deficiencies 
in tax are first claimed to be invalid by reason of defend-
ant's erroneous construction of the statute and that the 
statute as so construed is unconstitutional. Secondly, it 
is claimed in the petition that plaintiff's mining and 
natural resources business in Utah is exclusively an 
interstate business and that any tax, including the tax 
already paid, is invalid. A refund of $3,205,443.06, to-
gether with interest as provided by law, is requested 
as an overpayment. 
The definition of "doing business" in the Utah stat-
ute refers to the qualification to do or the doing of intran-
state business by a foreign corporation. (Sec. 80-13-1(5) 
U.C.A. 1943). The penalties of suspension or forfeiture 
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of corporate rights prescribed in Sec. 80-13-62 refer to the 
forfeiture of rights to do intrastate business. The mis-
demeanor prescribed in Sec. 80-13-63 refers to the trans-
action of or the attempt to transact intrastate business 
in this state. 
Sec. 80-13-3 prescribes that every corporation "for 
the privilege of exercising its corporate franchise or for 
the privilege of doing business in the state, shall annual-
ly pay to the state a tax equal to three per cent of its net 
income for the preceding taxable year computed and al-
located to this state in the manner hereinafter provided, 
or one-twentieth of one per cent of the fair value during 
the next preceding taxable year of its tangible property 
in this state, whichever is greater; but in no case shall 
the tax be less than $ 1 0 ; . . . " 
The tax has been construed by this Court to be not 
a property tax, nor an organization tax, nor an income 
tax, but a tax on the privilege of exercising the corpo-
rate privilege. 
"The net income of the taxpaying corpo-
ration to be allocated to Utah is merely the mea-
sure of the amount of the tax. The tax is imposed 
on the privilege of exercising the corporate fran-
chise or on the privilege of doing business in 
Utah." American Investment Corp. v. Commis-
sion, 101 Utah 189 (1941). 
"The more net income realized from doing 
business in Utah, the more valuable the privilege 
and the higher the tax." J. M. & M. S. Browning 
Co. v. Commission, 107 Utah 457 (1945). 
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"Though not an income tax, the amount of 
the franchise tax a corporation must pay in Utah 
is based on the income yielded from exercising 
the privilege of doing business or exercising the 
corporation franchise in Utah." Emerald Oil Co. 
v. Commission, 267 P. 2d 772 (1954). 
The minimum tax of $10 is thus payable where the 
net income is less than $333 and the fair value of tangible 
property in the State is less than $20,000. The statute 
by its terms and as construed and administered by de-
fendant does not purport to impose a tax on the privilege 
of conducting an exclusive interstate commerce business. 
Plaintiff, a New York corporation, is qualified in 
Utah to do an intrastate business. Whether this privilege 
alone, even if not exercised, would support a tax meas-
ured by some portion of its receipts exclusively derived 
from interstate commerce but fairly allocated to the 
business done within the State is not involved here. Plain-
tiff's returns show the difficulty of owning and operating 
properties of the size and magnitude owned and operated 
in Utah without engaging in some local business even 
were we to assume that its mining and metal activities 
are exclusively interstate commerce. Each of plaintiff's 
returns assign some net income or loss specifically to 
business done within Utah before attempting to allocate 
the bulk of the Utah Division's net income within and 
without the State under its interpretation of the formula. 
(See T.C. Ex. MMM(2), and Line 2, Schedule F., 
page 193.) However, it is unnecessary to rest the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
64 
validity of a franchise tax on plaintiff on the fact that 
it has the privilege and in fact does some local intrastate 
business consisting of holding and managing mining 
properties and collecting royalties therefrom or selling 
locally various miscellaneous items of property or that 
the Bingham and Garfield Eailway Company under the 
consolidated returns may have been engaged in some 
local intrastate commerce. 
The validity of a franchise tax on plaintiff in this 
proceeding rests squarely and solidly on the simple prop-
osition that mining or manufacturing within the state 
is not interstate commerce. It is local commerce. Inter-
state commerce commences only when, after the manu-
facture or production of the molybdenite and blister-
copper in Utah, the products are loaded on cars for ship-
ment and sale out-of-state. Local manufacture is intra-
state commerce. A state may tax the privilege of engag-
ing in local manufacture even though the entire product 
is subsequently sold out-of-state in interstate commerce. 
Furthermore, a state may impose a tax on the privilege 
of local manufacture measured by the full value of the 
product within the state and even though such value is 
measured by the actual cash receipts from sales outside 
the state. We take up at this point the development of 
this doctrine by the Federal Supreme Court, 
American Manufacturing Company v. St. Louis, 250 
U.S. 459 (1919), upheld, as applied to a foreign West 
Virginia corporation, an ordinance of the City of St. 
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Louis imposing a license tax on the privilege of conduct-
ing a manufacturing business in the city measured by the 
amount of sales of the manufactured goods, whether sold 
within or without the state and whether in domestic or 
interstate commerce. The tax was in addition to the ad 
valorem property tax and was at the rate of $1.00 on each 
$1,000 of sales made. Suit was brought by the taxpayer 
against the city to recover so much of the tax as was 
measured by sales of goods manufactured by the tax-
payer in the city afterwards removed to storage ware-
houses outside of the state and later sold from these 
warehouses to purchasers in states other than Missouri. 
The opinion quotes from the opinion of the State Su-
preme Court as follows: 
"We hold that the tax in question is a tax 
upon the privilege of pursuing the business of 
manufacturing these goods in the City of St, 
Louis; that when the goods were manufactured 
the obligation accrued to pay the amount of the 
tax represented by their production and it should 
be liquidated by their sale by the manufacturer; 
that their removal from the City of St. Louis and 
storage elsewhere, whether within or without the 
state, worked no change in this obligation; that 
their sale by the respondent wherever they may 
have been stored at the time, whether it was done 
through its home office in New York or the office 
of its factory in St. Louis, should have been re-
ported in its return to the license collector of the 
City of St. Louis and the amount included in fix-
ing the amount payable on account of its license 
tax." 
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The opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Pitney then 
states: 
"The admitted facts show that the operation 
and effect of the taxing scheme now under con-
sideration are correctly described in what we 
have quoted from the opinion of the state court. 
No tax has been or is to be imposed upon any sales 
of goods by plaintiff in error except goods manu-
factured by it in St. Louis under a license condi-
tioned for the payment of a tax upon the amount 
of the sales when the goods should come to be sold. 
The tax is computed according to the amount of 
the sales of such manufactured goods, irrespec-
tive of whether they be sold within or without 
the State, in one kind of commerce or another; 
and payment of the tax is not made a condition of 
selling goods in interstate or in other commerce, 
but only of continuing the manufacture of goods 
in the City of St. Louis. 
"There is no doubt of the power of the State, 
or of the city acting under its authority to impose 
a license tax in the nature of an excise upon the 
conduct of manufacturing business in the city. 
Unless some particular interference with federal 
right be shown, the States are free to lay privilege 
and occupation taxes. (Citing cases.) 
"The city might have measured such tax by a 
percentage upon the value of all goods manufac-
tured, whether they ever should come to be sold 
or not, and have required payment as soon as, 
or even before, the goods left the factory. In 
order to mitigate the burden, and also, perhaps 
to bring merchants and manufacturers upon an 
equal footing in this regard, it has postponed as-
certainment and payment of the tax until the 
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manufacturer can bring the goods into market. 
A somewhat similar method of postponing pay-
ment has been pursued for many years by the 
Federal Government with respect to the internal 
revenue tax upon distilled spirts. (Citing cases.) 
"To the suggestion that the tax burdens the 
mercantile rather than the manufacturing busi-
ness, because it would be possible for one to manu-
facture goods to an unlimited extent and pay no 
tax unless they were sold, or to sell goods and be 
required to pay the tax although they were not 
manufactured by the seller, it is sufficient to say 
—answering the second point first—(a) that, ac-
cording to the state law as laid down by the court 
of last resort in this case, a manufacturer has no 
right to sell goods except those of his own manu-
facture; and (b) it is not to be supposed that, for 
the purpose of evading a tax payable only upon 
the sale of his goods, a manufacturer would pur-
sue the ruinous policy of making goods and look-
ing them up permanently in warehouses. In the 
outcome the tax is the same in amount as if it 
were measured by the sale value of the goods 
but imposed upon the completion of their manu-
facture. The difference is that, for reasons of 
practical benefit to the taxpayer, the city has post-
poned payment until convenient means have been 
furnished through the marketing of goods. 
"In our opinion, the operation and effect of 
the taxing ordinance are to impose a legitimate 
burden upon the business of carrying on the manu-
facture of goods in the city; it produces no direct 
burden on commerce in the goods manufactured, 
whether domestic or interstate, and only the same 
kind of incidental and indirect effect as that which 
results from the payment of property taxes or 
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any other and general contribution to the cost of 
government. Therefore, it does not amount to a 
regulation of interstate commerce. And, for like 
reasons, it has not the effect of imposing a tax 
upon the property or the business and hence does 
not deprive plaintiff in error of its property with-
out due process of law." 
In the Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Company case, 
260 U.S. 245 (1922), the Supreme Court in an opinion 
by Mr. Justice McKenna upheld a tax imposed by Penn-
sylvania on each ton of anthracite coal mined "washed 
or screened, or otherwise prepared for market," in Penn-
sylvania equal to "one and one-half per cent of the value 
thereof when prepared for market." The statute also 
provided that the tax should be assessed at the time when 
the coal had been subjected to the indicated preparation 
"and is ready for shipment or market." 
The opinion refers to the assertion that the bulk of 
the anthracite production, or 80 per cent, was shipped 
into other states. The Governor of the state was quoted 
as having urged the tax because in effect the tax would 
be borne by consumers in other states. The Attorneys 
Generals of nine consuming states appeared before the 
court in an attempt to have the tax declared illegal and 
an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. In sustain-
ing the tax the Court stated as follows: 
"If the possibility, or indeed, certainty, of 
exportation of a product or article from a state, 
determines it to be in interstate commerce before 
the commencement of its movement from the state, 
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it would seem to follow that it is in such commerce 
from the instant of its growth or production; and 
in the case of coals, as they lie in the ground. The 
result would be curious. I t would nationalize all 
industries; it would nationalize and withdraw 
from state jurisdiction and deliver to Federal 
commercial control the fruits of California and 
the South, the wheat of the West and its meats, 
the cotton of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts 
and the woolen industries of other states at the 
very inception of their production or growth; that 
is, the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat un-
gathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet 'on the 
hoof/ wool yet unshorn, and coal yet unmined, 
because they are, in varying percentages, destined 
for and surely to be exported to states other than 
those of their production." 
The decision of the Court was placed mainly on the 
old decision in Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, which had held 
that timber cut in the forests but intended for exportation 
in interstate commerce and partially prepared for that 
purpose was nevertheless subject to tax like other prop-
erty within the state. 
In Oliver Iron Mining Company v. Lord, 262 U.S. 
172 (1923), the Supreme Court sustained, in the face of 
strong constitutional attack, the validity of a tax imposed 
by Minnesota on all who are "engaged in the business 
of mining or producing iron ore or other ores" within 
the state. The statute provided that the "occupation tax" 
so imposed should be equal to 6% of the value of the ore 
mined or produced during the preceding year, such tax 
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to be in addition to all other taxes. The statute likewise 
directed that the tax be computed on the value of the ore 
at the place where it is "brought to the surface of the 
earth" less certain deductions. The opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice VanDevanter states: 
"The chief contention is that mining, as con-
ducted by the plaintiffs, if not actually a part of 
interstate commerce, is so closely connected there-
with that to tax it is to burden or interfere with 
such commerce, which a state cannot do consistent-
ly with the commerce clause of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
"The facts on which the contention rests are 
as follows: The demand or market within the 
state for iron ore covers only a negligible percent-
age of what is mined by the plaintiffs. Practically 
all of their output is mined to fill existing con-
tracts with consumers outside the state and passes 
at once into the channels of interstate commerce. 
Three fourths of it is from open-pit mines and 
one fourth from underground mines. At the open-
pit mines empty cars are run from adjacent rail-
road yards into the mines and there loaded. Steam 
shovels sever the ore from its natural bed and lift 
it directly into the cars. When loaded the cars 
are promptly returned to the railroad yards, 
where they are put into trains which start the 
ore on its interstate journey. The several steps 
follow in such succession that there is practical 
continuity of movement from the time the ore is 
severed from its natural bed. The operations 
within the mine and the movement of the cars into 
and out of the mine are conducted by the plain-
tiffs. The subsequent transportation is by public 
carriers. At the underground mines the plaintiffs 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
71 
dig the ore, bring it to the surface through shafts, 
and put it in elevated pockets where it readily can 
be loaded into cars. The subsequent movements 
are much the same as at the open-pit mines, but 
their continuity is not so pronounced. Some of the 
ore from both kinds of mines—between 10 and 
20 per cent—is concentrated by washing or bene-
ficiated after coming out of the mine and before 
starting out of the state; but our conclusion re-
specting the usual operations renders this deflec-
tion immaterial. Plainly the facts do not support 
the contention. Mining is not interstate commerce, 
but, like manufacturing is a local business, sub-
ject to local regulations and taxation." 
In Lacoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 
545 (1924), the Court sustained a severance tax levied 
by Louisiana of 2c "on the dollar on and of the value of 
all skins or hides taken from any wild furbearing animals 
or alligators within this state, which severance tax shall 
be paid by the dealer." The Louisiana statute declared all 
wild furbearing animals and alligators in the state and 
their skins to be the property of the state until such tax 
shall have been paid. A dealer was defined to be one 
who buys such skins and hides from either a trapper or 
a buyer and ships them from the state or sells them for 
manufacture into a finished product in the state or one 
who ships or carries them out of the state. The opinion 
by Mr. Justice Butler states as follows : 
"In their argument here, plaintiffs in error 
stated that skins and hides are not manufactured 
into finished products in Louisiana, and that all 
are shipped out of the state. But that is no ob-
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jection to the tax. The state's power to tax prop-
erty is not destroyed by the fact that it is intended 
for and will move in interstate commerce. Such 
skins and hides may be taxed while in the hands 
of dealers before they move in interstate com-
merce. Failure to levy and enforce the tax before 
the skins and hides reach the dealers does not 
make the necessary operation and effect of the 
law an interference with interstate commerce. The 
imposition of the tax on the skins and hides while 
in the hands of the dealers is calculated to make 
certain that all will be found for taxation. No 
interference with interstate commerce results 
from the enforcement of the act. It is not repug-
nant to the commerce clause of the Constitution." 
In Hope Natural Gas Company v. Hall, the Court af-
firmed a decree by the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
West Virginia, sustaining a tax imposed by West Vir-
ginia upon the natural gas produced by the plaintiff based 
upon the value thereof within the state and before it 
enters interstate commerce. The opinion states that the 
chief objection was rested upon the direction of the stat-
ute that "the measure of this tax is the value of the entire 
production in this state, regardless of the place of sale 
or the fact that deliveries may be made to points outside 
the state." The trial court had held that the tax would 
substantially burden and interfere with interstate com-
merce and ordered an appropriate injunction. The Su-
preme Court of the state, however, upheld the tax, stating 
that a state may take into consideration the gross pro-
ceeds of a commodity produced in the state and sold in 
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another state for the purpose of determining the value 
of such commodity within the state and before it enters 
interstate commerce. The opinion of Mr. Justice Mc-
Keynolds states: 
"The chief business of plaintiff in error is 
production and purchase of natural gas in West 
Virginia and the continuous and uninterrupted 
transportation of this through pipe lines into 
Pennsylvania and Ohio, where it is sold, delivered 
and consumed. The corporation owns 3,178 pro-
ducing wells located in twTenty-five counties of 
West Virginia, from which it took in the year end-
ing June 30, 1925, more than 23 billion cubic feet 
of gas. And during the same period it purchased 
from other producers more than 25 billion cubic 
feet. Most of this passed into interstate commerce 
by continuous movement from the wells. 
"Here it has been argued that the challenged 
act burdens interstate commerce and therefore 
conflicts with Par . 8, article 1, of the Federal 
Constitution. Also, that to enforce the act would 
deprive plaintiff in error of property without due 
process of law and deny equal protection of the 
laws. 
"Counsel admit that without violating the 
commerce clause the state may lay a privilege or 
occupation tax upon producers of natural gas 
reckoned according to the value of that commodity 
at the well. American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 
U.S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522; 
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 67 
L. ed. 237, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; Oliver Iron Min-
ing Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 
Sup. Ct. Rep. 526. But they insist that, accepting 
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the statute under consideration as construed by 
the highest court of the state, plaintiff in error 
will be subjected to an unlawful direct tax upon 
gross receipts derived from interstate commerce. 
This argument rests chiefly upon certain language 
excerpted from the opinion below. But we review 
the final decree and must accept the statute as 
authoritatively construed and applied. The plain 
result of the opinion and final decree is to require 
that the tax be computed upon the value of the 
gas at the well, and not otherwise. If, hereafter, 
executive officers disregard the approved con-
struction and fix values upon any improper basis 
appropriate relief may be obtained through the 
courts." 
In Utah Power & Light Company v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 
165 (1932), the Court sustained a license tax of one-half 
mill per kilowatt hour measured at the place of produc-
tion levied by the State of Idaho against any person en-
gaged in the generation, manufacture or production of 
electricity and electrical energy for barter, sale or ex-
change, notwithstanding that instantaneously with the 
generation of the electricity in Idaho, the power was con-
veyed by transmission lines across the boundary into 
Utah and sold to various consumers. 
The issue involved was stated to be aupon the facts 
of the present case, is the generation of electrical energy 
like manufacture or production generally, a process 
essentially local in character and complete in itself; 
or is it so linked with the transmission as to make it an 
inseparable par t of the transaction in interstate com-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
75 
merce!" The court stated that, while conversion and 
transmission are substantially instantaneous, they were 
essentially separable and distinct operations. I t was said 
"The fact that to ordinary observation there is no appre-
ciable lapse of time between the generation of the prod-
uct and its transmission does not forbid the conclusion 
that they are nevertheless successive and not simul-
taneous acts." 
The opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland also stated: 
"The point is stressed that in appellant's sys-
tem electricity is not stored in advance but pro-
duced as called for. The consumer in Utah, it is 
said, by merely turning a switch, draws directly 
from the water-fall in Idaho, through the generat-
ing devices, electrical energy which appears in-
stantaneously at the place of consumption. But 
this is not precisely what happens. The effect 
of turning the switch in Utah is not to draw elec-
trical energy directly from the water-fall, where 
it does not exist except as a potentiality, but to 
set in operation the generating appliances in 
Idaho, which thereupon receive power from the 
falling water and transform it into electrical en-
ergy. In response to what in effect is an order, 
there is production as well as transmission of a 
definite supply of an article of trade." 
In Federal Compress and Warehouse Company v. 
McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934), the court upheld a Missi-
ssippi excise tax against commerce clause objections. 
The statute imposed an annual license tax for the privi-
lege of operating a cotton compress graduated according 
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to the number of bales of cotton compressed each year. 
The statute also levied a similar additional tax upon each 
person operating a warehouse whether in conjunction 
with a compress or not, graduated according to the stor-
age capacity of the warehouse. In this case it appeared 
that cotton purchased locally after it was ginned was 
transported to appellant's warehouse for storage and 
compression. Upon delivery appellant issued its nego-
tiable warehouse receipts for the cotton. All but a negli-
gible par t of the cotton so stored was ultimately shipped 
to points outside the state. The opinion by Mr. Justice 
Stone states: 
"A non-discriminatory tax upon the business 
of storing and compressing the cotton, which is not 
itself the subject of a movement in interstate com-
merce, is not forbidden. Most articles, before 
their shipment in interstate commerce, have had 
work done upon them which adapts them to the 
needs of commerce and prepares them for safe 
and convenient transportation, but that fact has 
never been thought to immunize from local taxa-
tion either the articles themselves or those who 
have manufactured or otherwise prepared them 
for interstate transportation. American Mfg. Co. 
v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459, 63 L. ed. 1084, 39 S. Ct. 
522; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 
U.S. 129, 66 L. ed. 42 S. Ct. 42; Oliver Iron Min. 
Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 67 L. ed. 929, 43 S. Ct. 
526; Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284, 
71 L. ed. 1049, 47 S. Ct. 639; Utah Power & Light 
Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165, 76 L. ed. 1038, 52 S. Ct. 
548. Here the privilege taxed is exercised before 
interstate commerce begins, hence the burden of 
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the tax upon the commerce is too indirect and re-
mote to transgress constitutional limitations. See 
Nashville, C. & St. L. K. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 
249, 77 L. ed. 730, 53 S. Ct, 345, 87 A.L.E. 1191. 
The case, therefore, stands on a footing different 
from those in which local regulations of the busi-
ness of purchasing a commodity within and ship-
ping it without the state have been deemed to im-
pede or embarrass interstate commerce in those 
commodities." 
In Cover dale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Com-
pany, 303 U.S. 604 (1938), the Court sustained the valid-
ity of a Louisiana statute imposing a privilege tax on the 
production of mechanical power as applied to an engine 
used to supply mechanical powrer to a compressor there-
by increasing the pressure of natural gas for transporta-
tion to purchasers in other states. The statute provided 
that every person engaged within the state in any busi-
ness which uses in the conduct of that business electrical 
or mechanical power of more than ten horse-power and 
does not procure all the power from a taxpayer subject 
to sections 1 or 2 of the act "shall be subject to the pay-
ment of an excise, license or privilege tax of One Dollar 
($1.00) per annum for each horse-power of capacity of 
the machinery or apparatus known as the 'prime mover' 
or 'prime movers' operated by such person for the pur-
pose of producing power for use in the conduct of such 
business or occupation." 
The taxpayer was engaged within Louisiana, Arkan-
sas and Texas in the business of producing and buying, 
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transporting and selling natural gas. The gas was ob-
tained from the Monroe and Richland Fields in Louisiana 
and transported through the taxpayer's twenty inch pipe-
line which extended from Sterling, Louisiana to Blanch-
ard, Louisiana where one branch went West into Texas 
and the other North into Texas and Arkansas up to Little 
Rock. 96.6% of the gas through this line during the year 
ended July 31, 1933, was delivered outside the State of 
Louisiana. Transmission of this gas through the pipe-
line required application of pressure. This pressure was 
supplied by 10 pumps or natural gas compressors directly 
connected to 10 4-cylinder 1,000 horse-power Cooper 
Bessemer internal combustion gas burning engines. There 
were also involved two 250 horse-power gas burning en-
gines for general power service at the station. In up-
holding the tax, the Court's opinion by Mr. Justice Reed 
states: 
"The language of the state statute makes it 
quite certain that this privilege tax falls alike on 
those engaged in interstate or in intrastate com-
merce, or in both. While a privilege tax by a state 
for engaging in interstate business has frequently 
met the condemnation of this Court as a regula-
tion of commerce, privilege taxes for 'carrying on 
a local business,' even though measured by inter-
state business, have been sustained. (Citing cases) 
The present case falls well within the line of state 
tax authority. 
"Taxation by the states of the business of in-
terstate commerce is forbidden only because it is 
deemed an interference with that commerce, the 
uniform regulation of which is necessarily reserv-
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ed to the Congress. (Citing cases) As this source 
of revenue, even if treated in a non-discriminatory 
manner, is withdrawn from local reach by in-
ference from the delegated grant, the exempting 
of those engaged in interstate commerce from the 
taxation others bear should not be extended be-
yond the necessity of keeping that commerce free 
from interference. Consequently, property taxes 
on the instrumentalities or net income taxes on the 
proceeds of interstate commerce are upheld. (Cit-
ing cases). 
"Privileges closely connected with the com-
merce may be regarded as distinct for purposes 
of taxation. So, local privilege taxes on storage 
in transit, compressing or dealing in cotton, al-
ready moving in its interstate journey from plan-
tation to mill, are validated as imposed upon op-
erations in connection with a commodity with-
drawn from the transportation movement. (Citing 
cases) And similar taxes are upheld for the privi-
lege of mining ores or producing gas, notwith-
standing the 'practical continuity' of the taxes pro-
ductive operation and the interstate movement." 
The opinion states further: 
"Other factors also show that the tax here 
does not interfere with interstate commerce. The 
tax is without discrimination in form or applica-
tion as between inter and intrastate commerce and 
it cannot be imposed by more than one state. The 
course of interstate commerce is clogged by taxes 
designed or applied so as to hamper its free flow. 
Section three, however, bearing equally on all use, 
is only complementary to the taxes of sections one 
and two. (Citing cases) It bears generally on all 
use of power and is not discriminatory. It obvi-
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ously adds to the cost of the interstate commerce. 
But increased cost alone is not sufficient to invali-
date the tax as an interference with that com-
merce." 
Although Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), 
invalidated the Indiana gross income tax under the com-
merce clause as applied to the receipt by a person domi-
ciled in the state of the proceeds of a sale of securities 
sent out of the state to be sold, the Court's opinion with 
respect to the issue involved in the present proceeding 
stated as follows: 
"This case . . . involves a tax imposed by the 
state on the seller on the proceeds of interstate 
sales. To extract a fair tithe from interstate com-
merce for the local protection afforded to it, a 
seller state need not impose the kind of tax which 
Indiana here levied. As a practical matter, it can 
make such commerce pay its way, as the phrase 
runs, apart from taxing the very sale. Thus it can 
tax local manufacture even if the products are 
destined for other states. For some purposes 
manufacture and the shipment of products beyond 
a state may be looked upon as an integral transac-
tion. But when accommodations must be made be-
tween state and national interests, manufacture 
within a state though destined for shipment out-
side is not a seamless web so as to prevent a state 
from giving the manufacturing part detached rele-
vance for purposes of local taxation. (Citing 
American Mfg. Company and Utah Power & 
Light Company cases)." 
In International Harvester v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 
(1947), the Court upheld the validity of the Ohio fran-
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chise tax upon a foreign corporation doing business in 
the state as applied to goods produced within Ohio but 
shipped and sold to customers outside the state. The 
Ohio statute provided that each foreign corporation au-
thorized to do business in the state must pay a tax or fee 
for the "privilege of doing business" or "owning or using 
a part or all of its capital or property" or "holding a cer-
tificate authorizing it to do business in the state." The 
taxpayer corporation held a certificate to do business in 
Ohio during the years involved and owned and operated 
two large factories at Springfield, Ohio which "produced 
millions of dollars worth of goods." It also operated 
four branch selling establishments associated with four 
warehouses and fourteen retail stores all located at vari-
ous places in Ohio which stored and sold goods produced 
at the Ohio factory. It also appeared that the taxpayer 
owned and operated sixteen factories, nearly 100 selling 
agencies and numerous retail stores in other states. Goods 
produced at these Ohio factories were not only sold in 
Ohio, but in addition were shipped for storage out of 
Ohio warehouses to be sold by out of Ohio selling agencies 
to out of Ohio customers. Some were shipped directly to 
out of Ohio customers on orders from out of Ohio selling 
agencies. Conversely, goods manufactured by the tax-
payer out of Ohio would be shipped to its Ohio ware-
houses and sold by its Ohio selling agencies to Ohio custo-
mers. The taxpayer contended that a tax assessed by 
Ohio had been determined in such a manner that a part 
of it was for sales made outside Ohio and another part 
for interstate sales. These consequences were alleged 
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to result from the formula used by Ohio in determining 
the amount in value of Ohio manufacturing and sales 
as distinguished from interstate and out-of-state sales. 
The Ohio statute prescribed a formula to be used in 
determining what par t of the taxpayer's total capital 
stock represents business and property conducted and 
located in Ohio. To determine this the total value of the 
issued capital stock is divided in half. One-half is then 
multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the 
value of all the taxpayer's Ohio property and the de-
nominator of which is the total value of all its property 
wherever owned. The other one-half is multiplied by an-
other fraction whose numerator is the total value of the 
"business done" in the state and whose denominator is 
country-wide business. The tax rate of 1/10 of 1% is then 
applied to the addition of these two products. In the 
"business done" numerator the state included as a par t 
of Ohio business an amount equal to the sales proceeds 
of a large par t of the goods manufactured at the tax-
payer's plants in Ohio no matter where the goods had 
been sold or delivered. 
In sustaining the tax as assessed by the state of Ohio, 
the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Black said as fol-
lows : 
"A part of the measure of the tax is conse-
quently an amount equal to the sales price of 
Ohio-manufactured goods sold and delivered to 
customers in other states. Appellant contends that 
the State has thus taxed sales made outside of 
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Ohio in violation of the due process clause. A 
complete answer to this due process contention 
is that Ohio did not tax these sales. Its statute 
imposed the franchise tax for the privilege of do-
ing business in Ohio for profit. The State su-
preme court construed the statute as imposing 
the tax on corporations for engaging in business 
such as that in which taxpayer engaged. One 
branch of that business was manufacturing. I t has 
long been established that a state can tax the 
business of manufacturing. The fact that it chose 
to measure the amount of such a tax by the value 
of the goods the factory has produced, whether 
of the current or a past year, does not transform 
the tax on manufacturers to something else." 
The Court stated further: 
"Furthermore, this Court has long realized the 
practical impossibility of a state's achieving a per-
fect apportionment of expansive, complex business 
activities such as those of appellant, and has de-
clared that 'rough approximation rather than pre-
cision' is sufficient. (Citing cases) Unless a palp-
ably disproportionate result comes from an appor-
tionment, a result which makes it patent that the 
tax is levied upon interstate commerce rather than 
upon an intrastate privilege, this Court has not 
been willing to nullify honest state efforts to 
make apportionments, (citing cases) A state's 
tax law is not to be nullified merely because the 
result is achieved through a formula which in-
cludes consideration of interstate and out-of-state 
transactions in their relation to the intrastate 
privilege. Since it has not been demonstrated that 
the apportionment here achieves an unfair result, 
(citing cases) and since it is assessed only against 
the privilege of doing local Ohio business of manu-
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factoring and selling, we do not come to the ques-
tion, argued by appellant, of possible multiplica-
tion of this tax by reason of its imposition by 
other states. None of them can tax the privilege 
of operating factories and sales agencies in Ohio." 
We also invite the Court's attention to the same rule 
as declared by the Supreme Court with respect to state 
income taxes. 
In U.S. Glue Co. v. Town of Wolf Creek, 247 U.S. 321 
(1918) the Court sustained the validity of the Wisconsin 
income tax law as applied to the net income derived from 
goods manufactured within the state but sold and de-
livered to customers outside the state. 
Under the Wisconsin law the net income of a corpo-
ration engaged in business within or without the state 
(other than certain items specifically assigned to the 
state) is taxed under an apportionment formula "under 
which the gross business in dollars of the corporation in 
the state, added to the value in dollars of its property 
in the state, is made the numerator of a fraction of which 
the denominator consists of the total gross business in 
dollars of the corporation both within and without the 
state, added to the value in dollars of its property with-
in and without the state." Under the law the resulting 
fraction was taken as representing the proportion of the 
income which was deemed to be derived from business 
transacted and property located within the state. A con-
troversy before the U. S. Supreme Court involved the in-
clusion in the numerator of two items designated (b) and 
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(c). Item (b) consisted of "$65,000 from goods sold to 
customers outside the state and delivered from its fac-
tory." Item (c) involved about "$31,000 from goods sold 
to customers outside of the state, the sales having been 
made and goods shipped from plaintiff's branches in 
other states and the goods having been manufactured 
at plaintiff's factory and shipped before sale to said 
branches." 
The court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney said 
that "stated concisely, the question is whether a state, 
in levying a general income tax upon the gains and 
profits of a domestic corporation may include in the com-
putation the net income derived from transactions in in-
terstate commerce without contravening the commerce 
clause of the constitution of the United States." It was 
further stated: 
"Such a tax, when imposed upon net income 
from whatever source arising, is but a method of 
distributing the cost of government, like a tax 
upon property, or upon franchises treated as prop-
erty; and if there be no discrimination against 
interstate commerce, either in the admeasurement 
of the tax or in the means adopted for enforcing 
it, it constitutes one of the ordinary and general 
burdens of government, from which persons and 
corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction 
of the State are not exempted by the Federal Con-
stitution because they happen to be engaged in 
commerce among the States. 
"And so we hold that the Wisconsin income tax 
law, as applied to the plaintiff in the case before 
us, cannot be deemed to be so direct a burden upon 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
86 
plaintiff's interstate business as to amount to an 
unconstitutional interference with or regulation 
of commerce among the States. I t was measured 
not by the gross receipts, but by the net proceeds 
from this part of plaintiff's business, along with a 
like imposition upon its income derived from other 
sources, and in the same way that other corpora-
tions doing business within the State are taxed 
upon that proportion of their income derived from 
business transacted and property located within 
the State, whatever the nature of their business." 
Also pertinent here is the leading case of Shaffer v. 
Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). I t sustained over com-
merce clause, due process and other objections the valid-
ity of the Oklahoma income tax law as applied to a non-
resident owning and operating oil and gas producing 
lands within the state of Oklahoma but managed from 
outside the state. The Oklahoma law, in addition to levy-
ing a tax against the net income of residents, also levied 
a tax "upon the entire net income from all property 
owned, and of every business, trade or profession carried 
on in this state by persons residing elsewhere." Plaintiff 
wras a non-resident of Oklahoma and a citizen of Illinois 
and a resident of Chicago. During the years involved he 
was engaged in the oil business in Oklahoma and during 
the year 1916 received net income from his oil and gas 
properties exceeding $1,500,000. The Court in sustaining 
the tax stated in the opinion by Mr. Justice Pitney as 
follows: 
"In well-ordered society, property has value 
chiefly for what it is capable of producing, and 
the activities of mankind are devoted largely to 
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making recurrent gains from the use and develop-
ment of property, from tillage, mining, manufac-
ture, from the employment of human skill and 
labor, or from a combination of some of these; 
gains capable of being devoted to their own sup-
port, and the surplus accumulated as an increase 
of capital. That the State, from whose laws prop-
erty and business and industry derive the protec-
tion and security without which production and 
gainful occupation would be impossible, is de-
barred from exacting a share of those gains in 
the form of income taxes for the support of the 
government, is a proposition so wholly inconsist-
ent with fundamental principles as to be refuted 
by its mere statement. That it may tax the land 
but not the crop, the tree but not the fruit, the 
mine or well but not the product, the business but 
not the profit derived from it, is wholly inadmis-
sable. 
"Income taxes are a recognized method of dis-
tributing the burdens of government, favored be-
cause requiring contributions from those who 
realize current pecuniary benefits under the pro-
tection of the government, and because the tax 
may be readily proportioned to their ability to 
pay. Taxes of this character were imposed by 
several of the States at or shortly after the adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution.... 
"The rights of the several States to exercise 
the widest liberty with respect to the imposition of 
internal taxes always has been recognized in the 
decisions of this court." 
A paragraph of special significance to the present 
proceeding is the following statement: 
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"The fact that it required the personal skill 
and management of appellant to bring his income 
from producing property in Oklahoma to fruition, 
and that his management was exerted from his 
place of business in another State, did not deprive 
Oklahoma of jurisdiction to tax the income which 
arose within its own borders. The personal ele-
ment cannot, by any fiction, oust the jurisdiction 
of the State within which the income actually 
arises and whose authority over it operates in 
rem. At most, there might be a question whether 
the value of the service of management rendered 
from without the state ought not be allowed as 
an expense incurred in producing the income; but 
no such question is raised in the present case, 
hence we express no opinion upon it. 
" I t is urged that, regarding the tax as im-
posed upon the business conducted within the 
State, it amounts in the case of appellant's busi-
ness to a burden upon interstate commerce, be-
cause the products of his oil operations are ship-
ped out of the State. Assuming that it fairly 
appears that his method of business constitutes 
interstate commerce, it is sufficient to say that the 
tax is imposed not upon the gross receipts as in 
Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292, 
but only upon the net proceeds, and is plainly 
sustainable even if it includes net gains from in-
terstate commerce. U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 
247 U.S. 321. Compare Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 
U.S. 165." 
For articles of general interest relating to the con-
stitutionality of state taxes, we refer the Court to the fol-
lowing : 
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44 A.L.R. 1228: 
"Excise tax on foreign corporation engaged 
exclusively in interstate commerce measured by 
net income from business within the taxing state." 
71 A.L.R. 256: 
"Constitutionality of tax on corporations in 
nature of, or purporting to be, excise or privilege 
tax measured by income or receipts." 
105 A.L.R, 11: 
"State excise, privilege, or franchise tax up-
on foreign corporations as affected by commerce 
clause." 
139 A.L.R. 950: 
"State excise, privilege, or franchise tax upon 
foreign corporations as affected by commerce 
clause." 
130 A.L.R. 1183: 
"State income tax in respect of business that 
extends into other states." 
167 A.L.R. 943: 
"What constitutes doing business, business 
done, or the like, outside the state for purposes 
of allocation of income under tax laws." 
54 Harvard Law Review 949 : 
"State Taxation In a National Economy." 
As we look at the Supreme Court cases referred to 
above, it will of course be quite obvious to the Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
90 
why the position of unconstitutionality taken in plain-
tiff's petition for certiorari has been to a large extent 
abandoned in its brief now on file with the Court. The 
petition (paragraph 9) claims that no franchise tax on 
plaintiff is valid under the Federal constitution and asks 
for a refund of $3,205,443.06, with interest. Paragraph 
17(b) further alleges that defendant's allocation on which 
the deficiencies here involved have been computed, is 
likewise repugnant to the Federal Constitution. 
Turning from the petition to the brief? we see about 
six pages of apparently miscellaneous constitutional dis-
cussion and indiscriminate citation of cases, the relevance 
of which to the case at bar is not shown. The only case 
in which the facts are given is the Hans Bees case which 
merely held that the North Carolina one factor statutory 
formula was invalid where by separate accounting evi-
dence the taxpayer was able to segregate and show the 
proper amount of net income attributable to its business 
activities in North Carolina. The taxpayer's sales office 
in New York was its own office where its own sales em-
ployees were selling merchandise in the taxpayer's own 
name add behalf. Not involved was manufacture in 
North Carolina and transfer of the product at a fair price 
to a sales subsidiary or other company for resale. The 
taxpayer showed by separate accounting and the Court 
recognized from such evidence that some profit should 
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be allocated to the sales activity in New York. In the 
case at bar the sales profit of the sales subsidiary and 
A. S. & K. has been fairly allocated by contract outside 
Utah. 
Plaintiff's argument under this branch of the case 
adds up, we suggest, merely to an assertion that there are 
generally speaking constitutional restraints on a state's 
power of taxation. By reason of this, it is urged, the 
statute should be construed in such a way that any con-
sideration of these restraints as applied to the case at bar 
may be avoided. In other words, the mere existence of 
constitutional restraints is suggested to justify the ex-
clusion of more than one-third of the net income of the 
Utah Division outside Utah, even though such net income 
has been separately computed on the Utah books after 
deducting the sales subsidiary's and A. S. & E.'s fair 
selling profit, the Utah Division's fair share of plain-
tiff's New York administrative expenses, and other out-
of-state expenses. 
Defendant rests its case squarely on the Supreme 
Court cases cited heretofore. These cases show conclu-
sively that local manufacture or mining is local business. 
A state has the power to tax the privilege of engaging 
in such a local occupation or business. No question of 
double or multiple taxation is involved. No other state 
can tax the privilege of engaging in a mining or manu-
facturing occupation or business in Utah. 
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The only constitutional problem presented here is 
whether in measuring the value of the privilege of oper-
ating the Bingham pit and producing molybdenite and 
blister copper in Utah, net income from operations con-
ducted by plaintiff in other states or foreign countries 
and having no connection with Utah has crept into the 
measure. Defendant took extreme care to see that the net 
income base included only operations of the Utah Divi-
sion. None of the net income of the Nevada Mines Divi-
sion, Bay (Arizona) Mines Division, Chino (New Mexi-
co) Mines Division or Braden Copper (Chile) operations 
has been included. Not a dollar of plaintiff's large invest-
ment income has been included, such income having been 
specifically assigned to the New York Office. Nothing 
has been included except net income of the Utah Divi-
sion from business attributable entirely to Utah. 
In the American Manufacturing Co. case the Su-
preme Court permitted the excise on local manufacturing 
to be measured by "$1.00 on each $1,000 of sales made" 
even though involved in the action were "sales of goods 
manufactured by plaintiff in the city, afterwards removed 
to storage warehouses outside of the state, and later sold 
from these warehouses to purchasers in states other than 
Missouri. . ." Such out-of-state proceeds were held to be 
a proper measure of a tax on the prior local manufacture 
of the goods within the state. Such sales proceeds were 
regarded as a proper substitute for value of the product 
at completion of production. Postponement of payment 
of the tax until financial returns were in was said to be 
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"a practical benefit to the taxpayer." It was further 
stated that uin the outcome the tax is the same in amount 
as if it were measured by the sale value of the goods, 
but imposed upon the completion of their manufacture." 
This case, involving a gross receipts and not a net income 
measure represents the farthest outpost in the field. It 
goes much further than is necessary to sustain a tax based 
upon the full net income, separately accounted for, of the 
Utah Division. The Utah franchise measure is one on net 
income. All of the out-of-state transportation, refining 
and marketing expenses have been deducted before com-
puting the tax. As indicated in the U. S. Glue Co. v. 
Oak Greek, and Shaffer v. Carter cases a tax upon gross 
receipts affects each transaction more directly than 
a tax on net incomes. Inclusion of net gains from inter-
state commerce is plainly includible, either under a net 
income or a franchise tax, and inclusion of out-of-state 
sales is likewise clearly permissible in computing the 
value of the local franchise as the International Har-
vester v. Evatt case recently reaffirmed. 
. By reason of the Utah statute resting upon a plainly 
taxable subject, that is, the privilege of engaging in local 
business (mining and manufacture), the tax could be 
measured by the gross value or the net Value of the locally 
manufactured product. In the American Manufacturing 
Co. case the out-of-state gross proceeds of sales were used 
as the tax base and without any deduction whatsoever for 
out-of-state transportation, selling or other expenses. The 
out-of-state proceeds were treated as the equivalent of 
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the value of the product on completion of manufacture 
within the state. In the Heisler case, the taxing authori-
ties were required to value the coal "when prepared for 
market." In the Lacoste case, the authorities were re-
quired to determine the value of the skins or hides from 
the fur-bearing animals or alligators in the hands of the 
Louisiana dealers. In Hope Natural Gas Co. the measure 
of the tax was the gross receipts from sales which were 
at or beyond the state line. In overruling the trial court, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court construed the law as 
taking gross receipts only to determine value at the 
mouth of the well. I t indicated that to find such value 
there should be deducted from the gross receipts the cost 
of transportation. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, 
Mr. Justice McReynolds stated "The plain result of the 
opinion and final decree is to require that the tax be 
computed upon the value of the gas at the well, and not 
otherwise. If, hereafter, executive officers disregard 
the approved construction and fix values upon any im-
proper basis appropriate relief may be obtained through 
the courts." The state court decision was affirmed. 
In the Oliver Iron Miming Co. case the 6 per cent rate 
was applied to the "value of such ore at the place wxhere 
the same is brought to the surface of the earth" less the 
costs of mining and certain other deductions. In arriving 
at such "value" at the mouth of the mine, the Minnesota 
tax authorities in practice take as their starting figure 
the published prices for iron ore on the Lower Lake Ports 
and subtract therefrom the loading and unloading 
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charges, rail and water freight and other transportation 
charges. Defendant, following receipt of the mandate of 
this Court in Columbia Iron Mining Co. v. Iron County, 
230 P. 2d 324 (1951), now uses these same mouth-of-the 
mine values for corporation franchise, mining occupation 
and net proceeds tax purposes in the case of Utah's 
iron mines. 
In the light of these authorities, a Utah franchise tax 
measured by the full net income derived from the molyb-
denite and blister copper product mined and manufac-
tured in Utah but sold outside is clearly proper. From 
the gross proceeds from the out-of-state sales negotiated 
and effected by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & K. have 
been deducted the out-of-state profit and expenses of 
the marketing companies, the out-of-state refining ex-
pense and the out-of-state transportation expense. Sub-
traction of these items gives us the gross value of the 
Utah molybdenite and blister copper product in Utah 
prior to the departure of such product from the state in 
interstate commerce. From this gross value, in arriving 
at taxable net income of the Utah Division should be 
further deducted the mining, milling, transportation and 
smelting expenses in Utah together with statutory de-
pletion, Federal taxes and a fair proportion of New York 
administrative expenses. Such net income as so sepa-
rately computed represents the proper constitutional and 
statutory base for the tax and not any lesser percentage 
thereof. 
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These same authorities likewise sustain the validity 
of the Utah mining occupation tax and the mines valua-
tions based on net annual proceeds. The same gross 
proceeds, or value, constitute the proper starting point 
in computing plaintiff's tax base under the franchise tax 
law, the occupation tax law and the net proceeds law. 
As will be discussed hereafter under Point II the gross 
proceeds, or their equivalent, derived from the out-of-
state sales of the Utah Division's molybdenite and blister 
copper product less the out-of-state marketing, refining 
and transportation expenses, constitute the basis from 
which under all three statutes the value of plaintiff's 
mine, the value of its mining occupation privilege and the 
value of its privilege as a foreign corporation to exer-
cise its corporate franchise in Utah, less the specific de-
ductions allowed by each statute, are to be determined. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO APPORTION NONE OF 
THE NET INCOME REFLECTED ON THE SEPARATE 
BOOKS OF ACCOUNT OF ITS UTAH DIVISION OUTSIDE 
UTAH AND THE DEFICIENCIES IN TAX HERE INVOLVED 
SHOULD BE INCREASED AND TAX ASSESSED ON THE 
BASIS OF THE FULL AMOUNT OF NET INCOME RE-
FLECTED ON SUCH SEPARATE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT. 
Under this branch of the case, we will undertake to 
show that if there be error in defendant's decision, it is 
that the tax under the Utah statute should be based on the 
full 100% net income shown and reflected on the sepa-
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rate books of account of plaintiff's Utah Division and 
not on any lesser percentage thereof. Defendant's argu-
ment on this proposition will include a discussion on the 
following: 
The net income shown on the separate books of ac-
count of the Utah Division is atttributable entirely to 
business done in Utah and assessment of the tax on this 
basis will involve no question of double taxation. In 
lieu of the allocation of income to Utah under the statu-
tory formula, the tax must be based on the income directly 
allocated to Utah by the separate accounting method em-
ployed by plaintiff. 
Judicial precedent has already been established with 
respect to this plaintiff showing that the separate income 
of its Utah Division reflects Utah business exclusively 
and should be used for corporation franchise, mining 
occupation and net proceeds tax purposes. 
The intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its 
sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. covering the transfer of 
the Utah product for resale by the latter companies, at a 
fair, reasonable and arms-length price, must be recogniz-
ed and accepted for tax purposes. Such intercompany con-
tracts between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary and A. S. 
& E. being fair, reasonable and arms-length, cannot be set 
aside as a fraud on the State of Utah or as an illegal 
device to syphon taxable income outside the state. 
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The separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary 
which conducts the business of selling in its own name 
and behalf all copper and molybdenite must be recognized 
and respected for tax purposes. 
The operations and net income of an affiliated "sub-
sidiary" company cannot be included in a tax return filed 
by the parent company unless a Consolidated Return un-
der the provisions of the statute is filed on behalf of both 
parent and affiliated subsidiary company. 
This Court has jurisdiction under the statute to 
modify defendant's decision by increasing the tax to an 
assessment on the full separate and segregated net in-
come of the Utah Division. 
At the outset it might be helpful to the court to refer 
briefly to the terms "apportionment" or "allocation," 
"unitary and non-unitary businesses," "allocation by sep-
arate or direct accounting," and "allocation by formula." 
We quote from the annotation in 167 A.L.E. 943 entitled 
"What constitutes doing business, business done, or the 
like, outside the state for purposes of allocation of in-
come under tax laws" (page 944): 
"A preliminary question arises as to the 
meaning of the word 'allocate.' The taxing stat-
utes do not ordinarily define it, Webster's New 
International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines allocate 
as '1. To distribute or assign; allot; apportion. 
2. To determine the locality of.' In taxing stat-
utes, an allocation of income seems to mean the 
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division or apportionment of income between one 
state and the rest of the world. Depending upon 
the circumstances, income may be allocated either 
directly or by formula. A direct allocation by the 
separate accounting method is made where a tax-
payer does business in two or more states, but all 
of his activities in one state, or all of a certain 
type of business in one state, is conducted as a 
separate business not connected with activities in 
other states. But in most cases a business is uni-
tary, so that a direct allocation is impossible, and 
an allocation—sometimes called 'indirect alloca-
tion'—must be made under a formula. 
"A business conducted in two or more states 
is deemed to be unitary where it is impossible to 
separate the business done in one state from that 
done in another—where there is a unity of use 
and management, Butler Bros. v. McColgan 
(1941) 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P. 2d 334 (affirmed in 
(1942) 315 U.S. 501, 86 L. ed. 991, 62 S. Ct, 701." 
Again in Prentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service, 
Vol. 1 "All States Unit" at paragraph 91, 400, it is stated : 
" 'Allocation,' otherwise referred to as ''ap-
portionment/ is that process whereby corpora-
tions, doing business concurrently within the tax-
ing State and other jurisdictions, determine the 
amount of income, from all operations which may 
properly be attributed to the taxing state, and 
upon which the taxing state may impose an income 
tax, or base an excise or franchise tax. It is well 
settled that such taxes may be imposed on the 
basis of such allocated or apportioned income." 
Again at paragraph 91, 428, it is stated: 
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"Unitary Business—What constitutes.—For 
allocation purposes it becomes important to de-
termine whether the business is unitary or non-
unitary in nature, in that statutory allocation 
formulas are ordinarily applicable to the former, 
whereas the latter lend themselves more appro-
priately to allocation by the use of separate ac-
count methods. A unitary business is one in which 
the units are closely allied and not capable of 
separate maintenance as independent profit mak-
ing businesses. The business of manufacturing 
and selling is ordinarily unitary, and so is that 
of an express company, and of utilities such as 
telephone companies and railroads. But a busi-
ness owning disconnected, independent railroad 
lines was held non-unitary and separable, and, 
likewise, an oil business was non-unitary and sep-
arable as to the operations of (a) producing, man-
ufacturing and refining, and (b) selling and dis-
tributing. And a corporation with dissociated sub-
sidiaries is conducting a separable business not 
subject to unitary allocation. A unitary business 
should not include in tax base for allocation pur-
poses any income or losses not connected with such 
unitary business." 
Again at paragraph 91,430 under the heading "Separate 
Accounting" it is stated: 
"If the corporation can separate its busi-
ness into departments, and prove that a separate 
department operates in the taxing state and show 
what profits are derived from that department, 
it has been held entitled to use separate account-
ing in allocating income to the taxing state. Sepa-
rate accounting is ordinarily appropriate for busi-
ness of a non-unitary nature . . . and has been 
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applied to an oil business doing all producing, 
manufacturing and refining outside the taxing 
state, particularly where local sales outlets were 
'charged at the market price with all products' 
received from the outside producers and refiner-
ies. Separate accounting has been held proper in 
the case of affiliated corporations for disconnected 
railroad lines in different states, although not 
adaptable to utilities such as telephone com-
panies." 
Again in Paragraph 91,281, it is stated: 
"On the other hand, in allocating income of 
corporations doing business in more than one 
state, much can be done from a bookkeeping stand-
point to separate manufacturing and sales so as 
to make available the use of separate accounting 
methods to reduce income, and to make unneces-
sary the application of an arbitrary statutory ap-
portionment formula, particularly where the laws 
of the taxing state sanction separate accounting in 
allocation . . ." 
Utah's corporation franchise tax law provides, in the 
first place (Section 80-13-16, UCA, 1943), that the "net 
income shall be computed . . . in accordance with the 
method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the 
books of such taxpayer . . ." Section 80-13-21, UCA, 
1943, provides that the net income of the corporation may 
be assigned on the basis of the three-factor formula con-
sisting of property, payroll and gross receipts, after as-
signing certain specific items within and without the 
state. Sub-paragraph 8 of this section provides, how-
ever, as follows: 
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"If, in the judgment of the Tax Commission, 
the application of the foregoing rules does not al-
locate to this state the proportion of net income 
fairly and equitably attributable to this state, it 
may, with such information as it may be able to 
obtain, make such allocation as is fairly calculated 
to assign to this state the portion of net income 
reasonably attributable to the business done with-
in this state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer 
to double taxation." 
The above sections when read together in the light 
of the applicable authorities, show that the statutory 
formula is designed to allocate to Utah a portion of the 
total net income of the corporation from all sources and 
operations where it appears from the facts and the book-
keeping methods employed that the income attributable 
to a particular state cannot be separately and directly 
computed. The formula is ordinarily used as a rough 
and ready means in appropriate circumstances to allocate 
to business within the state that proportion of the corpo-
ration's total income from all sources which the corpora-
tion's property, payroll and gross receipts assignable to 
the state bear to the total. On the other hand, where the 
net income attributable to the business within the state 
is separately computed on the taxpayer's books of ac-
count, the statute commands that the tax be computed 
on the basis of the net income reflected on the taxpayer's 
books and in accordance with the method of accounting 
regularly employed by him in keeping such books. The 
provisions of sub-section 8 tie into this command of the 
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statute and permit the assessment of the tax on the basis 
of the separate accounts employed by the taxpayer if, 
in the judgment of the Tax Commission, the income so 
separately computed and thereby allocated to the state 
fairly assigns to the state the net income reasonably at-
tributable to business within the state. 
With this reference to the statutory background, we 
now turn to the opinion and decision of this Court in 
Case No. 7298, reported in 221 P 2d 857. Although de-
pletion was an important issue presented to the Court 
in this case, the primary issue presented and adjudged 
was the question whether plaintiff, under the Utah law, 
should have its tax computed on the basis of the statu-
tory formula or on the basis of the separate accounts of 
its Utah Division. With respect to this issue, we point 
out those portions of the opinion relating to this issue. 
In the first place, the Court states at page 860 : 
"The errors assigned are as follows: 
(1) That the Tax Commission erred in refusing 
to follow the requirements of Section 80-13-
21, U.C.A. 1943, which would permit Kenne-
cott to allocate to Utah a proportionate part 
of its total income from all sources as dis-
tinguished from allocating a proportionate 
part of the Utah Division's income to this 
state." 
The Court after a discussion of the method of accounting 
employed by plaintiff in keeping the books of its Utah 
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Division "as a separate unit" then discussed the provi-
sions of the statute including sub-division 8 and stated 
"petitioner's contention in this respect is over-ruled." 
Also of considerable pertinence to the problem here 
concerned was the summary rejection by the Court of 
plaintiff's contention that subsidies paid by the Federal 
Government were improperly included as par t of the 
gross proceeds realized from the sales or conversion of 
ore into metal. 
Thus, under the clear mandate of this Court and the 
command of the statute, plaintiff's tax must be computed 
on the basis of the separate and segregated net income 
as computed on the books of account regularly employed 
and maintained by plaintiff for its Utah Division. The 
original separate account method used by plaintiff in 
filing its returns was regarded as controlling. Authority 
for this action was placed squarely on sub-division 8 
of the statute after distinguishing the California Packing 
case. In addition, the Court in refusing plaintiff the 
right to use the statutory formula stated "In addition 
it might unjustly discriminate against this state or the 
taxpayer in that the tax assessed might bear no reason-
able relationship to the value of the ore extracted or the 
amount of business done in this state." 
The question now before the Court is what, if any, 
proportionate par t of the Utah Division's income sepa-
rately computed must be allocated outside the state based 
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upon the findings and record in this proceeding. A read-
ing of the opinion shows very plainly and clearly that the 
Court was not prepared to determine on the record before 
it in No. 7298 what portion of the Utah Division's net in-
come was attributable to out-of-state business. The rec-
ord in that case on the sales activity was limited to the 
following stipulation: "The refined product is then sold 
for Kennecott's account by Kennecott Sales Corporation, 
which is a wholly owned subsidiary and which receives an 
agreed commission for such service." (Page 102 of Rec-
ord #7298, Ex. QQ 2 of present proceeding.) This state-
ment of agreed fact is repeated in the Court's opinion. 
The present proceeding devotes several hundreds 
of pages of testimony and exhibits to the method and 
character of the out-of-state sales of copper and molyb-
denite by the sales subsidiary and the out-of-state sales 
of gold, silver, platinum and palladium by A. S. & R. 
This extensive evidence was necessary and in fact vital 
to the question of determining what, if any, out-of-state 
business has been conducted by plaintiff with respect 
to the sale of products of its Utah Division. With the 
extensive and detailed facts now in the record with re-
spect to the out-of-state activities of the sales subsidiary, 
it is now somewhat interesting to look back and note 
how one carefully drafted and stipulated sentence is 
now sought to be used to justify the exclusion of 
more than % of the net income of the Utah Division 
from the Utah tax base. Additional evidence was of 
course required. There is nothing in the one stipulated 
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sentence to show how or in what manner, or in whose 
name, or from what premises, or to what customers, or 
under what arrangements, or at what prices, or under 
what terms, or whether individually or representatively, 
the sales subsidiary was selling the Utah Division's prod-
uct. The sentence made no distinction between molyb-
denite, refined copper, gold, silver, platinum or palladium-
I t made no mention of the fact that all sales of the copper 
and molybdenite were made by and in the name of and 
in behalf of the sales subsidiary and in the regular course 
of the sales subsidiary's own business, from its own prem-
ises and to its own customers. I t made no mention of the 
fact that all proceeds of sales to customers were collected 
by and in the name of the sales subsidiary and that all 
proceeds realized by plaintiff from sales of the Utah 
product were collected under intercompany contractual 
arrangements by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary. 
The present case now requires decision based upon 
the facts of record as to what, if any, business of the 
Utah Division is conducted outside Utah. The facts show 
that the out-of-state sales activity is the sales subsidiary's 
business and not the business of plaintiff or its Utah 
Division and that all out-of-state New York administra-
tive expenses pertaining to the Utah Division have been 
deducted on the separate accounts of the Utah Division. 
The question whether the Court's opinion in No. 7298 re-
quires use of the factor of 66.926% as being the propor-
tionate par t of the net income of the Utah Division at-
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tributable to business done in Utah for the year 1942 is 
completely without merit but is considered hereafter as a 
separate point. For present purposes our inquiry is 
whether the net income of the Utah Division constitutes 
in its full 100% amount net income attributable to Utah 
business. 
With respect to the general problem of when direct 
allocation by separate accounting should be used in pre-
ference to allocation by statutory formula, we refer the 
court to the annotation in 167 A.L.R. 943, entitled "What 
Constitutes Doing Business, Business Done or the Like 
Outside the State for Purposes of Allocation of Income 
Under Tax Laws," where at page 981, it is stated: 
"Direct Allocation and Separate Accounting. 
Attention is directed to certain rules author-
izing or requiring direct allocation where possible. 
Where the business conducted by the taxpayer 
outside the taxing state is clearly separable from 
the business done within the state, the income from 
the out-of-state business must be allocated to busi-
ness done outside the state by making a separate 
account of its income and expenses." 
Again in annotation in 130 A.L.R. 1183, entitled 
"State Income Tax in Respect of Business That Extends 
into Other States," it is stated at page 1205: 
"Circumstances under which allocation is proper: 
1. Generally. Allocation to the taxing state 
of a portion of the total income of a business that 
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extends into other states, as the basis for comput-
ing its state income tax, is proper only when the 
income is derived partly from within and part-
ly from without the taxing state . . . 
2. When business within state is separable. 
Although the income of a business is derived part-
ly from within and partly from without the taxing 
state, an allocation to that state of a portion of the 
total income, as the basis for computing state in-
come tax, is not ordinarily proper where the busi-
ness transacted within the state is separable from 
that transacted outside the state. The business 
within the taxing state has been held to be separ-
able, so as to make an allocation improper, in a 
number of cases." 
The leading article in this field is entitled "Allocation 
of Income by Corporate Contract" by Koswell Magill, 
44 Harvard Law Review 935. With respect to the segre-
gation of income by intercompany contract to the state 
where the income is actually earned, it is stated as fol-
lows at page 950: 
"If the contract corresponds with market 
prices independently quoted, the allocation so 
adopted should be upheld as against an appor-
tionment ratio, for the contract then effects a 
proper segregation of the actual income." 
Defendant in the administration of the tax laws of 
this state, and particularly the corporation franchise tax 
law here involved, makes frequent use of the principle 
of separate accounting in lieu of the statutory formula 
in effecting a fair and reasonable apportionment of net 
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income to the business done within this state. Many con-
crete examples could be cited. Defendant regularly as a 
general rule employs separate accounting methods of ap-
portioning net income in the case of banks, finance com-
panies, ranch companies, construction companies and in 
other similar instances where the books of account kept 
and maintained by the corporation properly reflect the 
net income from the operations within this state. The 
basic command of the law is to include within the tax base 
only the net income attributable to the business done 
within Utah. Where the taxpayer's books clearly segre-
gate the income of Utah operations from operations in 
other states or foreign countries, the use of such separate 
accounts is the proper statutory tax base from which 
to compute the franchise tax. The net income earned 
and realized from business done in Utah thus stands 
on its own footing unaffected by gains, losses or income 
earned and derived in other states. For example, if a 
corporation owned a cattle ranch in Utah and another 
cattle ranch in Wyoming, the tax should be computed on 
the basis of the Utah ranch operations separately ac-
counted for and unaffected by the gains, losses or income 
of the Wyoming ranching operations. Where, as in the 
present case, the out-of-state function or activity has been 
separately incorporated the use of separate account-
ing is, of course, mandatory in the absence of fraud or 
an intent to evade the Utah tax. 
In the case at bar the net income of the Utah Divi-
sion in its full 100% amount reflects solely and exclu-
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sively the net income from business done in Utah and 
nowhere else. The out-of-state administrative expenses 
pertaining to the New York Office have been allowed as 
a deduction. The out-of-state marketing, refining and 
transportation expenses have been allowed as a deduc-
tion. With these deductions the value of the Utah molyb-
denite and blister copper products has been accurately 
and fairly valued in terms of actual cash receipts. Such 
gross value less the local expenses of mining, milling 
and smelting together with a fair proportion of New York 
overhead, reflect the net income of Utah business. The 
gross value of the Utah molybdenite and blister copper 
product so arrived at has already been judicially deter-
mined to constitute the gross proceeds from plaintiff's 
Utah operations. 
The Utah mining occupation tax law imposes an oc-
cupation tax on every person engaged in the business of 
mining equal to 1% of the gross amount received for or 
the gross value of metaliferous ore sold. Under the 
provisions of Section 59-5-67 (c) and Section 59-5-68 (4), 
U.C.A. 1953, plaintiff arrives at its tax base by deduct-
ing from the gross proceeds of sales of the molybdenite, 
copper, gold, silver, platinum and palladium product, 
the costs of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, trans-
portation and marketing. Under this law, the mining 
(including milling) costs are not allowed as a deduction. 
The deduction from the gross proceeds of the out-of-
state marketing, refining and transportation expense 
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together with the locally incurred expense of smelting 
constitutes the "gross value" tax base on which this tax 
is computed. 
Arriving at the "net annual proceeds" of the Bingham 
mine for ad valorem tax purposes under section 59-5-58, 
U.C.A. 1953, is for present purposes done on much the 
same basis, except that mining and milling expenses are 
also allowed as a deduction, and gross proceeds are deter-
mined on a production basis by equivalent market values 
rather than cash proceeds of sales. Under the net pro-
ceeds law "gross proceeds realized" are defined to be 
"from the sale of conversion into money or its equivalent 
of all ores from such mine." 
Both the net proceeds and mining occupation tax 
laws speak of "ores" but cover the special situation of 
plaintiff where the ores or minerals themselves are not 
sold but the metals extracted from such ores or minerals 
are sold. Such metal extraction profit is added into the 
tax base. Furthermore, both laws cover the situation 
where the ores are sold under a bona fide contract of sale. 
Such contracts determine the gross proceeds or its equi-
valent for tax purposes. Both laws, by 1949 amendments, 
now even include a specific provision that sales of ores 
between affiliated companies shall not carry the price 
specified in the contract, unless such price is proportion-
ate to the reasonable fair cash value. 
The net annual proceeds realized by plaintiff from 
its Bingham mine to determine the value of that mine, 
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the gross value of the Utah Division's mineral and metal 
product used in determining the value of conducting its 
mining occupation in Utah and the net income of the 
Utah Division to be used in valuing its privilege of ex-
ercising its corporate franchise in Utah all rest on sub-
stantially the same conception. The gross proceeds or 
value of the Utah Division's molybdenite and blister cop-
per product represents and is in fact income earned from 
business operations in Utah. The out-of-state proceeds 
of sale, less the out-of-state expenses, is the proper and 
appropriate starting point in computing the income de-
rived by plaintiff from its Utah business operations. 
Use of such out-of-state proceeds rests on a secure con-
stitutional footing, as the cases cited heretofore under 
Point I clearly indicate. 
In Mercur Gold Mining and Millimg Co. v. Spry, 16 
Utah 222 (1898), this Court stated, at page 230, that the 
"gross yield of minerals and metals" and the "value there-
of" were the appropriate measuring rods in determining 
the net annual product of the mine. 
In Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Company, 294 
F. 199 (1923), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit, speaking through Judge Sanborn, quoted 
from the decision of this court in the Mercur Co. case and 
at page 205 indicated that so far as the product is con-
cerned nothing can be taxed except the net annual prod-
uct of the mine, and only that which exists and has been 
ascertained as the annual net proceeds of the mine is to be 
assessed and taxed. 
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In Salt Lake County v. Utah Copper Co., 93 F. 2d 
127 (1937) (CCA 10), the Court speaking through Judge 
Phillips, sets forth historically the method which has been 
used in arriving at the net annual proceeds of the Bing-
ham mine, including the copper, gold and silver product. 
The court stated at page 131: 
"Blister copper has an established and readily 
ascertainable market value, and when the taxing 
authorities were apprised of the number of pounds 
produced it was a simple matter to appraise its 
value in money" 
The court also stated: 
"The trial court concluded that the phrase 
'gross proceeds realized during the preceding cal-
endar year from the sale or conversion into money 
or its equivalent of all ores from such mine,' em-
braced the amount received from sales in such 
year of blister copper, gold and silver bullion pro-
duced in such year, and the amount of the blister 
copper, gold and silver bullion produced in such 
year but remaining unsold at the end of the year, 
the latter amount to be arrived at by appraisal; 
and that the copper company was entitled to have 
deducted therefrom the production costs as de-
fined in the statute in determining the net annual 
proceeds." 
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in this case, 303 U.S. 652. 
In Salt Lake County v. Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion, 163 F. 2d 484 (1947), the Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit held that premium or subsidy pay-
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ments by the Federal government for certain minerals 
produced in excess of fixed quotas pursuant to Act of 
Congress and the O.P.A. should be added to the proceeds 
received from the sale of ores or metals in computing 
the base for taxation of mines and mining claims in 
Utah. The Court ruled that such subsidy or premium 
payments should be included as elements in the yard stick 
for measuring the value of mining properties in Utah 
for purposes of ad valorem taxation, and that such in-
clusion did not amount to a tax against the United States 
or any of its instrumentalities. 
In Kennecott Copper Corporation v. State Tax Com-
mission, 212 P. 2d 187 (1949), this Court held that Fed-
eral subsidies paid to plaintiff were properly included 
in the tax base for the purpose of determining the state 
net proceeds tax and the mining occupation tax for the 
years 1944 and 1945. Justice Latimer speaking for the 
Court, stated at page 190: 
"Appellant, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 
mined and milled its own ores, shipped its mill 
concentrates to independent smelting and refining 
companies on a contract or toll basis for refining 
and marketed its own refined copper after it had 
been processed and returned. I t received premium 
or subsidy payments for over-quota production, 
based upon monthly affidavits showing the com-
pany's production of 'returnable' copper, com-
puted on ninety-seven per cent of the copper con-
tained in the company's mill concentrates as deter-
mined from assayed samples of its ores." 
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The Court held that the premium prices received by 
plaintiff had to be included as a part of gross proceeds 
in computing the net proceeds and mining occupation 
taxes. 
From the foregoing cases, it is clear that the gross 
proceeds received by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary 
and A .S. & E. with respect to the Utah Division's molyb-
denite and blister copper product, which proceeds are fair 
and based on market prices, constitute the gross income 
of the Utah Division. Such proceeds less out-of-state 
expenses constitute the statutory yardstick for determin-
ing the value of plaintiff's Utah mine, its Utah occupation 
and its Utah franchise. 
Recalling that the separate books of account of the 
Utah Division reflect the receipts by plaintiff of the 
intercompany transfer at fair prices of copper and molyb-
denite to the sales subsidiary and gold, silver, platinum 
and palladium to A. S. & E., which companies in turn 
resell the products in their own name and behalf and in 
the regular course of their own business, we turn now to 
those cases which require a state franchise tax to be 
based upon the net income segregated to the taxing state 
and which exclude the financial results of business opera-
tions in other states. The sales subsidiary and A. S. & E., 
both separate and distinct corporations from plaintiff, 
are the selling companies. Plaintiff's Utah Division is 
merely a producing unit. The selling function and acti-
vity is thus clearly separable from the producing function 
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or activity both corporate-wise and bookkeeping-wise. 
Plaintiff is entitled to no apportionment of net income 
outside the state by virtue of sales activities conducted 
by other companies. Nor obviously does the fact that it 
maintains an out-of-state administrative office entitle it 
to apportion sales conducted by other companies outside 
the state. Moreover, we dispose first of any suggestion 
that the mere existence of an administrative office out-
side the state entitles plaintiff to an apportionment of 
net income outside the state. The Utah Division's fair 
and proportionate share of the New York administrative 
expenses has been allowed as a deduction both on the 
separate books of account of the Utah Division and the 
Utah tax returns. 
We refer again to the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Shaffer v. Carter, supra, upholding 
the right of Oklahoma to tax the income from oil and gas 
properties derived within the state notwithstanding that 
such properties were owned by nonresidents and managed 
from outside the state of Oklahoma. The Court stated: 
"The fact that it required the personal skill 
and management of appellant to bring his income 
from producing property in Oklahoma to fruition, 
and that his management was exerted from his 
place of business in another state, did not deprive 
Oklahoma of jurisdiction to tax the income which 
arose from within its own borders . . . At most, 
there might be a question whether the value of the 
service of management rendered from without the 
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state ought not to be allowed as an expense incur-
red in producing the income; but no such question 
is raised in the present case, hence, we express no 
opinion upon it." 
In Cottonwood Coal Company v. Junod, 236 P. 1080 
(1925), the Supreme Court of Montana held that a Min-
nesota Corporation with its principal place of business in 
the city of St. Paul, Minnesota, but engaged in the busi-
ness of mining within the state of Montana was not en-
gaged in business partly within Montana and partly in 
Minnesota by reason of the fact that its administrative 
office was located in St. Paul. In this case it appeared 
that the corporation's plants and mines for the mining of 
coal were all located within the State of Montana. With 
respect to the corporation's administrative office in Min-
nesota, it appeared that a majority of the directors and 
officers of the corporation resided in Minnesota, that 
all of the meetings of stockholders and of the board of 
directors were held in Minnesota, that the corporation 
had an office in Minnesota, that the business plans and 
policies of the corporation were formulated at its princi-
pal office in Minnesota, that the business of the corpora-
tion carried on in Montana at all times was partially 
supervised and directed through its main office in Minne-
sota, that some of the financial affairs of the corporation 
were handled and managed from Minnesota, that some 
of the proceeds derived from the business of the corpora-
tion in Montana were sent to the main office of the cor-
poration in Minnesota and deposited in certain Minnesota 
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banks to the credit of the corporation from which dis-
bursements were made from time to time for the expenses 
in operating its business in Montana, that the corporation 
received in Minnesota certain interest on bonds and bank 
balances owned by it in Minnesota banks. The Court 
stated at page 1081: 
"From the foregoing statement it is apparent 
that the only question for determination on this 
appeal is whether the plaintiff during the year 
1920 was 'engaged in business' partly within the 
state of Minnesota, within the contemplation of 
chapter 79, supra." 
The court stated further: 
"This statute fixed as the measure of the li-
cense fee to be exacted from all corporations for 
the privilege of carrying on business in this state 
1% of their net income derived from the business 
carried on in this state, whether engaged in busi-
ness wholly in this state, or partly in this state and 
partly in another, and the sole purpose of sections 
2 and 3 is to point out the method of determining 
this net income. Beyond that determination, so far 
as this statute is concerned, the state has no in-
terest in the business of the corporation. If the 
business is strictly Montana business, the net in-
come is ascertained by deducting the expenses 
and other statutory allowances from all the gross 
income, since the gross income of the business or 
occupation of the corporation is thus necessarily 
a Montana gross income; and if the gross income 
is derived from the business done in Montana and 
from business done in another state, then all of the 
corporation's gross income is not used in comput-
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ing the license fee, but only the gross income de-
rived from the part of the corporation's business 
wholly carried on in this state. And as only the 
Montana gross income is used, so also the Mon-
tana expenses will be allowed to be deducted from 
this gross income, to reach the net income contem-
plated in the statute. 
"From this it appears that, when the statute 
uses the expression 'engaged in business/ whether 
in this state or elsewhere, it is speaking in terms 
of profit and loss, and does not refer to mere 
corporate action, such as holding meetings of the 
board of directors, doing clerical work or book-
keeping, formulating the plans of policies, or per-
forming other corporate acts, which do not in and 
of themselves result in the production of income, 
but does contemplate some kind of business the 
conduct of which results in an income—some gain-
ful occupation of the corporation. This purpose 
and intent is manifest all through the various 
provisions of the statute. 
"Necessarily a corporation must do certain 
acts with reference to its corporate activity at the 
state in which it is incorporated. Usually it must 
maintain an office, keep certain records, and hold 
annual meetings of its stockholders therein. Doing 
these things implies that it is carrying on busi-
ness to some extent in such state, but by doing 
them it is not 'engaged in business' there, within 
the purview of the statute, which uses the word 
'business' solely in connection with its gainful pur-
suit, and as a means of determining its net income 
as the basis of fixing a license fee. In the statute 
under consideration the activity of the corpora-
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tion is not made the measure of the license fee, 
except as such activity manifests itself in the 
production of income." 
This decision of the Supreme Court of Montana 
involving a mine within the taxing state and with an ad-
ministrative office outside the state is obviously very 
closely parallel to the case at bar. The Court held that 
the entire income from the mining business was attribut-
able in its full 100% amount to Montana where the mine 
was located and operated. This decision reflects the gen-
eral principle and approach where the tax is based by 
separate accounts strictly to the operations within the 
taxing state. The income and business operations are 
clearly separable from income and operations in other 
states and are clearly separable from the operations of 
the administrative office outside the state. The most that 
is required under the separate accounting approach is 
the allowance of a fair share of the out-of-state adminis-
trative expenses as an expense deduction against the 
net income attributable to the business within the taxing 
state. 
Plaintiff's basic contention in the case at bar is that 
the entire business commencing with mining and through 
the successive stages of smelting and refining and to and 
including the sale and distribution of the finished metal 
product is a unity of operation and ownership. This con-
tention overlooks the fact that the selling function and 
activity together with the fabricating function and acti-
vity have been separately incorporated from the produc-
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ing function and activity. In these circumstances, it is 
clear that the operation is a unity up to but not including 
the sale or fabrication. 
In Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897) 
involving an early application of the unit rule as applied 
to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, the 
Court stated through Chief Justice Fuller at page 222: 
"We repeat that while the unity which exists 
may not be a physical unity, it is something more 
than a mere unity of ownership. I t is a unity of 
use, not simply for the convenience or pecuniary 
profit of the owner, but existing in the very neces-
sities of the case—resulting from the very nature 
of the business. 
"The same party own a manufacturing estab-
lishment in one state and a store in another, and 
may make profit by operating the twoy but the 
work of each is separate. The value of the factory 
in itself is not conditioned on that of the store or 
vise versa, nor is the value of the goods manu-
factured and sold affected thereby. The connec-
tion between the two is merely accidental and 
growing out of the unity of ownership. But the 
property of an express company distributed to dif-
ferent states is as an essential condition of the 
business united in a single specific use. I t consti-
tutes but a single plan, made so by the very char-
acter and necessities of the business." 
All defendant contends in the case at bar is that 
plaintiff owns a producing establishment in one state 
and through its sales subsidiary a store in another. I t 
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makes a profit by operating the two but the work of the 
Utah Division is separate from the sales subsidiary's 
store. 
An excellent case as to what constitutes a unitary 
business requiring the apportionment method of comput-
ing the tax is the decision of the Supreme Court of Ore-
gon in Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Galloway, 154 P 2d 
539 (1944). In this case the court held that a Delaware 
corporation doing business within the State of Oregon did 
not have to have a net overall income before Oregon could 
assess a corporation excise tax against it so long as the 
corporation's Oregon business yielded a net income. 
The Court also held that par t of the plaintiff's business 
consisting of its ownership of 58,724 shares of the capital 
stock of the Continental Coal Company, an operating 
coal company, was not such an integral part of its busi-
ness that the State of Oregon was required to apply 
against the corporation's total net income the loss of $4,-
093,308.27, which resulted when that stock became worth-
less, under the apportionment formula contained in the 
Oregon statute, thus cancelling the profit which the 
Oregon tax officials found was earned from and attribut-
able to Oregon business. The stock owned of the coal 
company constituted 93.09% of the total outstanding 
stock of the coal company. The corporation's excise re-
turn included all items of income and deductions from 
operations both within and without the state of Oregon. 
The loss on the coal company's stock was taken as a de-
duction on the return on the ground that such stock had 
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become worthless within the taxable year. Except for the 
stock loss the corporation would have had a net income 
of $588,178.00. The Oregon tax officials found that $207,-
103.53 of this total was earned in Oregon. 
The Court in an opinion by Judge Rossman, after re-
ferring to the corporation excise tax as a price exacted 
for the privilege of doing business in Oregon and of earn-
ing a net income in the state, indicated that "the losses 
or profits resulting from operations in other states are 
immaterial" to the privilege granted by Oregon of earn-
ing a net income in Oregon. The Court also referred to 
the admonition in the law that "the determination of net 
income shall be based upon the business done within the 
state" and also to the provision similar to Subdiv. 8 of 
the Utah statute which authorized the Commission to per-
mit or require a segregated method of reporting so as 
fairly and accurately to reflect the net income of the 
business done within the state. The Court stated at page 
544: 
"Section 110-1507 does not employ the word 
'unitary,' but the duty of the defendant to deter-
mine whether a corporation which produces in-
come both within and without Oregon is unitary 
or multiform is implied. The section, as we have 
already indicated, uses the term 'segregated 
method' and 'apportionment method.' Before 
either of those methods can be employed, the ques-
tion must first be answered whether the business 
is unitary or otherwise in character. 
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"Every definition of the word 'unitary' must 
of necessity be general, and since such must be 
its nature, a repetition of definition cannot be 
helpful in the solution of any specific problem. 
In determining whether a business is unitary or 
otherwise in character, a knowledge of the facts 
is essential; in truth, the facts are all important. 
For instance, in determining whether or not two 
or more ventures conducted by a corporation are 
divisible or unitary, one might learn much about 
their nature by consulting the corporation account 
books. If the books intermingle the income pro-
duced and the expenses incurred by the several 
ventures, a conclusion would possibly be war-
ranted that the enterprises were a single unit. At 
any rate, as opposed to the inconvenience of segre-
gating the ventures, one might prefer to deem 
the business as unitary. Upon the other hand, 
if a separate set of books was kept for each ven-
ture, and if overhead was apportioned to each, it 
may be that the corporation's business would be 
deemed divisible. In other words, collateral facts, 
in addition to the nature of the undertaking, may 
be entitled to consideration. The determination 
of the nature of the business enterprise is essen-
tially a practical matter. Much must be left to 
the sound business sense of the tax commission. 
Fortunately, the passage of time gains for the 
commissioners the accession of experience and out 
of the latter there frequently develops expertness. 
I t is the fact that findings, such as the one w^hich 
the plaintiff now attacks, were written by men 
whose judgment was buttressed by experience 
which entitles such findings to be accorded a high 
degree of respect when attacked in a judicial pro-
ceeding." 
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Fisher v. Standard Oil Company, 12 F . 2d 744 (1926) 
(CCA 8), involved the North Dakota Statute imposing a 
tax of 3 % on the net income of corporations de-
rived annually from business conducted within the 
state. The corporation was an Indiana company and its 
business in North Dakota consisted of selling at wholesale 
and retail petroleum products and by-products which it 
produced, manufactured and refined wholly outside the 
state and shipped into the state for sale in North Dakota 
used in selling and distributing its products after bring-
ing them within the state. It appeared inferentially that 
as shipments were received they were charged to the 
North Dakota selling agency at wholesale prices. 2% was 
added as profit to the cost of producing, manufacturing 
and refining on receipt of shipments and before sale in 
the state. 
The North Dakota statute provided that the tax should 
apply to that portion of the total net income of the corpo-
ration doing business partly within and partly without 
the state which the business within the state bore to the 
total business within and without the state. The statute 
further provided that where such business within the 
state is not otherwise 'more easily and certainly separ-
able from such total business' the net income should be 
apportioned on the basis of the ratio that the property 
within the state bore to the entire property both within 
and without the state. 
In filing its returns, the corporation computed its 
tax on the basis of the income separately computed with 
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respect to the North Dakota selling operations. The state 
tax commissioner reviewed the returns and made a re-
assessment of tax. He did not employ, however, the statu-
tory one-factor formula based on property but in lieu 
thereof and without statutory authority used a factor 
based on gross sales within the state as compared with 
total gross sales everywhere. Use of the statutory prop-
erty factor would have resulted in a smaller tax than that 
reported on the returns on the basis of treating the 
North Dakota operations as separable from the busi-
ness of the corporation conducted elsewhere. The Court 
speaking through Judge Lewis refused to permit the 
reassessment as made and stated, page 747: 
"Theories of allocation can have no place in 
the inquiry, if net income within the state stands 
on its own footing unmixed with outside business 
. . . We think it cannot be doubted that the prod-
ucts as brought into the state had an easily as-
certainable wholesale market price. We think ap-
pellee's business within the state is easily separ-
able from its other business by charging it with 
the wholesale price of the products which it sells 
in North Dakota. That would put it on an equality 
there with those who sell and do not produce and 
refine. By strong implication from the language 
of sections 10 and 27 business without the state 
is to be disregarded, if that within the state is 
easily and certainly separable from that without, 
thus creating an exception to the methods in each 
of the three sections for the ascertainment of net 
income." 
Standard Oil Co. v. Thoresen, 29 F . 2d 708 (1928) 
(CCA 8) again involved the North Dakota tax statute 
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but in a modified form from that considered by the court 
in the preceding case. The statute in its modified form 
provided for the allocation of income under a different 
statutory apportionment formula. The statute stated 
that there should be allocated as attributable to business 
within the state such percentage of the total income of the 
corporation as the tangible property and business within 
the state bore to the total property and business of the 
corporation, the percentage of property and business be-
ing separately determined and the two percentages aver-
aged. The business factor in turn was measured by pay-
roll and purchases plus receipts from sales. The statute 
further provided that payroll should be assigned to the 
office, agency or place of business of the corporation at 
which the employee chiefly worked or from which he was 
sent out or with which he was chiefly connected. Pur-
chases were assigned to the office, agency or place of 
business at or from which such purchases were chiefly 
handled and attended to with respect to the negotiation 
and execution. Eeceipts from sales were assigned to the 
office, agency or place of business of the corporation 
at or from which the transaction giving rise to such re-
ceipts were chiefly handled and attended to with re-
spect to the negotiation and execution. The statute like-
wise contained a provision for alternative methods of 
allocation somewhat similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah 
statute. 
The corporation filed a return under the statute not 
on the basis of a separate accounting for its North Da-
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kota operations, but on the basis of that portion of its 
total income everywhere derived which the North Dakota 
statutory formula, as described above, allocated to North 
Dakota, 
Thereafter, the tax commissioner made an additional 
assessment against the corporation "based upon the allo-
cation to that state of a portion of the income made by the 
oil company in the business of producing crude oil from 
the ground, and in the business of manufacturing and 
refining the crude oil, although it neither produced a 
barrel of oil in the state of North Dakota nor did it refine 
any oil in that state." The Court, in an opinion by Dis-
trict Judge Pollock, stated at page 710: 
"The question presented for decision in this 
case is this: Does the law of the state of North 
Dakota require the plaintiff to pay taxes on its 
producing and refining oil business done al-
together in states other than that state because of 
the fact it is engaged in the business of marketing 
refined oil in that state?" 
With respect to the contention of the state that the 
statutory formula should be applied because the ''lousi-
ness of plaintiff may and should for the purpose of tax-
ation be regarded as a unit m the production, transpor-
tation, refining and marketing of oil," the Court con-; 
ceded that the unit theory of taxation sought to be applied 
by the state "is alright and has been upheld by the su-
preme court" in such cases as Underwood Typewriter 
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, and Adams Express 
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Company v. Ohio, supra. The Court indicated, however, 
that such cases were inapplicable to the present situa-
tion and stated at page 711: 
"There is a unity of use of the different ap-
pliances and agencies employed by the express 
company and on this ground the tax of Ohio was 
upheld; but the right of the plaintiff or any other 
corporation or citizen to engage in different char-
acter of business in different states, or in the 
same state, must be conceded. The plaintiff in this 
case is engaged in the production of crude oil in 
those states wherein crude oil is found. There 
is no crude oil discovered in the state of North 
Dakota, The plaintiff has also engaged in the 
manufacture and refining of crude oils in many 
states, but has not done so in the state of North 
Dakota, It has engaged in marketing refined oil 
alone in that state. On its properties within the 
state of North Dakota employed in the business 
of marketing oil, and on the income arising from 
the doing of that business within the state of 
North Dakota it may be there taxed by the state 
and the tax must be paid. On its business of pro-
ducing and refining oil it should be taxed only by 
the state in which this production is found or 
refining done. In the manufacture or refining of 
crude oil in different states it must be taxed and 
pay its taxes within said states; others, not en-
gaged in the production or refining of oils, engage 
in the marketing of refined oils in the state of 
North Dakota. It is conceded to be a very easy 
matter for the state to determine the market value 
of refined oils within its borders at any time and 
place, and on this, having ascertained the selling 
price, to determine the tax necessary to be paid. 
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"As tending to the view of the case here taken, 
the recent decision of this court in Fisher, State 
Treasurer of North Dakota v. Standard Oil Com-
pany, 12 F . 2d 744, opinion by Judge Lewis. 
" I t follows the decree should be reversed and 
case remanded, with directions to enter decree in 
favor of the plaintiff in accordance with this opin-
ion." 
The problem of allocation by separate accounting 
versus allocation by statutory formula was again in-
volved, this time before the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin, in Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Wisconsin Tax 
Commission, 223 N.W. 85 (1929). In this case it appeared 
that the corporation did business within and without the 
state of Wisconsin and was engaged in the business of 
producing, refining, transporting and marketing petrol-
eum products and by-products in eleven midwestern 
states. I ts refining operations were centered in Indiana. 
I t s property within the state of Wisconsin consisted chief -
ly of tanks and filling stations required to supply the 
Wisconsin demand. Practically no manufacturing was 
done within the state of Wisconsin. The Tax Commis-
sion, on the theory that the business of the corporation 
was a unitary business, made an assessment computed 
under the Wisconsin statutory formula based upon the 
average of the three factors of tangible property, manu-
facturing costs and sales. The Wisconsin statute pro-
vided that persons engaged in business within and with-
out the state should be taxed only on such income as is 
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derived from business transacted and property located 
within the state. The statute likewise included a provi-
sion similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah statute permit-
ting an allocation by separate accounting when in the 
judgment of the tax commission that method would rea-
sonably reflect the income properly assignable to the 
state. 
The court, in an opinion by Judge Bosenberry, stated 
at page 87 : 
"The plaintiff contends that its income should 
be ascertained by the allocation and separate ac-
counting method by which the Wisconsin busi-
ness is charged at the market price with all prod-
ucts received by it, with the expense of transacting 
the business, including a proper allocation of gen-
eral or overhead expenses and office accounting; 
there should be credited to Wisconsin the gross 
amount received from sales of goods within the 
state, and that the difference constitutes the tax-
able income of the plaintiff company." 
The position of the state is set forth in extracts from 
the argument of the Attorney General of the state con-
tained in a footnote. It was argued that the use of the 
separate accounting method would lead to the exclusion 
of income and deductions resulting from business acti-
vities and property located within Wisconsin. It was, 
further argued as follows: 
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"The appellant's method of accounting does 
not clearly separate the Wisconsin business and 
income from the entire business and income of the 
company. The crude oil is refined by the appel-
lant's refineries and the resultant gasoline, re-
fined oil and by-products, are billed to the sales 
department at assigned billing prices. Each de-
partment of the company which has a part in the 
making or handling of the product, charges a 
profit, which profit is treated as a cost to the next 
department receiving the product. Thus, the de-
partmental books of the appellant show estimated 
fictitious profits on products not yet sold. It is 
easy to see that this method of accounting cannot 
be used for all purposes, and especially not for 
income tax purposes." 
The Court rejected the argument of the state and 
stated at page 88: 
"We regard as unsound the argument sub-
mitted to sustain the commission's position in this 
case. If the manufacturing profits of the plaintiff 
company are increased by means of sales opera-
tions in the state of Wisconsin, the converse is 
true that the sales operations in Wisconsin benefit 
by the manufacturing operations of the plaintiff 
corporation in other states. The argument cannot 
be applied one way and not the other. If it should 
appear that the manufacturing operations were 
conducted at a loss in other states, would it be 
claimed that some part of that loss might properly 
be charged to sales operations in the state of Wis-
consin to diminish the Wisconsin income! We 
think not. There are some operations which from 
their very nature produce an income which cannot 
he properly allocated by separate accounting 
methods, instances of which are the telegraph, 
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telephone, and express companies. They stand 
ready to serve whoever may apply for service and 
the entire operation constitutes a unit of service. 
That is not the case with the manufacturing and 
sales business, particularly so where the accounts 
are so kept as to be readily separable. 
"Nor do we find anything in Underwood 
Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain . . . inconsistent 
with our conclusion in this case. There was no 
separation on the basis of market value between 
the operations of the manufacturing department 
and the sales department as there is in this case. 
We perceive no reason why under the facts in 
this case, the profits derived from the sales op-
eration should not be ascertained so far as plain-
tiff is concerned as they would be if the sales op-
erations were conducted by a separate corporate 
entity. In either case the profits are earned at 
the same time and place." 
Piedmont and Northern Railway Co. v. Query, 56 F . 
2d 172 (1932), held that the South Carolina Tax Com-
mission could not employ the statutory formula on a mile-
age basis in computing the railroad company's income 
taxes with respect to two disconnected lines of railroads, 
one located entirely in South Carolina and the other 
entirely in North Carolina. 
I t appeared that the railway company, a South Caro-
lina corporation, owned one line of railroad entirely in 
South Carolina, extending from Spartenburg to Green-
wood, a distance of 101 miles. The other line located en-
tirely in North Carolina extended from Charlotte to 
Gastonia, a distance of 26 miles. The two lines of rail-
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road were 56 miles apart at the nearest point and were 
separately operated except as to certain expenses for 
general management. The railway company had paid 
taxes to South Carolina on the entire net income of the 
railroad in South Carolina including its earnings from in-
terstate as well as intrastate commerce. It paid no tax on 
the income of the railroad in North Carolina. The Tax 
Commission contended that the railway company should 
be taxed on the net income of the intrastate traffic of 
the South Carolina road plus a mileage proportion under 
the statute of the combined net income of interstate com-
merce of the two roads and imposed additional income 
taxes on this basis. The Court in an opinion by Judge 
Parker rejected the contention of the Tax Commission 
and stated at page 175: 
"The mileage proportion basis as applied to 
the interstate income of a railroad or a railroad 
system partly within the state ordinarily measures 
with reasonable accuracy the value of the property 
or the income earned within the state . . . I t will 
not be sustained, however, where the circum-
stances are such that its application results in tax-
ing the railroad on property beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the taxing power . . . " 
The foregoing cases, involving as they do judicial 
insistence on the use of separate accounting methods 
in lieu of the statutory formula in determining net income 
attributable to business within the taxing state, have 
a clear and obvious applicability to the facts of the case 
at bar. The cases hold that where a product is manu-
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factured in one state and transferred by the corpora-
tion to its "sales department" in another state at a fair 
and reasonable price, the state where the selling activity 
takes place is required to compute its tax, not on the basis 
of the statutory formula, but on the basis of the dif-
ference between the prices so charged or billed and the 
proceeds of sale within the state taking into account its 
other expenses within the state and a fair share of the 
corporation's out-of-state general overhead or adminis-
trative expenses. In the case at bar, the Utah Division's 
molybdenite, copper and other product is not charged to 
plaintiff's "sales department" but is transferred and 
charged to the sales subsidiary and A. S. & B.? separate 
and distinct companies, at fair and reasonable prices. 
Such prices are market prices less fair and reasonable 
deductions therefrom. Both the sales subsidiary and 
A. S. & E. earn, receive and are allowed to retain a fair 
profit for performing the selling activity outside Utah. 
A pair of cases both decided by the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin on April 15, 1941 are squarely on the point 
involved in the present appeal. The first case is Bur-
roughs Adding Machine Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commis-
sion, 237 Wis. 423, 297 N.W. 574. In this case it appeared 
that the appellant was a Missouri corporation duly quali-
fied to transact business in Wisconsin. Appellant, a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Burroughs Adding Machine 
Co., a Michigan corporation, was engaged in selling 
throughout the United States, Alaska and Hawaii various 
adding, calculating and bookkeeping machines manu-
factured by the parent company. The parent company 
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transacted no business and owned no property in Wis-
consin. In addition to the stock of appellant, the parent 
corporation owned the stock of 25 other subsidiaries en-
gaged in selling and servicing machines produced by the 
parent. The officers of appellant and the parent company 
were the same and there were several directors common 
to both companies. 
In 1921 appellant and the parent entered into a con-
tract under which appellant agreed to purchase from the 
parent all of the products manufactured by it. For these 
products appellant agreed to pay to the parent all sums 
received by it except such sums as would permit appel-
lant to earn annually 24% of the par value of appellant's 
capital stock. The corporations operated under this con-
tract until 1934, appellant receiving annually a net in-
come of 24% of $150,000.00 or $36,000 per year. In 1926 
the Tax Commission demanded a consolidated statement 
from appellant and the parent company. This was re-
fused and a doomage assessment was proposed and sus-
tained upon hearing. Injunction proceedings instituted 
in the Federal Court were denied. In 1930 the Commis-
sion again demanded consolidated statements but permit-
ted appellant, pending audit, to file returns stating the 
income as actually received and accounted for on its 
books with certain adjustments. Such returns were made 
for 1929 to 1933 inclusive. 
On January 1, 1934, a new contract was entered into 
under which sales were made by the parent to appellant 
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at a 50% discount from list prices and with the allocation 
to appellant of 90% of sales and advertising expenses 
uas well as a proportion of general expenses" (principally 
incurred for jointly used offices). This contract estab-
lished on a contractual basis the same discount, costs and 
expenses appellant used in computing its income for the 
years 1929 to 1933 inclusive, except that the apportion-
ment of general expenses under the new arrangement was 
somewhat more favorable to appellant and to that extent 
increased the latter's income. The Tax Commission re-
fused to accept the returns on the basis of the separate 
accounting of appellant and approved additional assess-
ments of tax on the basis of consolidating the income of 
appellant with that of its parent and applying to such 
consolidated income the statutory Wisconsin formula 
made up of the average of the three factors of property, 
sales and manufacturing costs. The parent and subsidi-
ary were treated by the Commission as a unit and a ratio 
between appellant's property, sales and costs in Wiscon-
sin to those of the parent and all of its subsidiaries every-
where was established. The opinion by Justice Wickhem 
states at page 575: 
"The question here is whether there is any 
authority in the Tax Commission under the pro-
visions of Section 71.25, stats., to require a con-
solidated return of the income of the parent and 
all subsidiaries and then to compute the tax ap-
portionable to Wisconsin in accordance with the 
factors set up in section 71.02 3d." 
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On the other hand, appellant asserted that the statute 
furnished no authority for disregarding the corporate 
entity and apportioning the tax on the basis of the statute 
which in terms applied only to single taxpayers doing 
business within and without the state. 
The position of the Tax Commission was thus identi-
cal with the position of plaintiff in the case at bar, that 
is to say, it was argued that the manufacturing opera-
tions of the parent company should be consolidated with 
those of the sales subsidiary and the statutory three-
factor formula applied to such consolidated income. 
After indicating that the duty of the Tax Commission 
is to determine the income which the taxpayer would have 
had had it not been for this income diverting contract, 
the Court continued, page 576: 
"The question, therefore, is whether a per-
centage of total consolidated income arrived at by 
taking an arithmetical average of the ratios of 
appellant's tangible property, sales and manufac-
turing costs in Wisconsin to total consolidated 
property, sales and manufacturing costs every-
where, establishes what appellant would have 
earned in Wisconsin had it not been for the con-
tract of 1921. I t is our conclusion that it does not 
do so. The fallacy in the method is that it attri-
butes to appellant that portion of the parent's in-
come which constitutes the latter's profit from the 
activities of appellant in Wisconsin." 
As is stated by Judge Cardozo in the Studebaker 
case, supra (244 N.Y. 114,155 N.E. 70): 
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"The tax has been laid upon the theory that 
the profit to the agent, in order to be fair and 
reasonable, must absorb the entire profit to the 
principal from the business of the agency . . . The 
privilege for which the appellant has been taxed 
is the privilege of selling in New York the prod-
ucts of its principal. The business transacted 
by the principal included the process of manufac-
ture carried on in Michigan and Indiana, a process 
which was anterior of necessity to any service by 
the agent. We find no basis for a holding that a 
fair agreement between the parent which manu-
factured and the subsidiary which sold would 
have given the whole profit to the subsidiary and 
nothing to the parent." 
"Judge Cardozo concedes, as did this court 
in the Curtis case, that if the selling agency is a 
mere bookkeeping device of the parent, there is 
power in the taxing state to assess the parent cor-
poration upon its activities there and to use a con-
solidated return to apportion the proper amount 
of this tax to the taxing state. But where a statute, 
as does Section 71.25, requires that the subsidiary 
be treated as an entity and its income established, 
the commission must comply and it may not do 
this by assigning to the subsidiary profits of the 
parent corporation from dealings with the sub-
sidiary. The use of the ratio is based upon the 
theory that a single taxpayer is involved and that 
the application to this taxpayer's total income of 
a percentage which is the average of the ratios 
gives a fair approximation of the entire income 
of this taxpayer in this state. Upon this theory, 
the use of ratios has been sustained. Hans Kees' 
Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 . . . This is 
what the application of the ratios in this case 
actually accomplished, and it matters little 
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whether appellant be considered an entity and 
hence taxed upon the income of another or 
whether the effect is to levy a tax indirectly upon 
the parent corporation. In neither case does the 
method answer the calls of section 71.25 . . . 
"As Judge Cardozo points out, there should 
be little difficulty in addressing the inquiry to 
the question how much would have been made had 
contracts not artificially controlled the income. 
A consideration of the usual or customary com-
missions and the normal and usual expenses of 
selling and servicing, the profit or loss on trade-
ins and other such matters, would bear directly 
upon the issue prescribed by section 71.25, and 
lead to an answer to the statutory question. This 
we hold to be the proper method of approach." 
The other Wisconsin case is that of Northern States 
Power Co. v. Tax Commission, 237 Wis. 433, 297 N.W. 
578. This case involved an appeal by Northern States 
Power Company and four affiliated companies against 
additional assessments of income taxes made by the Tax 
Commission. A chart on page 579 (N.W.) shows the 
common stock ownership of the principal affiliated com-
panies in the Northern States Power group. The chart 
shows Northern States Power Company (Delaware) own-
ing directly or indirectly the stock of fourteen corpora-
tions, including Northern States Power Company (Wis-
consin), and Northern States Power Company (Minne-
sota). All of the companies were in practical effect man-
aged by the same persons as officers and directors. The 
intercompany business relations and contracts are shown 
in detail on page 580. Under these intercompany ar-
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rangements, gas and electric energy would be sold from 
one company or division of a company to one of the other 
affiliated companies. For example, it is stated "Inter-
state Light and Power Company (Wis.) (Apple Eiver 
Div.) hydro-electric energy was disposed of by Northern 
States Power Company (Minn.)." The various subsidi-
aries were financed directly or indirectly by Northern 
States Power Co. (Del.) by loans upon which 6% interest 
compounded monthly was exacted. 
Each of the eight Wisconsin subsidiaries of the 
Delaware corporation reported their income to Wis-
consin for the year involved "upon a separate accounting 
basis." The Tax Commission concluded that the sepa-
rate accounting method used by the companies did not 
reflect their true income derived from business transacted 
in Wisconsin and made separate additional assessments 
against each of the Wisconsin subsidiary companies for 
the year 1930 to 1933, inclusive. 
In making its assessments the Tax Commission con-
solidated the total net income of the Delaware company 
and all of its subsidiaries, direct and indirect, including 
appellant. Against this total net income so determined, 
the Tax Commission applied the statutory three-factor 
formula and of the total net income so apportioned to 
Wisconsin attributed a portion thereof to each of the 
appellant taxpayers. 
The case involved particularly the production of 
power by the Wisconsin subsidiaries and the transfer and 
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sale of such power to the Minnesota subsidiaries for re-
sale to Minnesota customers. In applying the statutory 
three-factor formula, consisting of property, sales and 
manufacturing factors, the taxpayers apparently made no 
objection to use of the property and sales factors, but did 
object to use of a factor of units manufactured in lieu of 
the costs of manufacturing. The Tax Commission had 
decided that cost of manufacturing, if used instead of 
units manufactured, would have given an inequitable 
ratio "inasmuch as Wisconsin is predominantly hydro 
and Minnesota is predominantly steam." Thus the higher 
cost of production in Minnesota would have the effect 
of allocating income to that state disproportionate in 
amount. 
In its findings the Commission, among other things, 
held that it was not bound by the terms of the intercom-
pany arrangement between the companies, that it could 
consolidate and apportion the income of the companies 
as a group, that the intercorporate arrangements were 
not fair and reasonable, that the intercorporate arrange-
ments established an unfair price for the power produced 
by the Wisconsin affiliates and that the arrangements 
had the purpose and effect of evasion of the income tax 
law. It was also concluded that the use of common offi-
cers and directors "in effect made of the Wisconsin sub-
sidiaries mere branches of the parent corporation." 
On the appeal the taxpayers contended that each 
appellant should be treated as a single taxable entity, 
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that the commission had no power to consolidate the net 
incomes of the companies and apportion the same by 
formula, and that if the sales between the affiliated com-
panies were at an unfair price, the commission should 
ascertain the facts and fix a fair price and adjust the 
corporations' income accordingly. 
The Tax Commission, on the other hand, contended 
that where the separate accounting basis understated 
true Wisconsin income it was entitled under the statute 
to consolidate and apportion the income of the affiliated 
companies. 
The Court speaking through Chief Justice Kosen-
berry stated at page 584: 
"Without statutory authority the commission 
proceeds in this case to consolidate the incomes of 
the parent and affiliated companies and then to 
apply the formulas applicable to income taxes 
within and without the state. It not only does 
that but having found by formulas the income of 
all the Wisconsin affiliates, it proceeds to appor-
tion it among the affiliates by formulas. I t in 
effect treats the whole matter as if there was but 
one taxpayer and that the parent corporation, its 
Wisconsin income being apportioned among the 
Wisconsin affiliates. We find no authority in 
the statute for such procedure." 
Again, at page 585, it is stated: 
"As was stated in the Burroughs case, we find 
no insuperable difficulties in finding, if such be 
the fact, that a company is selling its products at 
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less than a fair price, or in finding that it is pur-
chasing products in a manner so as to create a loss 
or improper income, and after those facts have 
been determined, it should not be impossible to de-
termine what the reasonable profits would have 
been but for such arrangement, having due re-
gard to reasonable profit. Certainly the difficulty 
of solving such a problem falls far short of equal-
ling the difficulty of ascertaining a just and fair 
rate in a rate case. The result of the application 
of formulas in these cases, is as in the Burroughs 
Adding Machine Co. case, to allocate earnings 
to Wisconsin, which are made outside of the state 
by subsidiary corporations who have purchased 
products from Wisconsin corporations. What is 
to be taxed in Wisconsin under the income tax 
act is Wisconsin income. If a Wisconsin company 
manufactures a product which it sells outside of 
the state and the buyer thereafter resells it at a 
profit, Wisconsin can have no claim upon that 
profit. If the price paid for energy generated in 
Wisconsin is a fair price, the fact that a subsidi-
ary makes a profit upon a resale in Minnesota 
gives Wisconsin no right to tax the profit in Min-
nesota" 
In the case at bar neither plaintiff nor defendant 
has a right to ignore the intercompany arrangements 
with and the separate corporate entities of the sales 
subsidiary and A. S. & E, The price collected by plain-
tiff from the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. with respect 
to the Utah Division product being a fair price, the profit 
realized by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. on the re-
sale in New York or elsewhere outside Utah gives Utah 
no right whatsoever to tax such sales profit as allocated 
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by the parties in such contracts. The profit is earned 
by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. outside Utah. At 
the same time, however, Utah is entitled to a tax on the 
full profit earned by the Utah Division from its produc-
tion within Utah as arrived at on the basis of the inter-
company contracts and reflected on the separate accounts 
of the Utah Division's operation. 
We refer at this point to several leading and import-
ant cases which hold that the taxing officials are not 
bound by the intercompany prices agreed upon between 
affiliated companies where such contract prices are not 
fair or reasonable or arms-length prices but in effect 
constitute a fraud on the tax laws of the taxing state and 
represent devices to syphon out of the taxing state income 
earned from business done within the state. In this con-
nection reference is made to section 80-13-18, U.C.A. 
1943, which gives defendant specific statutory authority 
to distribute, apportion or allocate the gross income or 
deductions between or among corporations controlled 
by the same interests in order to prevent evasion of taxes 
or clearly to reflect the income of any of such corpora-
tions. Even in the absence of such specific statutory au-
thority, it is generally held by the Courts that taxing 
>Js may ignore sham transactions whose only pur-
>ffect is to evade the tax laws of the state. 
°mical v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 214 
X Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld 
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tax on the basis of the value of the charcoal, crude alcohol 
and acetate of lime produced by the corporation but dis-
tributed at cost to its two stockholders, Cleveland Cliffs 
Iron Company and Goodman Lumber Co. The Court 
stated at page 449 : 
"The value of the goods was readily ascer-
tained by the tax commission and the income of ap-
pellant was thereby fixed with certainty. The 
appellant claims that the income found by the 
tax commission is a theoretical income and not an 
actual income. In law that is certain which can 
be made certain. The income of the appellant was 
made certain by the application of correct princi-
ples of accounting and the tax thus ascertained/' 
To the same effect is In re Morton Salt Company, 95 
P . 2d 335 (1939), in which the Supreme Court of Kansas 
permitted the tax commission to treat a parent corpo-
ration and its foreign subsidiaries as a unitary business, 
where it appeared that the parent company made no 
profit on its manufactured product but sold such product 
to its sales subsidiaries at cost. The Court, after dis-
cussing certain Wisconsin and Massachusetts cases, stat-
ed at page 339 : 
"In the Wisconsin and Massachusetts ca^~* 
the business transactions between the paren+ 
poration and its subsidiary were condu^' 
basis which made a separate fair pre 
Because of this the Court held und^ 
lar statute applicable that for tb^ 
puting income tax the corpr 
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situation here. Appellant makes no profit from 
the manufactured product sold to its subsidiaries; 
it sells to them at cost. The result is that it sy-
phons out of this state its own profits for its 
manufacturing business in this state into its for-
eign state subsidiaries and collects that profit 
through the dividends declared to it by such sub-
sidiary. The two opinions in the Palmolive Co. 
case disclosed the formation of numerous corpo-
rate entities designed for the purpose of enabling 
the original corporation to evade income taxes in 
Wisconsin. So far as these corporations had any-
thing to do with the manufacture, distribution and 
sale of products, the court treated all of them as 
a unitary business, disregarding corporate forms. 
Even agreements between the manufacturing com-
pany and the selling companies on the cost of 
manufacture, plus 3% profit for certain years and 
plus a 6% profit for certain other years, was dis-
regarded as inadequate. Among the many corpo-
rations formed was one that dealt solely with ad-
vertising, and because of the nature of its busi-
ness it was not included within the group of cor-
porations treated as a unitary business." 
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Palmolive Co. v. Conway, is reported 
in 56 F. 2d 83 (1932). The decision of District Judge 
Lindley is reported in 43 F. 2d 226 (1930). In this case 
it appeared that the Palmolive Co. of Wisconsin which 
had manufactured and sold Palmolive soap in Milwaukee 
since 1894 was reorganized in 1923. As a result of the 
reorganization the parent company became the owner of 
all the property of the Wisconsin company outside Wis-
consin and became the owner of all the capital stock of 
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plaintiff. Plaintiff on the other hand became the owner 
of the Milwaukee plant and equipment and all of the 
stock of the Wisconsin Company. The Wisconsin com-
pany remained the owner of the Milwaukee inventory 
and accounts receivable relating to Wisconsin business. 
The three corporations were governed by officers and 
directors substantially identical. The parent company 
established its chief office in Chicago where it occupied 
seven floors. Plaintiff had no separate offices and no 
full time employees. I ts transactions were few and its 
books of records were kept by the office force of the par-
ent company. 
The parent company contracted with the Wisconsin 
company to buy the latter's entire output of Palmolive 
soap, except that sold in Wisconsin, for the year 1924 
at factory cost plus 3%. For 1925 and 1926 the agreed 
purchase price was fixed at factory cost plus 6%. 
District Judge Lindley, after reviewing the opera-
tions and profits realized before and after the reorgani-
zation and other pertinent facts, stated at page 229: 
"These and many other facts of like import 
and significance lead the Court to conclude that 
under the undisputed circumstances shown, and 
the intercorporate relations shown, the contract 
of factory cost plus percentage manufacture and 
sale to the parent company constituted a fraud 
upon the income tax laws of Wisconsin." 
He concluded that the reorganization of the old Wis-
consin company and the new intercompany arrangements 
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were designed solely to evade the Wisconsin tax and for 
the purpose of giving the appearance of removing from 
the state all income of the Wisconsin company over 6% 
plus factory cost, whereas in fact there was left within 
the state the same activities of production which existed 
prior to the new arrangement. Notwithstanding that the 
cost of production continued to be much the same after 
the reorganization as before, its previous average gross 
profit of 50% was cut down so that 90% of such gross 
profit was diverted from a Wisconsin source to a new 
apparent source in Chicago. Although the intercompany 
sales agreement was set aside the Court refused to set 
aside the arrangements with the affiliated advertising 
corporation known as the "Buckingham Agency." In this 
connection the Court at page 232 stated: 
"What has been said has been said with ref-
erence to the income of the Wisconsin company 
and plaintiff company earned in the State of 
Wisconsin. In the opinion of the court, the situa-
tion with regard to the income of the Buckingham 
Agency is different, and no part of such income 
should be allocated or charged to the plaintiff or, 
Wisconsin companies. That corporation was or-
ganized subsequent to the reorganization herein-
before discussed. I t had only one activity, the 
placing of advertising. Its activities were all out-
side of the state; they had no connection with the 
manufacture, but consisted of placing advertising 
of the parent company with advertising houses 
and collecting commissions thereon. No par t of 
its income was directly or indirectly earned in 
the state of Wisconsin; no par t of it is taxable 
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within the state; and, to the extent of the alloca-
tion thereof by the tax commission to Wisconsin 
there should be an injunction as prayed." 
In affirming the decree of the District Court, the 
Circuit Court speaking through Judge Alschuler stated 
at page 85: 
"But, apart from the foregoing, we will give 
some consideration to the Wisconsin company's 
profits as undertaken to be fixed by its contract 
with the parent company. While intercorporate 
contracts fixing the income or profits of a sub-
sidiary are not per se fraudulent or void as 
against state taxation of the subsidiary is income, 
concededly they will not stand in the way of as-
cribing to the subsidiary a reasonable income from 
the operation which it carries on within the income 
taxing state. A stipulated percentage of profit 
upon manufacturing cost might in many cases be 
fair enough if all cost factors were included; but 
with substantial cost items omitted the agreed 
percentage might prove only a delusion." 
The Court also stated page 87 : 
"Having in mind the magnitude of the busi-
ness here involved, we believe the commission 
reached a conclusion which sufficiently approxi-
mates justice between this taxpayer and the state 
as to require approval of the result." 
A somewhat similar situation was presented in Bukk 
Motor Company v. City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 48 F . 
2d 801 (1931) (CCA 7). The decision of District Judge 
Geiger in this case is reported in 43 F . 2d 385 (1930). 
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The case involved the validity of a reassessment of state 
income taxes by the Wisconsin Tax Commission for the 
years 1917 to 1924 of Buick Motor Company, a Michigan 
corporation, licensed to do business in Wisconsin. The 
company with a capital stock of $10,000.00 was a wholly 
owned subsidiary of General Motors Company, a Dela-
ware corporation. Under contract dated January 2? 1917, 
General Motors Company, termed the "seller," contracted 
with Buick Motor Company, termed the "buyer," to sell 
to the buyer the entire output of automobiles produced 
at the seller's Buick factory at Flint, Michigan, upon a 
basis which would result in an annual net profit of 
$2500.00 to the buyer on said business. The contract 
had unlimited duration. 
During the years involved appellant's annual sales 
of cars and parts ranged from a minimum of $89,000,000 
to a maximum of $231,000,000, the annual sales of the 
Wisconsin branch ranging from $2,454,000 to $6,800,000. 
The cars and parts sold by the Wisconsin branch were 
billed to the branch by appellant at about the same price 
as to independent distributors and were shipped from 
General Motors factory at Flint, Michigan and remit-
tances were made by customers to the Wisconsin branch 
which, having no bank account of its own, sent the remit-
tances as received to General Motors. For the year 1917 
ppellant returned as income to Wisconsin the sum of 
,018.42, later contending that its income was only $2,-
% which was the amount of income annually returned 
Ae years thereafter. For 1919 the tax commis-
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sion added as further income the sum of $80,051.00 repre-
senting in the main Wisconsin's portion of a total amount 
held by appellant as reserves for dealer's rebate. In 
1920 the commission signified its dissatisfaction with ap-
pellant's general plan of return of income. Correspond-
ence and discussions ensued, and resulted in 1921 in the 
innauguration of the general practice of treating appel-
lant's Wisconsin branch as though the branch were an 
independent jobber or distributor of the Buick products. 
Amended returns were accordingly filed for 1919 and 
1920 but none for prior years under which a portion of 
the income tax paid for 1919 was refunded to appellant. 
For subsequent years returns were filed on this basis. 
However, in 1926 the commission caused an audit to be 
made of appellants' accounts as well as those of General 
Motors. The commission concluded from the audit that 
the returns did not truly reflect the income from Wis-
consin business and accordingly made a reassessment 
of tax. The Court in an opinion by Judge Alschuler 
stated at page 803: 
"But it is insisted that the intercorporate con-
tract relation should be given effect, and that the 
stipulated $2500.00 of net profit to appellant 
should be held to be the maximum of appellant's 
actual taxable income for each of the years in 
question. Whether the contract, as between the 
contracting parties, is upon its face fraudulent, 
does not concern the state in the matter of it 
taxes upon income derived from business tran 
acted within its limits. Whatever other purpr 
such a contract might have, the conclusion 
quite irresistable that one of its objec+ 
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transfer the income arising from the business of 
such states as then had, or might thereafter enact, 
an income tax law, so that the income would not be 
taxable in the state where earned. This motive 
might not alone warrant the state in ignoring 
the contract, but if appellant, notwithstanding 
the contract, continued to earn the income upon 
business transacted within the state, the contract 
would not serve to defeat the right of the state 
to tax the income so earned." 
Again 
"'While appellant carried on this vast busi-
ness under an arrangement with General Motors 
wjiereby the profits realized at once passed to 
General Motors, the profits constituted taxable 
income in Wisconsin where they passed to the 
single beneficial owner of the capital stock. Dis-
tribution of corporate profits to or among stock-
holders, by whatever form, does not relieve the 
corporation from income tax on what is earned 
and distributed." 
The Court cited the Cliffs Chemical and Shaffer v. Car-
ter cases, hertofore mentioned. 
In the case at bar, running like a thread through 
plaintiff's argument, is the suggestion that because plain-
tiff is qualified to do business in New York where the 
sales subsidiary transacts the business of selling plain-
tiff's Utah molybdenite and copper product, the opera-
*s of the two companies should be scrambled together 
1 unit. Of some interest on this point is the state-
-f the Court at page 804: 
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"I t is maintained for appellant that General 
Motors was also licensed to do business in Wis-
consin, and that if this income from the selling 
of Buick products were taxable in Wisconsin, it 
should be assessable to General Motors as its in-
come. But appellant is a distinct corporation, 
which had contracted with General Motors to buy 
and sell Buick automobiles and parts, and it was 
this separate entity which transacted this business 
in Wisconsin, and to this entity the state had a 
right to look for its tax upon the profit arising in 
Wisconsin on the transaction of this business 
there. Judge Geiger's opinion has, in our judg-
ment, well demonstrated that the intercorporate 
contract does not limit the state to a tax upon the 
income which the contract assumes to prescribe." 
Also running like a thread throughout plaintiff's 
argument is the suggestion that the sales subsidiary in 
selling the Utah product is acting for plaintiff repre-
sentatively and not individually in the course of its 
own business. This matter will be discussed hereafter 
in more detail under Point 3 of this brief. We take the 
liberty, however, of referring to Judge Geiger's state-
ment and analysis of this point at page 390: 
uThis particular contract provides for a 25% 
profit on a capital of $10,000.00. If it must be 
respected, then a contract eliminating all profit 
retainable by the plaintiff ought to be just as 
valid. Certainly, on its face, it negatives the pur-
pose of creating an ordinary agency, and the voir 
ume of business transacted by the plaintiff d-
not indicate a good-faith purpose to allow f 
per year as reasonable compensation for the 
of a distinct and separate entity which assur 
^ ^ 
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sponsibility, as such, for the enormous business 
transacted. In my judgment, it cannot be true, 
as plaintiff asserts, 'were the contract involved 
made with General Motors by an individual in-
stead of plaintiff, we may assume that it would 
pass everywhere unchallenged as determinative 
of that individual's income.' The assumptions that 
the contract made by an individual would be anal-
ogous and of unquestioned validity when tested 
out under a tax law would, so it is believed, de-
pend upon the identical consideration urged 
against the plaintiff, viz. whether the individual 
professed or insisted that the business transacted 
was his individually or whether it was his repre-
sentatively; what, if any, purpose could be dis-
cerned in his willingness to transact a country-
wide volume for little or no consideration in 
either capacity; and what, above all, is to account 
for the rather anamolous and practically inde-
terminate manner of fixing a purchase considera-
tion." 
Again, it is stated: 
"And the record for the Tax Commission, 
in this case, is not only consistent with, but largely 
predicated upon, the idea that the income arising 
on the business transacted came to the motor 
company, not on business which it transacted in 
the state, but solely upon devolution by the plain-
tiff to the motors company under or by virtue of 
the con t rac t . . . 
" I t is my judgment that when the business 
transacted is found to be plaintiffs, conceding the 
'subsidiary' relation to General Motors, the tax 
authorities of the state were not obliged to re-
spect the contract as an instrumentality relieving 
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plaintiff, in whole or in part, from the effective-
ness of the tax law against the income arising in 
or on such business." 
The Buick case is clear authority for the proposition 
that where by intercompany contract the wholly owned 
subsidiary undertakes to sell the product produced by its 
parent the business of selling is the separate and distinct 
business of the subsidiary and this notwithstanding that 
the producing parent may be qualified to do business in 
the state where the sales subsidiary in conducting the sell-
ing business. If the intercompany contract does not give 
the sales subsidiary a fair and reasonable profit for con-
ducting the selling business, the taxing authorities may 
adjust the terms of the contract and determine the profit 
which would have been earned if the contract had been 
negotiated on a fair, reasonable and arms-length basis. 
In the case at bar, it is the specific fact that the inter-
company contracts between plaintiff and its sales sub-
sidiary and A. S. & E. transfer the Utah product to the 
selling companies at a fair, reasonable and arms-length 
consideration. In such circumstances, neither defendant 
nor plaintiff are entitled to have this contract set aside. 
The contract is binding on both the taxpayer and the tax 
authorities. 
The doctrine of the foregoing cases is again illustrat-
ed by the decision of this Court in Columbia Iron Mining 
Co. v. Iron County, 230 P. 2d 324 (1951). In this case 
the court held that defendant was not bound to accept the 
price for iron ore contained in the intercompany contract 
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between Columbia Iron Mining Co. and Geneva Steel Co., 
both wholly owned subsidiaries of United States Steel 
Corporation, where it appeared that such prices were 
below fair market value and thereby avoided the payment 
of the fair amount of taxes on iron ore. The Court speak-
ing through Mr. Justice McDonough stated at page 327: 
"As between subsidiaries, the ore selling sub-
sidiary and the ore buying subsidiary, the opera-
tions are controlled by the parent corporation, 
and the United States Steel Corporation as such 
parent corporation is the ultimate owner. It was 
not the intent of the legislature to permit a cor-
poration which operates in this state through 
wholly owned subsidiaries, to allow one subsidiary 
to sell to another subsidiary at a price which is be-
low fair market value, and thereby avoid payment 
of the fair amount of taxes. In such cases, the 
ultimate owner is the parent corporation, and the 
state tax commission is not required to adopt the 
intercompany sales as the basis for the assess-
ment." 
It may be of interest to note that this decision, which 
was rendered a few months following the denial of plain-
tiff's petition for rehearing in Case No. 7298, required 
administrative implementation. In lieu of contract values 
of approximately $1.55 per ton of iron ore, a new fair 
market value of the iron ore had to be ascertained by de-
fendant. The values finally arrived at and determined 
were the values used by the state of Minnesota taxing 
authorities in determining the value of iron ore at the 
mouth of the iron mines in Minnesota. Such values in 
Minnesota are determined annually by working back from 
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the published prices of iron ore at the Lower Lake Ports. 
From such published prices are subtracted the transpor-
tation and other expenses incurred in getting the ore 
from the mouth of the mine to the Lower Lake Ports. 
Such values when transplanted to Utah have resulted in 
tax values of iron ore in the neighborhood of $4.50 to 
$6.50 per ton depending upon the grade, character and 
composition of the ore. Such values are now used by 
defendant for net proceeds, occupation tax and franchise 
tax purposes and have not been appealed for judicial 
reviews 
We turn now to a pair of decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Kansas covering, not the reasonableness of in-
tercompany sales prices, but the reasonableness of an 
intercompany contract between parent and subsidiary 
company covering management and administrative ser-
vices rendered by the parent to and for the subsidiary 
company. These cases are pertinent to the case at bar 
when it is recalled that for the period 1931 to 1936 the 
Utah Division w a^s not a division of plaintiff but an affi-
liated company, Utah Copper Company. The record 
shows that both from an accounting and operating stand-
point, the Utah Division is a separate unit of plaintiff, 
separable from plaintiff's other divisions and subsidi-
aries. In other words, the mandate of this court in No. 
7298 requiring defendant to compute the tax on the basis 
of the separate accounts of the Utah Division is in cer-
tain respects equivalent to requiring the Utah Division 
to be treated as a separate and distinct entity or unit 
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from plaintiff's other operating divisions or subsidiaries. 
The question, heretofore mentioned, arises as to the 
extent to which the New York management and adminis-
trative expenses should be allowed as a deduction on the 
separate books and tax returns of the Utah Division. In 
computing the net income of the Utah Division arising 
from business done in Utah, the Utah Division's fair and 
proportionate share of the New York administrative 
expenses as reflected on its books has been allowed as a 
deduction by defendant on the Utah tax returns. It will 
be remembered that the Cottonwood Coal Co. case, here-
tofore cited, holds specifically that the maintenance of an 
out-of-state administrative office by a mining company 
conducting mining operations within the taxing state does 
not require an apportionment of income outside the state 
in which the mining operations are conducted. 
Nutrena Mills Inc. v. Kansas State Tax Commission, 
91 P. 2d 15 (1939), involved a corporation organized un-
der the laws of Missouri engaged principally in the busi-
ness of manufacturing and selling feed for livestock and 
having its principal manufacturing plant in Kansas where 
it was duly authorized to do business. All of its stock 
•wned by Miller Management Corporation, a Mis-
cation, not qualified to do business in Kansas 
on states that "the evidence is that it per-
ils services for Nutrena Mills, Inc., in the 
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On June 23, 1934, the subsidiary entered into a writ-
ten contract with its parent under which the parent 
agreed to furnish to the subsidiary "complete manager-
ial superintendence and executive control for the proper, 
efficient and economical operation of the business and 
affairs" of the subsidiary. For such services the sub-
sidiary agreed to pay $4.50 to the parent for each ton of 
feed manufactured by the subsidiary. For the year 1935 
this amount was reduced to $3.25 per ton. In filing its 
tax returns for the years 1934 and 1935 in Kansas the 
subsidiary deducted $47,308.85 for 1934 and $129,001.67 
for 1935 because of the management and financial 
charges. The Tax Commission readjusted these amounts, 
allowing $7,000 for 1934 and $33,580 for 1935, these being 
the sums actually paid by the parent for salaries of the 
officers of the subsidiary. The balance was treated as 
dividends from the subsidiary to the parent and accord-
ingly taxable to the subsidiary. The Kansas law and 
regulations permitted the deduction of all 'ordinary and 
necessary' expenses paid in carrying on a business and 
permitted the deduction of a reasonable allowance for 
salaries or other compensation paid for personal services 
actually rendered. 
The subsidiary taxpayer argued that tbr 
per ton agreed upon were fair and reasonal 
It appeared, however, that the subsidiary'* 
commission for 1933 showed that its net r 
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to have been 46c plus for 1933, to have been $1.85 for 1934 
(up to June 1) and had never approached anything like 
$4.50 per ton. The Court stated page 18: 
"Hence, the agreement is open to the interpre-
tation that the price per ton which by its contract 
of June 1934, the Nutrena Mills, Inc., agreed to 
pay the Miller Management Corporation for its 
management and financial services was fixed so 
high that it would take all of the profits of the 
Nutrena Mills, Inc., even though they might be 
greatly in excess of the previous profit of the 
company." 
Again, 
"The Nutrena Mills, Inc., had its manufactur-
ing plant in Kansas and transacted its business in 
this state and is liable for income taxes here. If, 
as argued by appellee, it was to syphon out of this 
state and into another state the profits made by 
Nutrena Mills, Inc., in Kansas by a contract to 
pay the out-of-state corporation a sum grossly 
in excess of the reasonable value of its services 
to Nutrena Mills, Inc., that fact should not defeat 
the collection of the income tax from the Nutrena 
Mills, Inc., by this state." 
The other Kansas case is Wyandotte County Gas 
Company v. State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, 
127 P. 2d 481 (1941). In this case it appeared that the ap-
pellant Wyandotte County Gas Company was the operat-
ing gas company of the Cities Service organization in the 
Kansas City area, In filing its Kansas income tax return 
for 1937 the company claimed a deduction of $30,120.20 
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from gross income which amount represented a manage-
ment fee paid to its parent, Cities Service Company. Such 
fee had been computed under an intercompany contract 
dated September 1,1929 on the basis of 1%% of its gross 
revenue. 
The commission disallowed the deduction in its en-
tirety finding as follows: 
"The commission further finds that the New 
York management fees paid to the Cities Service 
Company were based upon a percentage of gross 
income and were computed without regard to ac-
tual services rendered. Such fees, therefore, do 
not constitute an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness e x p e n s e . . . " 
No attempt was made before the commission or in the 
District Court to show the value of any services rendered 
the taxpayer by the Cities Service Co. or in fact that 
any services had been rendered. The Court cited the 
Nutrena Mills, Inc. case and sustained the commission. 
Under these cases and the separate accounting cases 
cited heretofore, the most that plaintiff should be entitled/' 
to charge and deduct against the net income from its 
Utah operations is a fair distributive share of the New 
York administrative expenses to the extent that such 
expenses are reasonable in amount and cover services 
actually rendered by the New York administrative per-
sonnel to the activities of the Utah operation. There is 
not the slightest showing or contention in the present pro-
ceeding that the amount of New York administrative 
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expenses allowed by defendant is unfair, unreasonable 
or in an amount less than the fair value which such ser-
vices contributed to the net income earned by the Utah 
Division. In fact Mr. Henry B. Fernald testified as fol-
lows (See F . page 157): 
"Q. And the general and administrative overhead 
of the New York Office has been properly al-
located in par t to the Utah Division ? 
A. I think I can say it has been properly allo-
cated, but understanding that there are some 
of the general expenses of the corporation 
on which there has been no attempt to distri-
bute, division by division; but they are left as 
general expenses of the corporation, which 
in the aggregate are quite minor in total 
amount." 
The Cottonwood Coal Company case, the Standard 
Oil Company cases, and the other cases heretofore refer-
red to show clearly and conclusively that the Utah tax 
may and should be assessed on the basis of the net income 
of the Utah Division separately computed on plaintiff's 
books of account where the segregation of income on 
such books of account is based upon market values which 
on a fair basis allocate some of the profits to the state 
of production and some of the profits to the state where 
the selling business is transacted, providing that a fair 
share of out-of-state administrative overhead is charged 
back against the operation in the state of production. 
Such segregation of income on a separate accounting 
basis Is required in such circumstances even though 
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the taxpayer corporation itself in its own name and in the 
regular course of its own business conducts both the 
manufacturing and selling operations. The selling acti-
vities of Standard Oil in North Dakota, for example, 
were not conducted by a separate subsidiary of the tax-
payer corporation, but were conducted by its own "sell-
ing department." 
In the case at bar, the selling activity has been 
separately incorporated and all sales are handled by and 
in the name of the separate and distinct subsidiary cor-
poration. Computation of the tax on the company en-
gaging in the production operations must be computed 
on the segregated books of account if such accounts re-
flect fair and reasonable intercompany arrangements 
between the affiliated companies. The net income which 
plaintiff derives in New York from the selling operations 
separately conducted by its wholly owned sales subsidi-
ary is derived from the dividends which plaintiff re-
ceives annually from such subsidiary. During the period 
here involved, plaintiff received dividends from the sales 
subsidiary aggregating $1,240,000. Such dividends to-
gether with all of plaintiff's other investment income has 
been allocated to New York and excluded from the Utah 
tax base. All of the net income from the molybdenite 
and blister copper produced by the Utah Division in Utah 
is attributable to Utah and is earned from Utah busi-
ness solely and exclusively. All of the Utah products 
being transferred to the sales subsidiary and A. S. & R. 
at fair prices for resale, plaintiff on a separate account-
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ing basis is entitled to no apportionment of income with-
in and without the state of Utah merely by virtue of the 
maintenance of an out-of-state administrative office. 
Where allocation to the taxing state is made by 
separate accounting methods the only thing required with 
respect to the out-of-state administrative office is that 
a fair share of such general out-of-state overhead be 
charged against the separable local operation.Were this 
not so, there would be no such thing as allocation by 
direct separate accounting methods. The statutory for-
mula would be applicable to all cases, the only difference 
being the question whether such statutory formula should 
be applied to the total net income of the corporation from 
all sources or whether it should as a matter of right en-
title the taxpayer to apply it against the separate net 
income shown and calculated on his separate set of books 
as attributable to the operations conducted within the 
producing state. The mere existence of an out-of-state 
administrative office would thus require the state of pro-
duction to allocate income within and without the state 
by formula in every and all cases. This is clearly not 
the law as the foregoing cases cited under this point show. 
A different case would be presented, of course, where 
the taxpayer corporation comes forth and shows that the 
existence of the out-of-state administrative office has 
subjected him to an income or franchise tax in the state 
in which the administrative office is located. In such a 
case a question of double taxation of the same net income 
might be involved. 
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In the case at bar, plaintiff has not shown nor does it 
now claim that any question of double taxation is in-
volved. It makes no claim that any portion of the net 
income of the Utah Division is taxable or has been sub-
jected to tax by the New York taxing authorities. This 
feature of the case is particularly important because a 
computation of tax under Subdivision 8 of the Utah 
Statute under the mandate of this Court in Case No. 
7298 requires defendant in computing the tax to take into 
account whether or not the assessment will result in 
double taxation. This failure of plaintiff to make any 
claim of double taxation is particularly significant also 
when we look at plaintiff's Utah operations from the 
standpoint of New York's similar franchise tax law. 
New York's claim for tax against net income arising from 
plaintiff's Utah Division is negligible, if any. In the first 
place, New York sees a corporation which by separate 
accounts has attributed all of the net income of the Utah 
operations to the Utah separate division of the company. 
If New York accepts and recognizes such separate and 
segregated accounting methods it sees on such books no 
net income of the Utah Division allocated or apportioned 
to New York. In the second place, if New York sought 
to apply its statutory formula based upon property, pay-
roll and gross receipts against plaintiff, it is faced with 
the fact that all of the property of the Utah Division is 
located outside New York, all of the payroll of the divi-
sion is located outside New York and all gross receipts 
from sales of the Utah product are negotiated and effect-
ed by a separate and distinct corporate entity, to wit, 
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the sales subsidiary or A. S. & R. as the case may be. 
In these circumstances and on the present record it may, 
therefore, be fairly concluded that not $1.00 of net income 
which plaintiff in the case at bar is seeking to exclude 
from the Utah tax base has been taxed or is legally sub-
ject to tax by any jurisdiction as arising from or attribut-
able to the doing of business outside the state of Utah. 
Plaintiff's net income from the Utah molybdenite and 
blister copper product is in its full 100% amount net in-
come earned from its land and mines and other opera-
tions in Utah. The market values determined under the 
intercompany contracts between plaintiff and its sales 
subsidiary and A. S. & E. constitute the separate gross 
proceeds or their equivalent for the purpose of net pro-
ceeds, occupation tax and corporation franchise tax of 
plaintiff's Utah Division. Deduction of the out-of-state 
administrative, selling, refining, transportation and 
marketing expenses from gross proceeds actually realized 
represents Utah gross income which arises from the pri-
vilege of engaging in a local business which has been 
granted to plaintiff by the State of Utah. No other state 
or foreign country has or in the nature of the case could 
have any claim for tax against this income or the privi-
lege for which it is exacted. As a further illustration of 
principle, see State v. Harnpel, 178 N.W. 244 (1920), 
held that income from out-of-state land and mines 
*r> Michigan was not taxable in Wisconsin when 
'^tees resident in Wisconsin and distri-
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buted to Wisconsin beneficiaries, such beneficiaries being 
stockholders of the corporation previously owning such 
land and mines. 
To summarize, defendant urges here under point 2 
that the full 100% net income of the Utah Division con-
stitutes plaintiff's Utah corporation franchise tax base. 
This follows for the reason that plaintiff by fair and rea-
sonable intercompany contracts with the sales subsidiary 
and A. S. & E. has allocated by corporate contract the 
profits attributable to Utah business and earned from 
the Utah molybdenite and blister copper product. De-
fendant also urges that the profit on the sale of the prod-
ucts is earned by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. out-
side Utah, that such selling profit based on intercompany 
contract is fair and reasonable, that in the absence of 
fraud or an intent to evade the Utah tax neither plaintiff 
nor defendant in this proceeding may set aside the inter-
company contracts with or the separate corporate entities 
of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E,, that the out-of-
state expense incurred by plaintiff with respect to the 
Utah product does not constitute out-of-state business 
by plaintiff or its Utah Division, that a tax required to be 
computed on the basis of a direct allocation by separate 
accounting methods must be based on such separate ac-
counts and not on the basis of the statutory formula an 
plied to such separate accounts, and that the fair vr 
of the Utah molybdenite and blister copper product 
on the intercompany contracts with the sales 
and A. S. & E. less the out-of-state ex^ 
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statutory allowances have already been judicially deter-
mined to constitute the proper tax base with respect to 
plaintiff's Utah operations for net proceeds and occupa-
tion tax purposes. 
It would appear that plaintiff's case on this appeal 
will turn mainly on the question whether the separate 
corporate entity of the sales subsidiary may be set aside 
and ignored. Both before the defendant below and here 
on appeal, plaintiff seeks to ignore the separate corpo-
rate entity of the sales subsidiary either on the ground of 
"agency" or on the ground that being a wholly owned and 
dominated subsidiary of plaintiff, defendant and this 
court should look through the corporate form and treat 
the sales subsidiary as a mere department or adjunct 
of plaintiff in carrying on and conducting plaintiff's 
business. In other words, plaintiff is arguing that the 
sales subsidiary is the alter ego of plaintiff because domi-
nated by its sole stockholder. On the other hand, if re-
garded as a separate entity, it is urged that it is acting 
"representatively" and not "individually," conducting 
plaintiff's business but not its own business. 
The cases and authorities to be discussed under 
Point 3, together with the authorities discussed here 
under this Point 2, all show clearly and conclusively that 
in the absence of fraud or evasion the separate corpo-
rate entity must be recognized and accepted for tax pur-
poses. By definition the word "taxpayer" means one 
corporation, not two or more corporations, except where 
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in pursuance of the law in such cases provided, affiliated 
companies are permitted to file a consolidated tax re-
turn covering the operations of the companies as if they 
were a single entity. Unless affiliated companies join in 
a consolidated tax return the tax liability of each com-
pany must be separately computed providing the inter-
company contracts and arrangements are fair and reason-
able and have been negotiated upon an arms-length basis. 
It should be recalled at this point that plaintiff's 
sales subsidiary, a New York corporation, has never 
qualified to transact nor has it in fact transacted busi-
ness within the state of Utah. The consolidated return 
provisions of the Utah franchise tax lawT and defendant's 
regulations issued thereunder manifest a clear intent that 
only affiliated companies subject to taxation in Utah 
may file a consolidated tax return. Where such consoli-
dated returns are filed, intercompany transactions are 
ignored and one tax computed with respect to the entire 
group of affiliated companies as if they were one legal 
taxable entity. The action of plaintiff in filing its Utah 
tax returns of adding back into the Utah Division's net 
income the full commissions paid to its sales subsidiary 
and deducting in lieu of such commissions an estimated 
amount representing the actual expenses incurred by the 
selling subsidiary with respect to the sale of the Utah 
copper and molybdenite appears to be clearly in erroi . 
Such action appears directly contrary to the regular 
and systematic treatment of such commissions on the 
books of account of the Utah Division. I t seems to fly 
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directly in the teeth of the fair and reasonable intercom-
pany arrangements between plaintiff and its sales sub-
sidiary. Furthermore, it appears to do violence to the 
provisions of the Utah statute relating to the filing of 
consolidated returns. 
As stated by this Court in First Security Corpora-
tion of Ogden v. State Tax Commission, 91 Ut. 101 (1936) 
at page 113: 
"The statute requires only Utah corporations 
or corporations qualified to do business in Utah 
to make returns. The state of Utah has no power 
nor authority to require a Wyoming corporation 
which has not accepted the constitutional provi-
sions of Utah nor qualified to do business in the 
state, to make returns under the income tax law." 
In A. C. Lawrence Leather Co. v. Commonwealth, 
151 N.E. 851 (1926) the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts stated the same principle as follows at page 
852: 
"The clear meaning of the paragraph in its 
entirety is that taxation upon combined net in-
come of foreign corporations can be levied only 
when such corporations doing business in this 
commonwealth constitute the entire group filing 
a consolidated return of income to the federal gov-
ernment, and that such corporations which have 
joined with one or more corporations 'not subject 
to this section/ in filing a consolidated return to 
the federal government must each file with the 
commissioner a statement of its net income as 
there described." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
172 
Again the same court in J. G. McCrory Co. v. Com-
missioner of Corporations, 182 N.E. 481 (1932) at page 
484 stated: 
"The taxpayer was a domestic corporation. 
Neither its parent corporation nor any one of the 
other subsidiaries of that parent corporation car-
ried on a business in this Commonwealth. The tax-
payer conducted a local retail business in two 
cities within the Commonwealth. I t was not en-
gaged in business elsewhere. There is no warrant 
in Gr. L. c. 63 for basing the excise tax on the do-
mestic corporation upon the capital or income 
of foreign corporations carrying on no business 
within the Commonwealth. I t is elementary that 
no tax can be valid unless authorized by statute 
and assessed in conformance to its terms . . . 
There is nothing in this record to show that the 
relation between the taxpayer and its parent cor-
poration was fictitious or a mere cloak for some-
thing not appearing on the face of the transaction. 
The method followed by the commissioner upon 
the facts disclosed was in conflict with the princi-
ple stated in Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 
206, at page 215, . . . in these words: '. . . because 
of the fundamental conceptions which underlie 
our system, any attempt by a state to measure the 
tax on one person's property or income by refer-
ence to the property or income of another is con-
trary to due process of law as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.' While the tax in thf 
case at bar is an excise and not a property tax, 
this principle is equally applicable when the excise 
is measured by property or income not belonging 
to the corporation sought to be taxed." 
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The Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Oliver 
Iron Mining Co. 292, N.W. 407 (1939) in discussing the 
mandatory consolidation provisions of the Minnesota 
statute, stated at page 411: 
"Nor does it offend our tax law or any pro-
vision of c, 405 that the affiliated or related cor-
porations which have no tax status in this state 
are not joined in the consolidated returns. As 
we regard it, if all of the affiliated corporations 
which are taxable in this state join in the consoli-
dated return it is a sufficient compliance with our 
law although there may be other affiliated corpo-
rations having no tax status here." 
See also Annotation contained in 117 A.L.E. 508 entitled 
"Franchise tax of corporation as affected by creation 
of affiliated corporation." 
Under the foregoing authorities it is quite clear that 
plaintiff's returns in consolidating the operations of 
the Utah Division with the operations of the sales 
subsidiary, which latter corporation is not subject to 
taxation in Utah, is wholly unwarranted and in conflict 
with the clear wording of our Utah statute. Further-
more, it should be remembered at this point that even if 
the separate corporate entity of the sales subsidiary is 
completely disregarded, plaintiff makes no claim in this 
proceeding that the separate corporate entity of the 
fabricating subsidiaries, Chase Brass and Copper Co. 
and Kennecott Wire and Cable Co., should be disregard-
ed. The transfer of 25% of the total production of copper 
of the Utah Division to these fabricating subsidiaries in 
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any event would have to be attributed to Utah business 
for the reason that such intercompany sales are on fair 
and reasonable terms and thus covered by the separate 
accounting cases heretofore mentioned. The statutory 
formula could in no event be applicable to such transfers 
of the Utah copper product to the affiliated fabricating 
subsidiaries. Furthermore, it should be pointed out 
that A. S. & E. which disposes of the gold, silver, plati-
num and paladiuin product of the Utah Division cannot 
under any circumstances consolidate for tax purposes 
its operations with those of plaintiff for the reason that 
plaintiff and A. S. & R. are not affiliated companies. 
With respect to defendant's position under this 
point that the Utah tax must be computed upon the full 
100% net income show and reflected on the separate ac-
counts of plaintiff's Utah Division, which position as-
sumes that the separate corporate entity of the sales 
subsidiary must be recognized and respected both by de-
fendant and plaintiff, we invite the court's particular at-
tention to the case of Curtis Companies, Inc. v. Wisconsin 
Tax Commission, 251 N.W. 497 (1933), which case is also 
reported in 92 A.L.R. 1065. 
Bearing in mind plaintiff's basic position in this pro-
ceeding that plaintiff's producing operations in Utah 
must be combined with the selling operations in New York 
of its sales subsidiary and tax computed on the basis of 
the statutory formula as appplied to such combined op-
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erations, w7e quote from the summary of appellant's 
argument appearing at page 1067 of the A.L.E. Report: 
"Plaintiffs and affiliated corporations cannot 
on the record here be treated as a single corpora-
tion doing business both within and without the 
state, in order to justify an apportionment of in-
come as the income of Curtis Companies, Inc." 
In the case at bar plaintiff seeks to combine the op-
erations of its sales subsidiary with the Utah Division 
in its attempt by use of the statutory formula to exclude 
% of the net income of the Utah Division as attributable 
to the selling activities conducted in New York. In the 
Curtis Companies case, it was the tax commission which 
attempted to combine the operations of the affiliated cor-
porations and compute the tax as if such combined opera-
tions were being conducted by a single corporation. We 
quote first from the headnote contained in the A.L.E, 
Report. 
"Authority to require a consolidated state in-
come tax return from a manufacturing corpora-
tion and the company of which it is a subsidiary, 
and to treat such return as the return of a single 
corporation in ascertaining, according to the 
method prescribed by the income tax statute, the 
portion properly subject to state income tax, on 
the ground that the allocation of corporate income 
of the manufacturing corporation to the state as 
arrived at by the separate accounting method is 
controlled by arbitrary factors, to-wit, the margin 
allowed to the manufacturing corporation on sales, 
at a price not claimed to be unfair, to the distri-
buting subsidiaries of the parent company the 
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distribution of advertising charges, the distribu-
tion of general administrative charges, and the 
factory rental charge made by the parent company 
to the manufacturing company,—is not conferred 
by a statutory provision relating to cases where a 
corporation so conducts its business as directly or 
indirectly to benefit the members or stockholders 
by selling its products at less than a fair price, 
and to cases where a corporation a substantial 
portion of whose capital stock is owned either di-
rectly or indirectly by another corporation ac-
quires and disposes of the products of the parent 
company in such a manner as to create a loss or 
improper net income." 
Again on page 1066 (ALE) the headnote states: 
"So long as the corporate form or intercorpo-
rate agreements between a manufacturing subsidi-
ary and the company by whom all the stock of such 
subsidiary is owned do not constitute devices 
having the purpose or effect of covering up in-
come actually received by the corporation whose 
affairs are under examination, the State Tax 
Commission is without power, in assessing the 
subsidiary for state income tax, to disregard cor-
porate agreements as to price, expenses, and other 
factors essential to the establishment of a net 
income, and to proceed to determine the income 
upon the basis of its judgment as to providence 
or business wisdom of such arrangement." 
The headnote continues: 
"Power to disregard the corporate entity, 
or intercorporate contracts, in assessing the state 
income tax of a manufacturing corporation, stock 
in which is owned by a parent company but which 
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has its own officers who actually transact its af-
fairs and which sells its products at a fair price to 
the distributing subsidiaries of the parent com-
pany, by which charges are made for rental, ad-
vertising and general administrative charges, is 
not conferred upon the state tax commission by a 
statute empowering it to require, in the case of 
affiliated corporations, 'such consolidated state-
ments as in its opinion are necessary in order to 
determine the taxable income received by anyone 
of the affiliated or related corporations.' " 
The opinion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court by 
Justice Wickhem gives the specific facts involved in the 
case as follows : 
The Curtis Companies, Inc. was a holding company 
owning all the capital stock except director's qualifying 
shares of the Curtis & Yale Company and of several com-
panies engaged in a similar business. The Curtis & Yale 
Company was a producing company manufacturing and 
jobbing sash, doors and miscellaneous mill work. Its 
plant was located at Wausau, was owned by Curtis Com-
panies, Inc. and was leased by that corporation to the 
Curtis & Yale Company. Both the Curtis & Yale Com-
pany and Curtis Brothers & Company, another subsidi-
ary with a plant at Clinton, Iowa, did extensive manu-
facturing and sold their products to outside dealers as 
well as to the distributing subsidiaries of Curtis Com-
panies, Inc. 
It appeared that since 1920 Curtis Companies, Inc. 
and Curtis & Yale Company had filed returns of income 
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with Wisconsin reporting Wisconsin income upon a 
separate accounting basis. In 1929 a field audit of both 
companies for the years 1925 to 1928 inclusive was made. 
On the basis of this audit it was determined that Curtis 
& Yale Company owed additional income taxes of $6,-
319.90 and that Curtis Companies, Inc. was entitled to 
a refund of $491.55. In making these assessments the 
separate accounting method of reporting Wisconsin's 
income was not changed. Due notice of the additional 
assessment was given and on objection by the taxpayers, 
a hearing was held before the commission. On the hear-
ing it was conceded that Curtis Companies, Inc. was 
entitled to a greater refund, that is, in the amount of 
$547.58. Curtis & Yale Company conceded liability for an 
additional tax of $2,611.72, but objected to the balance. 
Objection of Curtis & Yale Company to the assess-
ment centered principally about the disallowance of a 
total of $66,640.47 for advertising expenses in the returns 
of the company for 1925 to 1928 inclusive. These sums 
represented charges made to Curtis & Yale Company 
by Curtis Companies, Inc. as its proper share of national 
advertising authorized by it. 
As a result of the hearing the commission concluded 
that the separate accounting method did not reasonably 
reflect Wisconsin income and that the "proper basis for 
reporting in this case is, therefore, a consolidation of 
the incomes of the inter-related corporations and an 
apportionment thereof in the manner described by the 
statute." 
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The assessment ultimately made was entered against 
Curtis Companies, Inc., the parent company. The plain-
tiffs contended that the action of the commission in con-
solidating the income of the affiliated companies and 
assessing a tax on the combined income to the parent 
company by application of the Wisconsin statutory form-
ula was improper and invalid. 
The Court refused to permit the statutory appor-
tionment of the combined income of the affiliated com-
panies and ruled that the tax should be computed on 
the basis of the separate accounts regularly maintained 
by each company. 
The opinion states at page 1070 (A.L.E.) : 
"Having determined that the allocation of 
corporate income to Wisconsin, as arrived at by 
the separate accounting method, is controlled by 
four arbitrary factors, to-wit: (1) The 1 1 % % 
margin allowed to the factories on sales to the 
distributing subsidiaries; (2) The distribution of 
advertising charges; (3) The distribution of gen-
eral administrative charges; and (4) The rental 
charged Curtis & Yale Company for the Wausau 
factory, it is first contended that the commission 
had a right to require consolidated returns under 
the authority given by section 71.25(2). I t is 
further contended that the domination of the 
Curtis and Yale Company by Curtis Companies, 
Inc. combined with the arbitrary character of the 
items which determine the Curtis & Yale income, 
justify the commission in disregarding the sepa-
rate identity of the corporations and imposing a 
tax in accordance with the consolidated return. 
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I t is conceded that this tax probably should have 
been entered against the Curtis & Yale Company, 
but it is contended that this is an error that can 
be readily corrected. I t will be noticed that the„ 
commission does not conclude that the inter-
corporate transactions under examination here 
were unfair during the years under audit, nor is 
it contended that either the form of corporate 
organization adopted or the contracts between 
the parent and subsidiary had for their purpose 
the evasion of the income tax law by diverting a 
portion of the Curtis & Yale Co. income properly 
attributable to its Wisconsin activities through 
subsidiaries doing business in the state not having 
an income tax law. 
"At the outset it seems clear that section 
71.02(3) (d) relates to the situation presented by 
a single taxpayer who does business within and 
without the state. He is permitted separately to 
account when that method reasonably reflects the 
income properly attributable to activities in this 
state, and, if it does not, the statute contains a 
precise and detailed description of the manner 
in which the Wisconsin income is to be determined. 
This method involves the application to the total 
income of such a taxpayer, of the average of cer-
tain ratios described in the section, Assuming 
that Curtis and Yale Company was a wholly inde-
pendent corporation and not a subsidiary, it is 
clear that this section sets forth in detail the 
method of ascertaining its Wisconsin income. I t 
is claimed, however, that the commission, for any 
purposes of the income tax law, may require a 
consolidated return in cases of affiliated corpo-
rations, and that having exacted this return, the 
corporations may be treated as a single corpora-
tion in applying the ratios described in section 
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71.02(3) (d). Certainly section 71.25 gives no such 
authority to the tax commission. This section is 
entitled 'Corporate Tax Evasion Prevented.' I ts 
first subdivision deals with two situations: 1st, 
a corporation which so conducts its business as 
to directly or indirectly benefit the members or 
stockholders by selling its products at less than a 
fair price; 2nd, where a corporation, a substantial 
portion of whose capital stock is owned either 
directly or indirectly by another corporation, ac-
quires and disposes of the products of the parent 
company in such a manner as to create a loss or 
improper net income. I t is not seriously con-
tended that Curtis & Yale Company sold its prod-
ucts at less than a fair price, nor was this fact 
found by the commission. The second provision 
of the section obviously has no application to the 
Curtis & Yale Company since it was the producing 
company and had no contract whatever to dispose 
of the products of Curtis Companies, Inc. In the 
two situations above described, neither one of 
which, as it seems to us, applies to this case, the 
commission may determine the income of the cor-
porations found to engaged in an effort to evade 
taxes by disregarding these arrangements and 
estimating the reasonable profits which might 
have been made but for their existence." 
The Court further stated : 
"If it once be admitted that the intercorporate 
contract or arrangement does not establish an 
unfair price for the goods, and in addition that 
it is not a device adopted for the purpose of avoid-
ing the provisions of the income tax law, section 
71.25 has no application, and, if the position of 
the commission is sound it must be because the 
commission, from some source or by some process, 
has acquired the right to disregard all intercor-
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porate contracts for income tax purposes when-
ever it appears that the taxpayer corporation, the 
income of which is under investigation, is wholly 
owned by another corporation. This question we 
shall consider hereafter. It is, of course, clear 
enough that except for this question, presently 
reserved, the commission has no visitorial or 
supervisory control over the affairs of a corpora-
tion; that it cannot question the wisdom of its 
contracts or practices, being limited to a decision 
as to whether or not the contracts or business 
practices are colorable devices adopted to conceal 
income and avoid the tax." 
With respect to whether the commission may com-
bine the operations and income of parent and wholly 
owned subsidiary merely because "a wholly owned sub-
sidiary is involved" the Court stated: 
uWe find no authority in the statutes to sus-
tain the conclusion that the commission has such 
powers. The only basis for a claim to such powers 
rests in the undoubted right of the commission 
to exact reports that accurately reflect income, 
and to tax upon the basis of the true income. So 
long as the corporate form or the intercorporate 
agreement do not constitute devices having the 
purpose or effect of covering up income actually 
received the corporation whose affairs are under 
examination, they do reflect the true income of 
the corporation. The corporation reports, for 
example, in this case the aggregate income actu-
ally received from sale of products. It reports 
its actual expenditures for advertising and for 
rent. Its gross income, minus legitimate deduc-
tions, constitutes its net income upon which a tax 
may be levied. The situation is quite different 
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from that in the Palmolive, Buick, and Cliffs 
Chemical Company cases, where profits actually 
earned by the subsidiary were routed to the 
parent corporation by special contract designed 
to prevent a showing of profit by the subsidiary." 
The judgment of the court below was reversed, the 
assessment set aside and the cause remanded to the tax 
commission with direction to reassess the tax as indi-
cated in the opinion based upon the separate accounts 
of parent and subsidiary and not on the basis of an 
apportionment of income under the statutory formula 
based upon the combined net income of parent and 
subsidiary. 
The Curtis Companies case is again clear authority 
that the action of plaintiff in the case at bar in combin-
ing the net income and operations of plaintiff's Utah 
Division and its sales subsidiary and apportioning the 
net income of both parent and subsidiary under the Utah 
statutory formula was improper and erroneous. Particu-
larly is this so where the subsidiary was not even quali-
fied to do or doing business in Utah and consequently 
not subject to taxation upon its- selling profit in Utah. 
The testimony, evidence and findings of defendant show 
that the intercompany arrangement between plaintiff 
and sales subsidiary covering the sale of the Utah prod-
uct is a fair, reasonable and arms-length arrangement. 
The transfers by plaintiff of a portion of the Utah 
product to A. S. & E. under fair, reasonable and arms-
length intercompany arrangements must likewise be 
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recognized and accepted by both plaintiff and defendant 
in this case. The Curtis Companies case is likewise of 
interest in that it shows once again that where the tax 
is to be computed on the basis of separate accounting 
methods only a fair and reasonable proportion of gen-
eral administrative charges need be charged against the 
local operation. Not an apportionment of income within 
and without the state is required or permissible, merely 
a fair distribution of the general overhead or administra-
tive expense. 
The foregoing authorities under this Point 2 clearly 
establishing that the Utah corporation franchise tax 
should be based upon the full 100 per cent net income of 
the Utah Division of plaintiff, as separately kept and 
maintained, we turn next to the question whether this 
court has jurisdiction to increase by a modification of 
defendant's decision or a remand of the case, the defi-
ciencies in tax as determined by defendant. 
The jurisdiction of defendant to increase the amount 
of deficiencies over the amount of deficiences shown in 
the initial notice by letter to the taxpayer, required under 
the provisions of Section 80-13-36, U.C.A. 1943, appears 
not to have been judicially considered in this state. 
Furthermore, the question seems not to have been con-
sidered of the extent to which this court has jurisdiction 
in modifying a decision of defendant or in remanding a 
case to defendant for rehearing, to make a determination 
or to direct a determination by defendant which will 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
185 
result in deficiencies in tax greater than the amounts 
previously asserted against the taxpayer by defendant. 
The general procedure contained in the statute with 
respect to the determination and assessment of tax defi-
ciencies by defendant with respect to corporation fran-
chise taxes is as follows. 
Under Section 80-13-36, U.C.A. 1943, after deter-
mining that there is a deficiency in tax, defendant mails 
notice of such deficiency to the taxpayer which notice 
contains the details of the deficiency and the manner of 
computing the tax. Within sixty days after the mailing 
of such notice, the taxpayer may file a petition with 
defendant for a re-determination of the deficiency. 
Except with the taxpayer's consent, the deficiency can-
not be assessed or collection proceedings instituted until 
a mailing of such notice and the expiration of sixty days 
thereafter, or if a petition has been filed with the defend-
ant until defendant's decision has become final. The 
statutory provisions suspend the running of the statutes 
of limitations on the making of assessments and the 
institution of collection proceedings until the expiration 
of 30 days after notice to the taxpayer of defendant's 
decision. Such decision, however, does not become final 
upon the expiration of such thirty day period if pro-
ceedings for review of the decision are taken to this 
Court. In the event of appeal, Section 80-13-46 provides 
that the decision "shall become final, (1) when affirmed 
or modified by the judgment of the Supreme Court; (2) 
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if the Supreme Court remands the case to the tax com-
mission for rehearing, when it is thereafter determined 
as hereinabove provided with respect to the initial pro-
ceedings." 
Upon the filing of the taxpayer's petition for a 
redetermination of a deficiency, notice of which has been 
mailed to the taxpayer, the statute requires defendant to 
give the taxpayer notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
It is also provided that after hearing a decision shall be 
made as quickly as practicable. Of particular importance 
to the question here presented is Section 80-13-39 entitled 
"Jurisdiction to Redetermine Deficiency." This section 
reads as follows: 
66The Tax Commission shall have jurisdiction 
to redetermine the correct amount of the defi-
ciency even if the amount so redetermined is 
greater than the amount of the deficiency, notice 
of which has been mailed to the taxpayer, and to 
determine whether any penalty, additional amount 
or addition to the tax should be assessed; pro-
vided, that at the hearing or prior thereto claim 
therefor is asserted." 
In addition to the power of this Court under Section 
80-13-46, referred to above, of affirming or modifying 
defendant's decision or remanding the case to defendant 
for rehearing, Section 80-13-47, entitled "Review by 
Supreme Court," provides for application to this Court 
for a writ of certiorari or review for the purpose of hav-
ing "the lawfulness of such decision inquired into and 
determined." This latter section also provides "upon the 
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hearing no new or additional evidence may be introduced, 
but the cause shall be heard on the record before the Tax 
Commission as certified to by it. The decision of the 
tax commission may be reviewed both upon the law and 
the facts, and the provisions of the code of civil pro-
cedure relating to proceedings in the supreme court shall, 
so far as is applicable and not in conflict with this chap-
ter, apply to the proceedings in the supreme court under 
the provisions of this section." Of interest also is Section 
80-13-48 entitled "Exclusive Jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court." This section provides "no court of this state, 
except the supreme court, shall have jurisdiction to re-
view, reverse or annul any decision of the tax commis-
sion, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution 
thereof." Although Section 80-13-47 permits "any party 
affected thereby" to apply for a writ to review a decision 
of defendant this apparently means and has been con-
strued to mean a party other than the Tax Commission 
itself. The requirement of the deposit or bond covering 
the taxes, interest and other charges in Section 80-13-49 
would indicate that defendant, unlike the Federal govern-
ment, has no right to appeal on behalf of the State a 
decision not appealed by the taxpayer. In the Federal 
law, the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue is specifically 
given the right of appeal from decisions of the Tax Court. 
I t appears that the problem of the validity of an 
increase in the deficiency beyond that set forth in the 
initial deficiency letter to the taxpayer may arise either 
before defendant or before this Court on appeal. Let us 
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assume the mailing by defendant of a notice of deficiency 
and the filing by the taxpayer of a petition for redeter-
mination of the taxes set forth in such deficiency letter. 
At any time before the hearing is actually held or at any 
time during the hearing, defendant has the statutory 
right to assert its claim to the increase. At the same time, 
if no such claim were asserted, Section 80-13-39 would 
prevent defendant by its decision from redetermining 
the deficiency in an amount greater than the amount con-
tained in the original deficiency letter. Again, if the 
decision were appealed to this Court, the Court has juris-
diction under the statute to "affirm," "modify" or "re-
mand" the decision to defendant for "rehearing." If the 
Court, after a review of the matter, decides that the tax 
deficiency appealed by the taxpayer is too small, may 
the Court "modify" the decision to increase the deficiency 
where claim therefor has been asserted at the hearing 
below by defendant, and, further, where a case on appeal 
has been remanded by this Court to defendant for re-
hearing, may defendant at the "rehearing" assert a claim 
for an increased deficiency as a result of the decision and 
opinion of this Court. These two questions, involving 
the occupational hazards of tax litigation, are presented 
here. 
The authorities hereafter discussed show that the 
same rule applicable to the initial hearing is applicable to 
the "rehearing" following a remand of the case by this 
Court. The reason for this is the provision in Section 
80-13-46 that upon remand of a case to the Tax Commis-
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sion for rehearing, the same statutory rules with respect 
to a decision by defendant are applicable on the rehearing 
as are applicable with respect to initial proceedings 
except that defendant's decision on rehearing cannot be 
inconsistent with this Court's decision and opinion. The 
discussion here with respect to the year 1942 and the 
effect of the court's mandate and remittitur in Case No. 
7298 on defendant's authority to increase the deficiencies 
on the rehearing over and above the def iciences originally 
asserted and appealed to this court is tied directly into 
plaintiff's argument that under the mandate of this court 
in Case No. 7298 the allocation factor of 66.926% is 
res judicata and binding on defendant. This point is 
hereafter discussed under defendant's Point 5 with re-
spect to whether defendant's decision is inconsistent with 
the Court's mandate in No. 7298 but discussed here with 
respect to whether defendant may assert a claim for an 
increase on the "rehearing" under the statute assuming 
such claim to be entirely consistent with the Court's 
mandate. 
In view of the fact that the questions here being con-
sidered are novel ones so far as this Court is concerned, 
we must turn primarily to the applicable Federal authori-
ties for assistance on the problem. 
I t will be remembered that the Utah corporation 
franchise tax law in its general framework is largely 
based upon the Federal 1928 income tax law. Section 
272 (e) of the Internal Eevenue Code provides as fol-
lows : 
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"Increase of deficiency after notice mailed.— 
The tax court shall have jurisdiction to redeter-
mine the correct amount of the deficiency even 
if the amount so redetermined is greater than the 
amount of the deficiency, notice of which has been 
mailed to the taxpayer, and to determine whether 
any penalty, additional amount or addition to the 
tax should be assessed—if claim therefore is 
asserted by the commissioner at or before the 
hearing or a rehearing." 
The above provision has been in the federal tax law since 
the 1926 act. 
For a general discussion of the problem see Prentice-
Hall 1954 Federal Tax Service, Volume 3, Para. 21,504— 
9, and 1954 CCH Fed. Tax Reporter, Vol. 4, para. 1354.10-
.155. 
The Utah statute, unlike the Federal law, confers no 
authority on defendant to grant a rehearing. Thus, fol-
lowing a hearing, when defendant's decision is rendered 
and mailed to the taxpayer, its jurisdiction in the matter 
is then completely exhausted and terminated. The only 
authority for a rehearing in the Utah statute is one 
directed by this Court upon a remand of the case. In 
other words, the authority of defendant is the same as 
that of the State Tax Commission of Arizona considered 
in Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
191 P. 2d 169 (1948). In this case it appeared that the 
taxpayer following a hearing before the commission and 
an adverse decision by the commission, instead of appeal-
ing to the court filed a petition for rehearing with the 
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commission which was granted. A further hearing was 
held and the commission's original assessment was con-
firmed. The taxpayer within the statutory period mea-
sured from the second decision appealed to the court. 
On behalf of the state it was argued that the commission 
had exhausted its jurisdiction when it entered its first 
decision and that all action taken thereafter was null and 
void, and that the court therefore was without jurisdic-
tion in the matter. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated 
at page 175: 
"Nowhere in the income tax law is there any 
authority for a rehearing by the commission upon 
rendering its decision after the hearing provided 
for in Sec. 73-1539, supra. The only remedy pro-
vided for is by appeal to the Superior Court. No 
appeal was taken from the order of the commis-
sion of December 29, 1942. Instead the appellant, 
for some reason, moved for a rehearing. The com-
mission was wholly without authority to grant a 
rehearing or to take further action of any kind 
in the matter. All actions thereafter taken by it, 
including its order of October 11, 1945 were null 
and void." 
When we turn to the provisions of the Federal law 
pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit 
Courts of Appeals to review decisions of the Tax Court 
of the United States (formerly Board of Tax Appeals) 
we see a substantial similiarity of these provisions with 
the Utah statutory provisions governing the jurisdiction 
of this Court over decisions of defendant. 
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Section 1141 of the Federal Internal Eevenue Code 
provides 
"(a) Jurisdiction.—The Courts of Appeal 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review the 
decisions of the tax court, . . . in the same manner 
and to the same extent as decisions of the district 
courts in civil actions tried without a jury; and 
the judgment of any such court shall be final, 
except that it shall be subject to review by the 
Supreme Court of the United States upon certio-
rari in the manner provided in Section 1254 of 
Title 28 of the United States Code." 
This section also provides 
"(c) Powers.—(1) To affirm, modify or re-
verse.—Upon such review, such courts shall have 
power to affirm or, if the decision of the board 
is not in accordance with law, to modify or to 
reverse the decision of the board, with or without 
remanding the case for a rehearing, as justice 
may require." 
The provisions of Section 80-13-39 U.C.A. 1943 and 
Section 272 (e) of the Internal Eevenue Code, with re-
spect to increases of deficiencies, appear to be almost 
identical with the exception that under Federal practice 
the Commissioner of Internal Eevenue may assert the 
claim not only "at or before the hearing" but also at "a 
rehearing." The phrase "or a rehearing" is omitted in 
the Utah law. This rehearing provision in the Federal 
law appears to be applicable to both rehearings granted 
by the Tax Court itself and those directed by the Federal 
Courts of Appeal. In other words, the Commissioner 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
193 
may assert his claim for increase before the hearing, at 
the hearing or at any rehearing before the Tax Court. 
In the case at bar the question of the validity of a 
claim asserted by defendant at a rehearing granted by 
itself is not involved. With respect to the year 1942, 
there is involved the validity of defendant's claim as-
serted at a rehearing directed by this Court by the man-
date and remittitur in No. 7298. With respect to the 
years subsequent to 1942, that is, 1943 to 1950 inclusive, 
there is involved the validity of defendant's claim 
asserted at the initial hearing, which hearing had been 
consolidated with the rehearing relating to 1942. 
In Cement Gim Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F. 2d 107 
(1929) (CCA DC), the Court after referring to the perti-
nent provisions of the Federal revenue code, stated at 
page 108: 
"The Commissioner, in his amended answer 
to the Board, set forth the error in his determina-
tion of the deficiency for the year 1920, and re-
quested that the deficiencies be increased by the 
amount of the partial allowance he had made for 
that year. This correction was made by the Board. 
The Board in its redetermination of the deficiency 
was acting clearly within its jurisdiction and 
authority." 
Again in Davison v. Commissioner, 60 F. 2d 50 
(1932) (CCA 2), the Court stated, page 51: 
"The petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of 
the Board to assess a deficiency greater than the 
deficiency set out in the 1925 notice because he 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
194 
asserts that the statute of limitations had run 
before the commissioner's amended answer was 
filed. This contention is without merit. Section 
274(e) of the Kevenue Act of 1926 . . . , permits 
the Board to redetermine the correct amount of 
the deficiency, even if it be greater than the defi-
ciency stated in the commissioner's notice to the 
taxpayer, 'if claim therefor is asserted by the 
commissioner at or before the hearing or a re-
hearing.' . . . The provisions of section 277 (b), 
. . ., and Section 274 (a) of the act . . . cause the 
running of the statute of limitations to be sus-
pended while proceedings are pending before the 
Board." 
However, in the same case covering the year 1926, 
the Court refused to permit an increase of deficiency 
where no claim therefore had been asserted at the hear-
ing, the Court stating, page 52 : 
"The 1926 deficiency was also increased by 
the Board, although the commissioner had failed 
to assert any claim for an additional deficiency 
as required by Section 274 (e) of the Revenue Act 
of 1926. This was clearly an error, and cannot be 
justified under Rule 50 of the Board's Rules of 
Practice. Rule 50 requires the computation of 
deficiency to be in accordance with the decision 
on the issues presented at the hearing of the 
proceeding on the merits. New issues, other than 
those relating to computation, cannot be raised 
upon computation of the tax under Rule 50." 
Again in Weiller v. Commissioner, 64 F. 2d 480 
(1933) (CCA 2), the Court stated the general rules to be 
as above, citing the Davison and Cement Gun cases. It 
then stated, page 482: 
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"The only difference between the two deci-
sions last mentioned and the case at bar is that 
here new property upon which an additional de-
ficiency has been found was first introduced in 
the answer of the commissioner before the Board 
of Tax Appeals and had never been considered 
by the commissioner or included in his deficiency 
notice. The taxpayer's theory seems to be that a 
deficiency can only be increased by the Board 
when it concludes that the commissioner adopted 
a wrong rule of law in dealing with the facts 
shown by the return, or where the particular 
credits or debits upon which the commissioner had 
based his determination of the deficiency were 
valued improperly. But we see no reason for sup-
posing that Section 308(a) is so limited and we 
hold that it enables the Board of Tax Appeals to 
make a full audit and do complete justice between 
the parties whenever the taxpayer seeks to review 
the assessment and the commissioner asserts a 
claim that an additional amount should be 
assessed. It seems clear from the foregoing that 
the Board proceeded properly and rightly deter-
mined an additional deficiency. It can make no 
difference that in arriving at this determination 
it dealt with matters extraneous to the original 
assessment," 
In Helvering v. Edison Securities Corp., 78 F. 2d 
85 (1935) (CCA4), the Court stated at page 90: 
"The Board refused to entertain the claim 
for increased deficiency seemingly on the ground 
that the power given it by Section 274 (e) is to be 
exercised only if the claim is asserted by the com-
missioner at or before the hearing or a rehearing 
of the case, and because in the opinion of the 
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Board this stage had been passed when the com-
missioner set up the claim in this case. We think 
that the power still persisted, for there seems to 
be no reason why the word 'hearing' should not 
be given a significance broad enough to include 
the whole proceeding down to the final decision. 
Ordinarily a hearing in equity embraces the deci-
sion also. (Citing Cases) But here the purpose is 
manifest to give the taxpayer an opportunity to 
answer and resist the claim before it is made 
effective by the action of the Board. If this is 
done, a claim of increase may be made and con-
sidered with propriety, whether it is presented 
during the taking of the evidence or in the period 
allowed for oral arguments, or written briefs, or 
even subsequently during the hearing under Rule 
50; in short, at any time before or after the filing 
of the board's findings of fact until the decision 
and judgment of the board has been entered; or 
even later in the event of a re-hearing. 
"This statement, however, must be taken with 
the qualification that the power to receive the 
claim should not be exercised unless a reasonable 
opportunity to oppose it is given to the taxpayer, 
and unless it is presented in accordance with 
reasonable rules laid down by the Board. If the 
question involved in the increase has been actually 
raised during the trial and the taxpayer has pre-
sented his evidence and his views on the point or 
has been given a chance to do so, the claim may 
be received at any time before the decision and 
allowed therein if found to be correct; but the tax-
payer ought not to be taken by surprise." 
Again the Court stated 
"Even after a full trial below, an appellate 
court has the power to remand a case for further 
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proceedings if it has been tried on a wrong theory, 
Underwood v. Commissioner CCA (56) (F2d) 67, 
73; and it cannot be doubted, in view of the pur-
pose for which the Board was established and of 
the statute governing its procedure, that it has 
equal power to do full justice to the parties while 
they are still before it " 
A footnote on page 91 discussing this problem and 
the jurisdiction of the Board under the 1926 act goes on 
to state 
"And from an adverse decision by the Board, 
either party was given a right to appeal to the 
Circuit Courts of Appeals, and these Courts were 
given power to modify or reverse a decision of the 
Board if not in accordance with the law, with or 
without remanding the case for a rehearing, as 
justice may require." 
With respect to the situation where a remand of the 
case from the Appellate Court was involved we invite the 
Court's attention first to the case of Underwood v. Com-
missioner, 56 F. 2d 67 (1932) (CCA 4), in which the 
Court stated at page 73: 
"The Board had ample power under the 
statute to require the production of additional 
evidence when it became clear that it could not do 
justice to the taxpayer by reason of the deficien-
cies in the record before it. It was unquestionably 
encumbant upon the taxpayer to offer the testi-
mony in the first instance, and cases arise where 
the moving party must suffer the consequences of 
his own neglect. Here, however, the Board's own 
opinion showed that the commissioner's action 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
198 
was wrong in a material respect. The information 
to correct the mistake was readily obtainable from 
the same source as that from which the gross 
receipts of the taxpayer were ascertained. Under 
these circumstances, the Board should have de-
ferred its decision until testimony showing the 
amount of the deductions to which the taxpayer 
was entitled was introduced, and then have rede-
termined the deficiency. The decision of the 
Board will therefore be reversed and the case 
remanded in order that the course indicated may 
be followed. This action, we think, is authorized 
by the powers vested in this court by the Eevenue 
Act of 1926, . . . where it is provided that the 
Circuit Court of Appeals shall have power to 
modify or reverse a decision of the Board, if not 
in accordance with the law, with or without re-
manding the case for a rehearing, as justice may 
require. In a number of instances, Circuit Courts 
of Appeal have remanded cases for rehearing 
when it seemed necessary in order to do justice 
to the parties. It does not appear in these cases 
that new evidence was available; but in the instant 
case the evidence is known to exist and it would 
be an abuse of discretion to decline to receive it. 
. . . In addition, there is the well established rule 
that an appellate court has the power, without 
determining and disposing of the case, to remand 
it to the lower court for further proceedings if 
the case has been tried on a wrong theory, or the 
record is not in condition for the appellate court 
to decide the question presented with justice to 
all parties concerned...." 
A case of particular pertinence to the case at bar is 
Hall v. Helvering, 68 F. 2d 399 (1933) (CCA DC). This 
case involved two appeals to the Circuit Court in the 
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same controversy. The taxpayer had assigned to his 
second wife certain life insurance commissions to which 
he was entitled from Lincoln National Life Insurance 
Company. The question arose whether the assignment 
constituted a transfer of future income on which the 
husband should be taxed or whether it was an assignment 
of property the income from which would be taxable to 
the wife. 
In the first proceeding before the Board of Tax 
Appeals, the Board decided that the assignment was 
merely an assignment of future income. The taxpayer 
appealed to the Circuit Court which reversed the Board's 
decision and held that the assignment was an assignment 
of property. The case was remanded to the Board for 
further proceedings. 
In the further proceedings before the board, follow-
ing the remand, the Commissioner contended that even if 
the amounts paid by the life insurance company to the 
wife did not constitute income taxable to the husband, 
nevertheless the amount that the wife had paid out of 
such sums to discharge debts of the husband was taxable 
to the husband. The Board sustained the Commissioner's 
contention and the taxpayer again appealed to the Cir-
cuit Court. The Circuit Court affirmed the decision of 
the Board and stated at page 400: 
"When the question arose as to whether there 
was a deficiency in petitioner's taxes, he appealed 
to the Board, and thereby stopped the running of 
the statute of limitations until final determination 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
200 
of that question, but when the case was here be-
fore, this court did not decide, nor was it asked 
to decide, whether there was a deficiency in peti-
tioner's income tax. 
"We decided only that what passed from the 
husband to the wife under their contract was 
property, not income; and remanded the case for 
further proceedings. 
"Such further proceedings could only mean 
to fix the taxpayer's liability, if any, on that basis; 
which in turn could only mean that the considera-
tion for the assignment should be taken into ac-
count; and the laws determining what is gain or 
loss from the sale of property should be applied to 
arrive at the tax due." 
Judge Groner dissented from the opinion not on the 
ground that the Commissioner lacked the authority to 
raise the issue on the remand, but on the ground that the 
Board on the remand had reached its decision without 
giving the parties an opportunity of introducing addi-
tional evidence on the new issue. Judge Groner's dis-
senting opinion states: 
"When our mandate went down, the commis-
sioner revived an alternative claim which he had 
originally urged on the Board but had elected to 
abandon, or at least not to urge, on the first 
petition for review. On this formerly uncon-
sidered issue, the Board, without any new evi-
dence, entered its order of redetermination, under 
which petitioner was required to pay, not only 
the full amount of the tax originally demanded 
by the commissioner, but some $4,000 or $5,000 
more. Assuming as I do, that it was permissible 
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for the commissioner to revive the issue unpassed 
on by the Board at the first hearing, I think the 
decision should nevertheless and for another rea-
son be reversed.... 
"The case on this new and previously uncon-
sidered issue was, I think, decided by the Board 
prematurely and without affording either of the 
parties opportunity to introduce evidence." 
Another case of a special significance to the case at 
bar is that of Swenson v. Commissioner, 69 F. 2d 280 
(1934) (CCA 5). In this case the court stated at page 
281: 
"An effect of the remandment of the cause to 
the Board of Tax Appeals 'for further proceed-
ings not inconsistent with this opinion' was to 
enable that Board to act on the petition for re-
determination which by the remandment again 
was submitted to it, and to direct it in doing so 
to avoid the errors which had vitiated its former 
decision. The ruling of this court plainly con-
templated a resubmission of the case to the Board 
of Tax Appeals and a reconsideration by that 
tribunal of evidence before it. Nothing contained 
in the opinion or the mandate indicated that the 
Board of Tax Appeals was to refrain from pass-
ing on the evidence submitted to it, or was bound 
by the finding of the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue on the subject of the fair market value 
of the corporate stock mentioned at the time it 
was received for the oil and gas lease. This court 
did not direct the Board of Tax Appeals to adopt 
or accept a computation based on findings made 
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and 
did not intimate that that Board was at liberty 
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to refrain from considering evidence submitted 
to it and reaching its own conclusion therefrom. 
After the reversal of the decision of the Board of 
Tax Appeals which formerly was reviewed by 
this Court and the remandment of the cause for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
Court's opinion, the duty of the Board to act on 
the petition for redetermination was not different 
from what it was before the former erroneous 
decision was rendered; the mandate of this court 
having the effect of restoring to that board the 
power it had when the case was first before it, 
except that its further proceedings were forbidden 
to be inconsistent with this Court's op'miow" 
A case in line with the above authorities and 
squarely in point with the case at bar is that of William 
E. Boeing v. Commissioner, 47 BTA 5 (1942). The, 
decision is also reported in CCH Board of Tax Appeals 
Dec. 12,543. 
In this case it appeared that the taxpayer filed gift 
tax returns for the years 1936 and 1937 claiming thereon 
two $5,000 exclusions on the ground that although the 
gifts were to a trust there were two beneficiaries of the 
trust and he was entitled to one $5,000 exclusion for each 
beneficiary. The Commissioner mailed the taxpayer 
notices of deficiencies in the amount of $1,312.51 for 
1936 and $1,312.50 for 1937, on the ground stated in the 
deficiency notice that the taxpayer was entitled to only 
one exclusion in view of certain court holdings to the 
effect that a trust represents one beneficiary. The tax-
payer filed a petition for redetermination of the defi-
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ciency with the Board. Following a hearing on the merits 
the Board decided in petitioner's favor and held that 
there was no deficiency. The Board's decision was placed 
on the ground that the two beneficiaries of the trust were 
the donees of the gift and not the trust itself, as the 
Commissioner had determined. The Commissioner ap-
pealed the Board's decision to the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The decision of the Cir-
cuit Court is reported in Commissioner v. Boeing, 123 
F. 2d 86 (1941). 
When the case was heard first before the Board, the 
only issue presented or considered by the Board was the 
question whether the trust or the beneficiaries constituted 
the "donee", that is, whether the taxpayer was entitled 
one or two exclusions. On appeal the Commissioner 
raised before the Circuit Court for the first time the 
question whether the taxpayer was entitled to any exclu-
sion by reason of the fact that the gifts were gifts of a 
future interest in which case under the statute the $5,000 
exclusion would not be applicable. 
The Circuit Court in its opinion reversed the decision 
of the Board, holding that the gifts were of future inter-
ests and in its opinion indicated that the Board was 
right in rejecting the proposition of law advanced by the 
petitioner that the trust was the donee "person" but 
further held that "on the basis of the record before it, it 
was wrong in holding that there were no deficiencies in 
taxes for the two years." The Court stated: 
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"Accordingly, the decision must be reversed 
and the cause remanded to redetermine or com-
pute the deficiency. Since the applicability of the 
future interests provision of the statute was not 
considered and no issue was made in respect of 
it, opportunity should be given the taxpayer to 
present evidence on the issue if he so desires. 
"As the matter stands the Commissioner has 
assessed deficiencies based on an exclusion of 
$5,000 for each of the two years, although the 
taxpayer appears to be entitled to none. The 
Board of Tax Appeals is a body authorized by 
statute to operate under rules of its own adop-
tion. Whether, in the light of its rules and of Sec. 
272(e), (f) of the 1932 A c t . . ., the Board may or 
should redetermine a greater deficiency than the 
amount of which notice has been given the tax-
payer is a question which we have not considered 
and do not undertake now to decide. The question 
is not before us since no assertion of an additional 
deficiency has yet been made by the Commissioner 
in conformity with the statute." 
Following its opinion the Circuit Court issued the 
following mandate: 
"On Consideration Whereof, it is now here 
ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the 
decision of the said Board of Tax Appeals in this 
cause be, and hereby is reversed, and that this 
cause be, and hereby is remanded to the said 
Board of Tax Appeals for further proceedings 
in harmony with the opinion of this Court. 
"You, Therefore, Are Hereby Commanded 
that such further proceedings be had in the said 
cause in accordance with the opinion and judgment 
of this court " 
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Following the filing of the above mandate, the Com-
missioner filed a motion with the Board to permit the 
Commissioner to file a claim for increases in the defi-
ciencies as proposed in the original deficiency notices and 
to permit the petitioner to introduce evidence on the ques-
tion of future interests if he so desired. 
The taxpayer on the other hand filed a motion 
stating that he had no desire to present additional evi-
dence on the future interest issue and opposed the Com-
missioner's motion to file a claim for the increased 
deficiencies. 
Member Sternhagen first ruled on March 9, 1942 
that the Commissioner's assertion of the claim for addi-
tional deficiencies was not timely in that the claim had 
not been originally asserted at or before the original 
hearing or a rehearing thereof stating as follows: "No 
claim was asserted by the respondent at or before the 
hearing. No motion was made for a rehearing and there-
fore no rehearing was had, so no claim was asserted at 
or before a rehearing. By rule 19 a motion for rehearing 
must, except by special leave, be filed within thirty days, 
so the time for such a motion has expired. If the present 
motion of respondent be considered as a motion for re-
hearing, although it is not couched in those terms, it is 
plainly not a timely motion." This ruling reported in 
46 BTA and in CCH Dec. 12,460, was pursuant to order 
of March 27, 1942, ordered to be reviewed by the full 
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Board of Tax Appeals. Upon review^, member Stern-
hagen's ruling wras reversed by the Board. After a care-
ful analysis and consideration of the problem, the Board's 
opinion states: 
"As we have already stated, it seems plain 
to us that the Court, in reversing and remanding 
these proceedings, has directed a rehearing at 
which the issue of 'future interests' is to receive 
consideration. That is the very occasion and 
purpose of the reversal and remand of the Board's 
prior decision. 
" I t is of course perfectly true that the Com-
missioner will get no increase in the deficiencies 
which he has already determined unless he asserts 
them in a proper pleading 'at or before the re-
hearing.' Moise vs. Burnet, 52 F . 2d 1071. . . 
The Moise decision clearly prohibits an increase 
in the deficiency under the pleadings now on 
f i l e . . . . 
"The Commissioner, however, by motion duly 
filed, seeks to file an amended answer in which 
by affirmative allegations he raises the issue of 
'future interests' and in which he clearly and 
succinctly sets forth his grounds for an increased 
deficiency and, after setting forth the grounds, 
concludes as follows: 
"Wherefore, respondent respectfully prays 
that the deficiency claimed in his notice of de-
ficiency be increased in accordance with the fore-
going computation and now asserts a claim for 
such increase of deficiency as the statute in such 
a case provides. 
"We think respondent's motion to file his 
amended answer raising the new issue of 'future 
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interest' and asking for an increased deficiency 
is, under the circumstances existing in these pro-
ceedings, a timely motion." 
The opinion also states 
"The present opinion replaces and supersedes 
the opinion herein entered March 9, 1942, . . ., 
which was, by order of the Chairman dated March 
27,1942 referred to the Board for review." 
The Moise Case referred to in the Board's opinion 
had held that the claim for an increased deficiency should 
be actually and definitely made and not left to conjec-
ture, inference or interpretation. The opinion of the 
Court in the Moise Case stated at page 1073: 
"No words of claim, request, or demand were 
used by the Commissioner. He must be bound by 
his pleadings and cannot be assumed to have 
intended to present a claim that he did not 
actually assert." 
Copy of this Court's remittitur issued January 12, 
1951 in case No. 7298 covering the year 1942 is in evi-
dence as Tax Commission Exhibit PP (2). The Court's 
mandate reads: 
"This cause having been heretofore argued 
and submitted on the return made to the Writ of 
Review heretofore issued herein, and the court 
being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is 
now ordered, adjudged and decreed that the 
order of the State Tax Commission be and the 
same is affirmed and the cause remanded with 
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instructions to determine and enter a deficiency 
judgment in accordance with the views expressed 
in the opinion filed herein." 
The case thus came back to defendant by remand 
under the authority conferred upon this Court by Section 
80-13-46, U.C.A. 1943, which provides that a decision of 
the Tax Commission shall become final "if the Supreme 
Court remands the case to the Tax Commission for re-
hearing, when it is thereafter determined as hereinabove 
provided with respect to the initial proceedings." Upon 
resumption of its jurisdiction over the case following 
the remand, defendant's authority and jurisdiction was 
the same as it had been before on the initial proceedings 
or hearing, the only qualification being that it could take 
no further action or make any redetermination or assert 
any claim for increased deficiencies at the rehearing 
which would be in conflict or in any way inconsistent w i^th 
the decision and opinion of this Court. 
The first hearing followed the remand in No. 7298 
which hearing covered not only the year 1942 but the 
subsequent years to and including 1950, was held on 
December 4, 1951. At this hearing (Tr. 3) it was stated: 
"The purpose of the hearing is to finally 
determine the corporation franchise tax deficiency 
of Kennecott for 1942 and the years subsequent 
thereto, under and in accordance with the decision 
and mandate of the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah in the case of Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration and Bingham and Garfield Eailway Com-
pany, Plaintiff, v. State Tax Commission, Defend-
ant, Case No. 7298." 
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It was also stated (Tr. 5) : 
". . . The serious question has arisen whether 
the method adopted by the commission has gone 
as far as the Supreme Court's decision requires. 
In other words, the present deficiencies in tax, 
excluding interest totalling $2,712,915.47, may be 
too low. We are thus placed in the dilemma of 
having Kennecott here contesting proposed de-
ficiencies which instead of being too high, may 
legally be too low. 
"Under the Supreme Court's mandate we are 
required to compute Kennecott's tax liability on 
the basis of the separate accounts of receipts and 
expenses which the company maintains for its 
Utah Division. This is clearly a sensible and 
proper basis because it relates Kennecott's tax 
liability to the net income it derives from each 
pound of copper, each pound of molybdenite con-
centrate, each ounce of gold, and each ounce of 
silver extracted from the ore actually mined from 
the Bingham pit in Utah." 
Defendant's claim at the hearing for an increase of 
deficiencies based upon the full 100% net income shown 
and reflected on the separate accounts of defendant's 
Utah Division was as follows (Tr. 8): 
". . . I must, as counsel and as a matter of 
precaution, to protect the interest of the State, 
here and at this time reserve the right to this 
Commission and to the Supreme Court if this case 
again reaches the Supreme Court, to amend the 
deficiencies by asserting tax based on 100% of 
the Utah Division's net income. Accordingly, 
under and pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 
80-13-39, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, jurisdic-
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tion of the Tax Commission is hereby reserved 
to assert, and claim therefor is hereby in fact 
asserted at this hearing to redetermine the present 
deficiencies in an amount or amounts greater than 
the amount or amounts, notice of which has pre-
viously been mailed to the taxpayer, by comput-
ing such deficiencies on the entire net income of 
the Utah Division and not on some lesser pro-
portion or fraction thereof." 
Defendant's assertion of claim to compute plaintiff's 
Utah corporation franchise tax based upon the full 100% 
net income of the Utah Division has thus been clearly 
and specifically made at the rehearing on 1942 and at 
the hearing on the subsequent years. The claim has in 
no way been left to conjecture, inference or interpreta-
tion. I t should also be pointed out and perhaps empha-
sized that the reserved right to increase the deficiencies 
is not related to a different "issue" from that previously 
considered by the Court in No. 7298. I t is thus unlike the 
Boeing case where the increase of deficiencies was due to 
a separate and distinct issue of "future interests" which 
had not been raised in the Board below. In the case at 
bar the issue is "allocation." That was the issue before 
defendant originally in the case covering the year 1942. 
I t was the issue before this Court in No. 7298. I t was 
the issue before defendant on the hearing cover-
ing the year 1942 and subsequent years. I t is the issue 
here on appeal again. Defendant has reserved its juris-
diction and the jurisdiction of the Court to allocate 100% 
of the Utah Division's net income to Utah if the facts and 
authorities so require and notwithstanding that by its 
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decision here on appeal the actual amount allocated to 
Utah is about 93%. Plaintiff's contention for 1942 is 
that the correct figure is 66.926%, which figure has been 
used by defendant in the original notice of deficiency. 
For the subsequent years plaintiff contends that the allo-
cation to Utah should average about 64%. 
Under the circumstances here presented and the 
pertinent authorities heretofore cited, it appears to be 
quite clear that this court has jurisdiction to modify 
defendant's decision here on appeal or to remand the 
case to defendant for further proceedings to permit the 
computation of tax based upon the full 100% net income 
of plaintiff's Utah Division. The basic reason for the 
Federal and Utah statutory provisions relating to claims 
for increased deficiencies over and beyond those con-
tained in the original deficiency notices, rests essentially 
on a conception of fairness to the taxpayer in giving him 
adequate notice of the nature of the claim and an oppor-
tunity to present evidence thereon and to have such evi-
dence considered before any redetermination is made. 
In the case at bar plaintiff cannot claim that it was sur-
prised or prevented in any respect from giving evidence 
on the issue of the extent to which the net income of its 
Utah Division should be allocated to Utah. It was prop-
erly apprised of defendant's claim for a full 100% allo-
cation on the first day of the hearing and the record is 
voluminous with plaintiff's testimony showing that the 
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amount of the Utah Division's net income to be allocated 
to Utah should be not 100% nor 93% nor 80%, but a 
percent which will average about 64% for all of the years 
involved. 
With respect to the proposition that this Court has 
full and complete jurisdiction under the circumstances 
here existing to modify the decision of defendant or to 
remand the proceedings with directions to redetermine 
the deficiencies in tax either by way of a decrease or by 
way of an increase in such deficiencies we refer the Court 
to the following cases. 
In Olds and Whipple v. Umted States, 22 F. Sup. 
809 (1938) (Court of Claims), the court stated at page 
818: 
"A third reason for denying this contention 
is that when a case decided by the Board is ap-
pealed to and reversed by the Circuit Court of 
Appeals such court is not limited by the provi-
sions of Sec, 274 (e) and 272 (e) of the Eevenue 
Acts of 1926 and 1928 in the decision of the issues 
raised on appeal by the taxpayer. Section 1003 
(b), 26 USCA Sec. 641 (c) (1), provides that upon 
such review, such courts shall have power to af-
firm or, if the decision of the Board is not in 
accordance with law, to modify or to reverse the 
decision of the Board, with or without remanding 
the case for a rehearing, as justice may require. 
If justice requires that issues raised by the tax-
payer on appeal be decided and if such a decision 
results, as it did in this case, in deficiencies in 
excess of those determined by the Board, the tax-
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payer is in no position to complain. The provi-
sions of the statute with reference to the deter-
mination of increased deficiencies were obviously 
intended to protect the taxpayer against the 
assertion of the increased deficiencies by the com-
missioner in excess of those determined by him 
in the statutory deficiency notice and against a 
determination by the Board of increased deficien-
cies by reason of a decision on matters of which 
the taxpayer has not been advised and not raised 
by either party before the Board. It would be a 
strained construction of the section to hold that 
it was intended to protect the taxpayer against 
his own deliberate acts or the natural and neces-
sary consequences of a correct decision of the 
issues raised by him. 
"The fourth and final reason which requires 
a decision against plaintiff on its contention made 
in support of the third alleged cause of action is 
that if it be assumed that the Board upon the 
opinion and mandate of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals did not have authority or jurisdiction to 
enter the decision of Nov. 20, 1935, or the in-
creased deficiencies for 1927 and 1929, unless 
claim therefor was made by the commissioner at 
or before the final hearing, a proper claim by 
the commissioner for the increased deficiencies 
of $15,234.67 for 1927 and $330.01 for 1929 was 
made by the commissioner in sufficient compliance 
with the provisions of Sections 274(e) and 272(e) 
of the Eevenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, respec-
tively. . . . The filing of the recomputation pursu-
ant to the order of the Board of Feb. 27, 1935, 
and the submission of the cases thereon to the 
Board for final decision was a rehearing within 
the meaning of Sections 274(e) and 272(e) of the 
Eevenue Acts of 1926 and 1928. The commissioner 
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was therefore enabled at such time to make claim 
for the first time for increased deficiencies, and I 
if his recomputation carried out the opinion and j 
mandate of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
we assume it did and which is not denied by the 
petition in this case, he made a valid and legal 
claim for the increased deficiencies within the 
meaning of the sections in question." 
Again in Insular Sugar Refining Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 157 F . 2d 673, (1946) (CCA 2), the Court stated 
at page 673: 
"When this case was before us last year . . , 
a majority of the court held that the Tax Court 
had been right except that it had mistakenly re-
versed the assessments, levying the deficiency 
properly assessable for the year 1935 in the year 
1936; and vice versa. Since the deficiencies were 
not the same, this required a refund of part of 
the deficiency paid for the year 1935 and an in-
 f 
creased deficiency for 1936. The taxpayer had 
sought to amend its petition before the Tax Court 
to conform to the facts; but apparently that court 
became confused and denied the application. In 
any case we held that its refusal was 'an abuse 
of discretion' and concluded our opinion as fol-
lows: 'the cause is remanded to the Tax Court 
with direction to amend its order to conform 
to the ruling here made.' Our mandate affirmed 
the order below; but remanded the cause to the 
Tax Court 'with direction to amend its order to 
conform to the ruling made in the opinion of this 
court.' This the Tax Court did by an order award-
ing a refund for 1935, and increasing the defi-
ciency of 1936. The taxpayer has appealed upon 
the ground that Section 272 (e) of the Internal 
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Revenue Code, . . ., gives jurisdiction to the Tax 
Court to increase a deficiency only in case 'claim 
therefor is asserted by the commissioner at or 
before the hearing or a rehearing'; and, although 
the commissioner did assert a 'claim' by amending 
Ms answer to increase the deficiency for 1936, 
at the hearing held upon remittitur of our man-
dates, that was not a 'rehearing,' so that the court 
had no jurisdiction to execute our mandate. 
"We cannot now see why we found it neces-
sary to remand the case at all; Section 1141 (c) 
(1) of the Internal Eevenue Code . . . , gives us 
power to 'modify . . . the decision of the tax court, 
with or without remanding the case for a rehear-
ing, as justice may require.' I t is true that the 
error was not of the kind which appeared upon 
the face of the record, and which may be corrected 
at the time; but plainly the section does not limit 
our powers to correcting such errors without a 
rehearing. However, whether we had the power 
to correct this error without remand, we did re-
mand it, and section 1141 (c) (1) certainly gave us 
power to remand the case for a 'rehearing' and 
perhaps only for a 'rehearing'. By what leger-
demain the Tax Court became incapable of obey-
ing our mandate "to amend its order to conform 
to the ruling made' escapes us. The theory ap-
pears to be that the merits have somehow become 
so enmeshed in a web of verbiage, that the tax-
payer is to be relieved of paying what he con<-
cedly owes!' 
The Court's attention is likewise invited to the 
provisions of Section 80-13-47, U.C.A. 1943, which indi-
cates that a decision of defendant may be reviewed by 
this Court both upon the law and the facts and that the 
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provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to 
proceedings in the Supreme Court shall so far as appli-
cable and not in conflict with the tax law be applicable 
to proceedings before this Court. 
Eule 72(a) providing for appeals to be taken to 
this Court from all final judgments states: 
"In equity cases the appeal may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact. In cases at law^ the 
appeal shall be on questions of law only." 
Eule 76(a) provides as follows: 
"The Supreme Court may reverse, affirm or 
modify any order of judgment appealed from, and 
may, in case the findings in any case are incom-
plete in any respect, order the court from which 
the appeal was taken to add to, modify or com-
plete the findings so as to make the same conform 
to the issues presented and the facts as the same 
may be found to be by the trial court from the 
evidence, and may direct the trial court to enter 
judgment in accordance with the findings when 
corrected as aforesaid, or may direct a new trial 
in any case, or further proceedings to be had. If 
a new trial is granted, the court shall pass upon 
and determine all questions of law involved in the 
case presented upon the appeal and necessary to 
the final determination of the case." 
I t would thus appear that the jurisdiction of this 
Court is fully as great and in fact substantially the same 
as that of a Federal Circuit Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court of the United States over decisions of the 
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Tax Court of the United States. It might even be urged, 
although the point is not here material, that the juris-
diction of this Court over defendant is somewhat broader 
than the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Appeal over 
the Tax Court for the reason that our statute makes it 
quite clear that a decision of defendant may be reviewed 
both upon the "law and the facts." By the Dobson deci-
sion, 320 U. S. 489, the Supreme Court of the United 
States severely restricted the jurisdiction of the Circuit 
Courts of Appeal over the Tax Court with respect to 
both law questions and questions of fact. Congress re-
pealed this decision by legislation effective Sept. 1, 1948, 
and the Federal statute referred to above now provides 
that the United States Courts of Appeals are authorized 
to review decisions of the Tax Court "in the same manner 
and to the same extent as decisions of the district courts 
in civil actions without a jury." This language might 
perhaps be construed as being a little narrower than the 
language of the Utah provision which states that the 
"decision of the Tax Commission may be reviewed both 
upon the law and the facts . . . " 
Under this Point 2 we undertook initially to show-
and have shown that the Utah franchise tax must under 
the mandate of this court in No. 7298 and the pertinent 
statutes and authorities be based on the full net income 
shown and reflected on the separate books of account of 
plaintiff's Utah Division, that use of the method of direct 
allocation by separate accounting methods precludes and 
prevents application and use of the three-factor statutory 
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formula, that the out-of-state administrative, refining, 
transportation and marketing expenses should be and 
have been deducted and charged against the operations 
in Utah, that the intercompany arrangements between 
plaintiff and the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. being 
fair, reasonable and arms-length must be recognized and 
respected by both plaintiff and defendant in this pro-
ceeding, that the separate corporate entity of the sales 
subsidiary cannot be set aside and ignored, that the 
operations of plaintiff's Utah Division and the operation 
of the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. cannot be combined 
and consolidated under the consolidated return provisions 
of the Utah statute, that within the issue of "allocation" 
defendant has properly and in accordance with the 
statute and the mandate of this court in No. 7298 re-
served the jurisdiction of defendant and this Court to 
compute the tax on the full 100% net income of the Utah 
Division of plaintiff and that on this appeal this Court 
should modify defendant's decision or alternatively re-
mand the case to defendant with directions that none 
of the net income of plaintiff's Utah Division as shown 
and reflected on its separate books of account be appor-
tioned outside the State of Utah. The tax based upon the 
lawT and the facts should be in an amount equal to 3 % 
of the adjusted total net income for the years here in-
volved shown on line 1 of tax computation schedule, page 
193 of defendant's decision here on appeal. 
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POINT NO. I I I . 
I F PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO APPORTION SOME 
OF THE NET INCOME OF ITS UTAH DIVISION OUTSIDE 
UTAH, THE DECISION OF DEFENDANT IS MORE THAN 
FAIR AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Under this branch of the case we will undertake to 
show that if plaintiff is entitled to apportion some of the 
net income of the Utah Division outside Utah by virtue 
of the existence of an administrative office outside Utah, 
defendant's decision being fair and reasonable and not 
arbitrary should be affirmed. Plaintiff's argument under 
its Point 1 is an excellent presentation of its position in 
the matter. In assessing the validity and the soundness 
of this argument, however, some preliminary remarks 
appear desirable. 
I t will be remembered that plaintiff's argument is 
addressed to a construction of the Utah statute which will 
result in the apportionment outside Utah of 36% of the 
net income of the Utah Division to its New York adminis-
trative office, notwithstanding it is not shown or even 
claimed that any portion of this income has been taxed 
or is taxable in New York and notwithstanding that the 
selling business was conducted by separate companies. 
In its decision defendant as a discretionary matter ap-
plied the statutory formula to the separate accounts of 
plaintiff's Utah Division in computing the tax. The de-
cision allocates about 6% of the property of the Utah Di-
vision outside Utah, 3 % of the payroll of the Utah Divi-
sion outside Utah, and 13% of the gross receipts 
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of the Utah Division outside Utah. The average of the 
3 fractions thus allocates outside Utah about 7% of the 
net income of the Utah Division, 93% being allocated to 
Utah business. Plaintiff on this appeal raises no objec-
tion to the apportionment of 6% of the property, 3% of 
the payroll and 13% of the gross receipts of the Utah 
Division outside Utah. The contention is that in addition 
to the apportionment of the gold and silver receipts out-
side Utah, constituting 13% of total receipts, all receipts 
from copper, molybdenite, platinum and palladium as well 
should be apportioned outside Utah. 
I t is argued that the gross receipts from all sales 
must be allocated outside Utah and thus excluded from 
the gross receipts numerator because generally speaking 
(see page 29 of brief) none of the sales were negotiated 
or made within Utah, none of the persons concerned with 
sales worked out of offices in Utah, none of the products 
were delivered to customers within Utah, no sales activi-
ties of any character wrere carried on within Utah, and 
that to apportion any gross receipts from sales to Utah 
patently violates the intent of the apportionment statute 
when viewed in relation to the very substantial activities 
occurring outside of Utah in connecting with the produc-
tion of net income from the Utah Division. Notwith-
standing that the fair and proportionate share of the New 
York administrative expense has been deducted and 
charged against the Utah operation, and notwithstanding 
that the Utah molybdenite and commingled blister cop-
per products are transferred at fair value to and for 
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resale by the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E., it is said 
that the Utah statute requires the sales business con-
ducted and carried on by the sales subsidiary and A. S. 
& E. to be assimilated with and attributed to plaintiff's 
outside administrative office. Furthermore, even though 
the sales subsidiary and A. S. & E. by intercompany con-
tract have been allocated and given a fair profit for con-
ducting the selling business, it is felt that the Utah 
statute decrees that 36% of the net income of the Utah 
Division be attributed to the administrative work per-
formed outside Utah by plaintiff's New York office. 
The mandate of this court in No. 7298, requiring a 
computation of tax on the basis of the separate accounts 
of plaintiff's Utah Division under the provisions of sub-
division 8 of the Utah statute, and the applicable authori-
ties heretofore considered under defendant's Point 2 
have shown that the tax properly should be computed 
on the basis of the full 100% net income of the Utah 
Division. An apportionment of 93% of net income to 
Utah is not arbitrary or error where the authorities and 
statutory provisions show that the proper apportionment 
should have been 100%. Without in any way conceding 
or admitting that the apportionment should be in any 
amount less than 100%, we take up the argument here 
to show that even if plaintiff is entitled to application 
of the statutory formula to its Utah Division's separate 
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accounts, defendant's decision is proper and in every 
respect fully complies with the statutory formula pro-
visions of the Utah statute. 
I t might be helpful to the Court in the ascertainment 
of the meaning and intent of the Utah apportionment 
formula to consider for a moment the underlying theory 
of apportionment formulas generally. On page 32 of its 
brief plaintiff cites Altaian and Keesling, Allocation of 
Income in State Taxation (2d Ed. 1950) for the proposi-
tion that the sales factor serves the purpose of balancing 
the property and payroll factor by giving weight to the 
elements which are not reflected by the property and 
payroll factors. We further invite the Court's attention 
to Chapter VI of the above cited treatise which is entitled 
"Theory of the Apportionment Formula." This chapter, 
page 107, first states: 
"As discussed in the preceding chapter, even 
though a taxpayer may be doing business in two 
or more states, where the business in any state 
is separate and distinct from the business in the 
other state, the income attributable to such state 
may properly be determined by the so-called sepa-
rate accounting method." 
Thereafter follows a general discussion of the appro-
priate use on the other hand of the statutory formula 
where the business within the taxing state is integrated 
with the taxpayer's business in other states to such an 
extent that the net income from operations within the 
taxing state cannot by separate accounting methods be 
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properly segregated from outside operations. In such 
a case net income arising from operations in the several 
states may be apportioned to the taxing state by formula. 
At page 110 the property factor is discussed and it 
is pointed out that under our business system capital is 
generally considered an income producing factor which 
to the extent at least of the taxpayer's actual capital 
investment should be taken into consideration in an 
apportionment formula. A discussion of the payroll fac-
tor commences at page 122, where it is stated that the 
use of the payroll factor is the easiest of all factors to 
justify on theoretical as well as practical grounds. It is 
stated: "There can be little question that without the 
services of human beings it would be utterly impossible 
to conduct business or to earn income." A discussion of 
the sales factor commences at page 124, where it is 
stated: 
uIn direct contrast with the payroll factor the 
use of the sales factor is one of the most difficult 
of all to sustain. The principal objection to the 
use of the sales factor is the difficulty of deter-
mining howr sales should be allocated. There are 
any number of possibilities of which the following 
are a few: The place where title passes; the place 
where the products sold are manufactured or pro-
duced; the place where orders are solicited; the 
place from which the goods are shipped; the place 
where orders are received; the place where orders 
are approved; the place from which the order is 
sent; and the place to which the goods are shipped. 
There are still other possibilities. Thus, in the 
case of companies engaged in the transportation 
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of passengers or freight, it is common to apportion 
receipts on a mileage basis. A similar rule is 
often followed in the case of companies engaged 
in the operation of telephone and telegraph lines. 
Still another possibility is to apportion sales to 
the office where the transaction is "principally" 
consummated. Another possibility would be to 
divide certain classes of sales and apportion them 
in part to one state and in part to another. In 
any given case, which of these or other methods 
should be used? 
"As will be seen later, there is a wide dis-
crepancy between the practices of the different 
states using the sales factor in the apportionment 
formula." 
After discussing the various conflicting considera-
tions and the difficulties involved in the application of 
a sales factor, the authors state: "In view of the fore-
going difficulties, it may well be asked, why use the sales 
factor?" It is then suggested that its use, as indicated 
by plaintiff, is justified to serve as a balance of the prop-
erty and payroll factors. 
Chapter VII is entitled "Allocation Formulae in 
Practice" and shows the wide variation among the vari-
ous states in their statutory provisions and practices 
with respect to allocation formulas. Also set forth are 
brief summaries of the apportionment formulas used by 
each of the several states. 
The attention of the Court is likewise directed to 
annotation entitled "What constitutes business, business 
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done, or the like, outside the state for purposes of allo-
cation of income under tax laws, 167 ALE 943. This 
article discusses the matter of sales outside the state or 
to out-of-state buyers and shows again the wide variation 
of practice among the states, particularly with respect 
to the sales factor under statutory formulas of appor-
tionment. A study of the formulas used by the various 
states would reveal quite clearly, it is suggested, that 
the apportionment formula adopted by any particular 
state seems to have been adopted by reference to the 
specific economic situation of that state. This is particu-
larly true with respect to the sales factor. A consuming 
state has a tendency to adopt a sales factor which would 
allocate the sale to the point of delivery or consumption. 
A producing state would have a tendency to allocate the 
sale to the point of shipment or manufacture. A mer-
cantile state would have a tendency to allocate the sales 
to the place where the orders are accepted or where other 
work connected with the sale is done. The result of the 
various conflicting formulae and the variation of practice 
among the states is that sales may be allocated to more 
than one state. This raises, however, no constitutional 
objection providing the state has a formula of apportion-
ment in the statute, "crude approximation" being suffi-
cient. The evil consequences of overlapping statutory 
formulas are to a considerable extent in most of the 
states alleviated by provisions similar to subdivision 8 
of the Utah statute, which permit a modification of the 
statutory formula where the taxpayer is able to show 
that application of the formula results in double taxation 
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1 
or does not properly reflect net income from business 
done within the state. Use of the method of direct allo-
cation by separate accounting is likewise designed to 
avoid problems of double taxation and the taxation of 
business attributable to activities outside the taxing state. 
Of the various types of sales factors which it might 
have chosen, Utah saw fit to select the same sales factor 
which is used by the states of Massachusetts and Pennsyl-
vania, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, as is well known, 
economically are primarily states of production and 
manufacture. The goods produced within those states 
are marketed throughout the entire country and else-
where. Both states as a matter of revenue protection to 
themselves adopted a rather strict but fair sales factor. 
All receipts of a taxpayer from sales are allocated to the 
state unless the taxpayer showTs not only that he is 
"doing business" outside the state but also that the sales 
business is being conducted outside the state in an office 
of the taxpayer actually maintained outside the state and 
from which office the sales are negotiated and effected 
in behalf of the taxpayer. It is not enough as it is in 
several states, that the sales are negotiated and effected 
outside the state by a roaming sales force of the tax-
payer. I t is also a statutory prerequisite that this sales 
force be negotiating and effecting the sales in behalf of 
the taxpayer from an out-of-state office maintained by 
the taxpayer with which the force is connected, situated 
or dispatched. 
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Is the position of plaintiff on this appeal that the 
phrase "in behalf of the corporation" should not be con-
strued as requiring the sales to be negotiated and effected 
by an agent in the name of his principal, the taxpayer, 
and in the regular course of the taxpayer's business. I t 
is deemed to be a sufficient compliance with the law that 
the agent although an independent broker, factor, com-
mission merchant or distributor is selling and marketing 
the goods out-of-state. Defendant, on the other hand, 
construes the phrase "negotiated or effected in behalf of 
the corporation by agents" as clearly meaning that the 
agent must be acting and operating representatively and 
in the name and behalf of the taxpayer corporation. I t is 
defendant's position that if the agent as broker, factor or 
commission merchant sells in his own name and behalf 
and in the regular course of his own business and calling, 
the statute does not permit the exclusion of such sales 
from the gross receipts numerator. We will undertake 
hereafter to answer the specific objections of plaintiff 
to defendant's construction of this statute. We empha-
size at this time, however, that defendant's construction 
rests upon the very basic common-sense business concep-
tion that sales business outside the state under the statute 
means sales business conducted by the taxpayer corpo-
ration outside the state. The whole idea of the Utah 
statute is to tax net income attributable to business done 
within the state. If the selling business outside the state 
is conducted by another corporation, the selling activity 
outside Utah is not business done by the taxpayer outside 
Utah. 
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Plaintiff seeks to distinguish the large group of 
cases holding that a corporation producing goods within 
the taxing state is not entitled to an apportionment of 
income within and without the state where the goods are 
marketed outside the state through independent brokers, 
factors or commission merchants. Such cases hold 
specifically and uniformly that the marketing of goods 
through independent brokers, factors or commission 
merchants does not constitute the doing of business out-
side the producing state. The attempt to distinguish 
these cases is based on the fact that plaintiff happens to 
maintain an administrative office in the state in which 
the selling business is transacted and conducted by other 
companies. The business of the selling companies thus 
becomes, it is felt, combined, assimilated and consoli-
dated with the business activities of the administrative 
office. On this theory the sales business thus becomes 
conducted and transacted by the administrative office 
outside Utah with the same force and effect as if the 
broker, factor or commission merchant did not exist. 
Any disinterested look at the tax computation (F. 
page 193) of defendant here appealed from shows on its 
face a clear and obvious liberality to plaintiff. No ques-
tion has been raised as to the specific assignment to Utah 
of the loss of $950,877.67 before arriving at the net in-
come subject to apportionment, nor to the assignment 
of 6 per cent of the property outside consisting primarily 
of inventory in transit to market, nor to assignment of 
3 per cent of the payroll outside consisting of New York 
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administrative expense and the further allowance of such 
expenses as a deduction, nor to the assignment outside 
of 13 per cent of gross receipts from sales of gold and 
silver, nor to the allowance in full as a deduction of all 
payments to A. S. & R. as expense. In allocating 7 per 
cent of the net income of plaintiff's Utah Division to the 
New York administrative office, as applied to about 
$230,000,000 of total net income, defendant has thus allo-
cated to the New York office and treated as non-taxable 
in Utah over $16,000,000 of net income. 
Plaintiff feels, however, that the existence of the 
administrative office in the same state as that in which 
the selling companies sell the Utah Division product 
requires the exclusion from Utah of 36% or over $82,-
000,000 of the net income of the Utah Division. 36% of 
the Utah Division's net income on plaintiff's theory is 
supposed to have been earned by the relatively small 
administrative staff located in plaintiff's New York 
office. Under the pertinent authorities, such a result 
appears to constitute a gross if not incredible distortion 
of the Utah statute. From a practical business stand-
point, it is difficult to see how to the administrative pay-
roll of 3% in New York is possibly attributable 36% of 
the profit of the marketable molybdenite and blister cop-
per product of the Utah Division which moves out of 
Utah each day for sale by other companies. If plaintiff 
itself conducted the selling business in New York in its 
own name and from its own premises by means of a sales 
department within its own organization, negotiating and 
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executing the contracts of sale of copper and molybdenite 
in its own name, dealing with the customers and collect-
ing receipts from sales in its own name and in the regu-
lar course of its own business, a different question would 
obviously be here presented. The administrative office 
of plaintiff in New York, however, has not and never 
has negotiated or effected the sale of a single pound of 
copper or molybdenite in behalf of the plaintiff corpora-
tion. The selling business conducted by separate and 
distinct corporations cannot be attributed to the adminis-
trative work conducted by plaintiff in its New York 
administrative office. I t is here in Utah that plaintiff 
has its large capital investment, where the mine is located, 
where the activities of 5,000 employees convert a raw 
crude ore into marketable molybdenite and blister copper. 
The income is earned from the industrial operation 
of producing metal, not from New York administrative 
services. 
The statutory test for the assignment of payroll 
within and without the state is essentially the same as 
the statutory test for the assignment of gross receipts 
from sales within and without the state. The statute 
says that there shall be assigned to the state wages, 
salaries, commissions or other compensation to its "em-
ployees" as represents the compensation of employees 
not chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from, 
premises for the transaction of business owned or rented 
by the corporation outside the state. Plaintiff makes no 
claim or suggestion here that the "commissions" to the 
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sales subsidiary constitute a part of out-of-state payroll. 
In fact, it will be recalled, for tax purposes plaintiff 
added such commissions back into income deducting esti-
mated expenses of the subsidiary instead. 
The statute under the gross receipts fraction assigns 
to Utah the amount of the corporation's gross receipts 
from sales "except those negotiated or effected in 
behalf of the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly 
situated at, connected with or sent out from premises for 
the transaction of business owned or rented by the corpo-
ration outside this state, and sales otherwise determined 
by the tax commission to be attributable to the business 
conducted on such premises." Thus, under the payroll 
fraction, the statute speaks of "commissions" to "employ-
ees." Under the gross receipts fraction the statute speaks 
of sales "negotiated or effected in behalf of the corpora-
tion by agents." Although the word "employees" is not 
used in the gross receipts fraction, it is suggested that 
"agents" although a broader term for some purposes 
is here used in much the same context and with the same 
meaning as "employees" under the payroll fraction to the 
extent that the agents as described must be acting "in 
behalf of the corporation." The phrase "in behalf of" 
means, as we shall hereafter see, "in the name of" and 
covers the situation where the agent is acting not indi-
vidually in the regular course of his own business, but 
representatively on behalf of the corporation. The dis-
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tinction in the statute is thus essentially dependent upon 
whether the "agent" is conducting his own business indi-
vidually or conducting the taxpayer's business repre-
sentatively. 
In other words, the question under the statute is 
essentially this—whose business is it? I s it the taxpayer 
corporation's business or is it the separate business of 
the agent? Pertinent judicial decisions in construing the 
statute plainly hold that sales of a corporation outside the 
state of production by independent brokers, factors or 
commission merchants is not business done by the corpo-
ration outside the state so as to require an apportionment 
of income within and without the state. This construc-
tion, illustrated in the decisions, rests on the obvious 
practical view that a corporation is only entitled to allo-
cate a par t of its net income to its sale activities outside 
the state if, but only if, the selling activities outside the 
state are performed by the corporation itself. 
Although wTe will hereafter take up plaintiff's argu-
ment point by point in detail with respect to the gross 
receipts factor, it is apparent that the basic framework 
of plaintiff's case rests upon the argument (page 35 of 
brief) that the sales of the Utah product are made entire-
ly outside Utah, to buyers located outside Utah, through 
persons operating at or from offices permanently located 
outside Utah, and that no selling activities of 'any 
character took place in Utah or were carried on by per-
sons within or operating from or under the supervision 
or direction of plaintiff's offices within Utah. 
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The short answer, of course, to this argument is 
contained in the numerous constitutional cases cited 
under defendant's Point 1. These cases made it abund-
antly clear that the state of production or manufacture 
has a very special and unique claim for a tax laid on the 
privilege of conducting a local manufacturing or pro-
duction business, even though a tax on such privilege be 
measured by the gross receipts from out-of-state sales. 
Moreover, our statute is perfectly plain in its intent to 
apportion gross receipts from sales outside Utah only 
where the taxpayer engages itself in a selling business 
outside the state from which such gross receipts are held 
by the statute to be in part earned and realized. The 
statute only permits % of the net income by the gross 
receipts factor to be allocated outside the state where the 
taxpayer engages in the business of selling outside the 
state from premises maintained outside the state. 
I t is, therefore, not enough under our statute for 
plaintiff to show that the sales of the Utah product are 
made outside the state. The goods originate in Utah, 
commence their interstate journey in Utah and the selling 
activity is conducted and transacted by a separate and 
distinct corporation, the sales subsidiary. The statute 
does not permit defendant to assign sales receipts to 
Utah only where it establishes that the taxpayer is con-
ducting the sales activities in Utah. The statute says 
that the sales receipts are assignable to Utah unless the 
taxpayer establishes that the sales are negotiated and 
effected in its behalf from its out-of-state premises, i.e., 
that it is doing a sales business outside the state. 
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We turn now to the consideration, here very impor- I 
tant, of the legal and tax status of independent brokers, 
factors and commission merchants. Are they, under the 
authorities and within the meaning of our statute, carry-
ing on their own business or are they carrying on as I 
plaintiff contends the business of their principal! ] 
i 
As a preliminary matter, we again invite the Court's 
attention to the standard form of contract covering all J 
sales of copper by the sales subsidiary (F. page 71) which 
reads: "Kennecott Sales Corporation, hereby agrees to 1 
sell and deliver and Triangle Conduit and Cable Com-
\ pany, Inc., New Brunswick, N. J. agrees to purchase and j 
receive the products on terms and subject to conditions 
specified below." 
We also refer to defendant's findings with respect j 
to the status, function and activity of Kennecott Sales 
Corporation. (Page 140 of Findings, et seq.) Among 
these findings, at page 147, is the following: 
"g. The Sales Corporation was employed by 
Kennecott as a commercial agent and vested and 
entrusted under appropriate instructions and ar-
rangements with the right of possession, disposal 
and control of all copper and molybdenite pro- j 
duced by Kennecott for the purpose of selling j 
such property, at an agreed commission or com-
pensation, in the name and pursuant to and in j 
the usual course of trade or business of the Sales 
Corporation and authorized to receive payment for 
such sales from the purchaser thereof. We hold , 
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and find that the Sales Corporation was in fact 
and functioned as a factor or commission mer-
chant with respect to all sales of copper and 
molybdenite during the period here involved." 
Prentice-Hall, State and Local Tax Service, Vol. 1, 
All States Unit, Para. 7500, states: 
"Another methed is to consign goods to a fac-
tor in the state whose business is to sell the goods 
to his customer and account to his principal ac-
cording to the terms of his contract . . ." 
Paragraph 7501 reads as follows: 
"Consigning goods to a factor in another state 
is interstate commerce. — A contract of factorage 
is one whereunder one party, called the consignor, 
places in the hands of the other party, the con-
signee or factor, goods which, while they are still 
in the latter's hand, remain the property of the 
consignor. The factor is to sell such goods to his 
customer in the state, paying to the consignor for 
the goods so sold a price fixed by the contract and 
retaining for himself the amount by which the 
price his customer pays him exceeds that which 
he is required to pay to the consignor. The busi-
ness done in the state is entirely that of the factor. 
When he makes a sale of the consignor's goods in 
the state, what really takes place is this: The 
factor purchases the goods from the consignor 
and resells them to his customers. In Mitchell 
Wagon Co. v. Poole, the court said: 'The contract 
here provided for the bankrupt becoming pur-
chaser in several contingencies. One, was when 
lie sold the wagons. This follows from the fact 
that he had a right to sell on such terms as to price 
and time of payment as he liked, but was bound, 
if he sold, to pay appellant for them at a fixed 
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price at a fixed time, and the proceeds of the sale 
were to be his. A sale by him ivas, in effect, a 
purchase and a resale.' . . . In Cooper Kubber Co. 
v. Johnson the Court said: 'The terms "factor" 
and "commission merchant" are said to be nearly 
or quite synonymous; the former expression being-
more common in the language of the law, and 
the latter in the language of commerce. A "factor" 
is one whose business is to receive and sell goods 
for a commission, being entrusted with the pos-
session of the goods to be sold, and usually selling 
in his own name. 1 Mecham on Agency, Sees. 74, 
2497, et seq. While in one sense a factor or com-
mission merchant is the agent of the consigning 
dealer or manufacturer, he does not conduct an 
agency for business for the latter at the place of 
business of the former, where the sales of the con-
signed merchandise are made to customers chosen 
by the local dealer, at his own risk, and the pro-
ceeds of the sale do not become the exclusive prop-
erty of the consigning company. And business so 
conducted is truly said to be that of the factor or 
commission merchant.' Where the consignor is a 
foreign corporation sending goods on consign-
ment to the factor from without the state, such 
corporation is engaged in interstate commerce." 
Although the sales subsidiary is here not a "del 
credere" factor in that it did not guarantee accounts for 
collection, it was in every respect under and by virtue of 
its contractural arrangements with plaintiff a usual and 
normal type of commission merchant, as the findings of 
defendant at page 60 et seq. clearly show. 
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We quote the findings, page 64: 
"p. The American Smelting and Refining 
Company or anyone holding any copper of Ken-
necott for delivery is authorized, upon demand 
made by the Sales Corporation to make deliveries 
to the Sales Corporation or its order of such 
copper." 
Again at page 33 is the following: 
"By arrangements entered into between Ken-
necott and the Sales Corporation which have been 
accepted, recognized and followed by A. S. & R., 
Kennecott has entrusted the Sales Corporation 
with authority to sell all of the refined copper 
produced at the Baltimore refinery of A. S. & R. 
or other refinery, and with the right to possess 
and control such copper for the purpose of sale 
and to issue instructions to A. S. & R. or others 
pertaining to the casting, storage, handling and 
shipment, sale or other disposition of such copper 
and with the right to receive payment from the 
customer of the purchase price thereof." 
The status of brokers, factors and commission mer-
chants is well recognized both in the law, in business and 
in the administration of state tax laws. Much of the agri-
cultural and livestock production in Utah is marketed 
outside the state through this medium. For example, 
cattle, sheep, wool and fruit are to a large extent so 
marketed. Conversely, many of the products consumed 
in Utah and produced in other states are marketed here 
in Utah by means of brokers, produce merchants, factors 
and commission merchants. Although selling the goods 
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of their principal, the business done is not the business 
of the principal, but their own business. They are the 
ones who sell to the customer in the market. For example, 
Eeg. 45 under the Sales Tax Law provides: 
"Every auctioneer, consignee, bailee, factor, 
etc., entrusted with possession of any bill-of-lad-
ing, customhouse permit, warehouseman's receipt, 
or other document of title for delivery of any tang-
ible personal property, or entrusted with posses-
sion of any such personal property for the purpose 
of sale, is deemed to be the retailer thereof, and 
upon the sale of such property is required to file a 
return on the selling price and pay a tax there-
on. . . ." 
Again Regulation No. 6 under the Corporation Fran-
chise Tax Law provides in par t as follows : 
"Application of corporation franchise tax act 
to foreign corporations selling merchandise to cus-
tomers in Utah. 
"In general, foreign corporations which have 
neither agents nor stocks of goods in Utah, and 
which engage in no other activities here, are not 
doing business in this state and are, accordingly, 
not taxable under the Corporation Franchise Tax 
Act, even though goods are shipped to customers 
in this state pursuant to order received by mail, 
telephone or telegraph. Such corporations are 
likewise not subject to the tax, even though sales 
are made to customers in this state pursuant to 
orders taken by independent dealers (factors) or 
by brokers, if such corporations engage in no other 
activities which amount to doing business in this 
state through the medium of an agent of the cor-
poration. 
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"(a) Whether or not orders taken for 
sales are made by an agent, or by an independent 
dealer, or by a broker must depend upon the facts 
of each particular case. In general, if a person 
acts only for one company and takes orders and 
makes sales in the name of that company or 
otherwise purports to represent that company, 
he is acting as an agent and his acts are the acts 
of the company. Conversely, if a person purports 
to be doing business on his own account and not as 
a representative of some other party, the person 
is generally acting as an independent dealer. 
Finally, if a person is acting as a representative 
and not in his own behalf but purports to be repre-
senting several other parties, his activities are 
generally those of a b roker . . . . 
"(d) Foreign corporations do not become 
subject to the tax imposed by the corporation 
Franchise Tax Act, because they send goods to 
independent dealers or brokers on consignment, 
or because they maintain stocks of goods here 
from which deliveries are made pursuant to orders 
taken by independent dealers or brokers." 
Thus the sales subsidiary in selling the Utah product 
of plaintiff is conducting its own business and not that 
of plaintiff even though in a sense every broker, factor 
or commission merchant is an "agent." The point here, 
however, is that the factor is not an agent acting in his 
principal's behalf and in the name of his principal — he 
is acting in his own name and behalf and in the regular 
course of his own business. See: Gwin, White & Prince v. 
Eenneford, 305 U.S. 434. The activities of the sales sub-
sidiary either in New York or in any other state in which 
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it might qualify to do business would not constitute the 
conduct by plaintiff in such states of a selling business. 
The selling business would be attributable solely and ex-
clusively to the activities of the sales subsidiary. The 
selling business would in no wise be attributable to plain-
tiff. Plaintiff as a result of the sales subsidiary's acti-
vities in either New York or elsewhere runs no risk of 
having the sales subsidiary's activities imputed to it for 
tax or other purposes. 
We refer the Court to the discussion under the head-
ing "Sales to Broker or Factor" contained at page 956 of 
annotation in 167 A.L.R. 943. It is there stated: 
"A taxpayer cannot be deemed to be doing 
business outside the state so as to require an allo-
cation of income where it merely sells its product 
outside the state through cooperative marketing 
associations and independent produce brokers or 
factors, even assuming that the association or 
brokers are agents of the taxpayer." 
The California case of Irvine Company v. McColgan, 
167 ALE 934, 157 P. 2d 847 (1945), is referred to. 
The above annotation refers to the decisions of this 
Court with respect to the question whether out-of-state 
broker sales constitute out-of-state business and states 
the ruling of the Supreme Court of Utah to be that such 
sales do not constitute out-of-state business for fran-
chise tax purposes. The annotation reads, page 957: 
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"The decision in American Invest. Corp. v 
State Tax Commission (1941) 101 Utah 189, 120 
P. 2d 331, that a sale, by a foreign investment 
corporation doing business within the state, of 
shares of stock in two other foreign corporations 
through an out of state broker was out-of-state 
business was over-ruled in a case involving ordi-
nary income of an investment company in J . M. 
and M. S. Browning Co. v. State Tax Commission 
(1945) 107 Utah 457, 154 P. 2d 993 . . . wherein it 
is also said that buying and selling stocks and 
bonds does not constitute doing business." 
Of significance here is the following statement at 
page 954 of the above annotation: 
"In the absence of a statute allocating to out-
of-state business sales negotiated or effected 
through a sales office maintained out of the state, 
there is little logical basis for making a differ-
entiation based solely on whether the taxpayer 
maintains a sales office out of the state or merely 
sends a salesman out of the state to do the same 
work that might be done through a branch sales 
office" 
The above quotation it will be noted interprets the 
Utah type of statute as requiring the maintenance of a 
"sales office" outside the state from which the out-of-state 
sales are negotiated or effected by the corporation's sales-
men. This is precisely defendant's point here, namely, 
that plaintiff although maintaining administrative of-
fices, does not maintain in New York a sales office. 
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In the following discussion we ask the Court to as-
sume, contrary to the Cottonwood Coal Co. Case and the 
numerous cases cited under defendant's Point 2 with ref-
erence to direct allocation by separate accounting 
methods, that plaintiff by virtue of its New York adminis-
trative office is thereby doing business in New York so 
as to require an apportionment of net income outside 
Utah. This was the assumption made in defendant's de-
cision by its computations of the payroll, property and 
gross receipts fractions. With respect to the sales factor 
we refer the Court to the discussion in the A.L.K. Anno-
tation, 167 at page 958 under the sub-heading "Express 
Statutory Provisions as to Sales." The statutory provi-
sions as to sales allocation are substantially the same in 
the states of Utah, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. Al-
though the problem of the sales factor was before this 
Court in the case of California Packing Corporation v. 
Commission, 97 Utah 367 (1939), the matter has been 
considered more frequently by the appellate courts of 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. 
We quote from the above annotation at page 960: 
"Where an out-of-state sales office made sales 
within the state which were filled from a branch 
within the state, and the state appellate tax board 
found as a fact that such sales constituted sales 
negotiated through the out-of-state office so as 
to be excluded from taxation under such a statute, 
the decision was affirmed in Commissioner of Cor-
porations and Taxation v. Ford Motor Company 
(1941) 308 Mass. 558, 33 NE 2d 318, in view of 
another statute making the board's findings of 
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fact final. Conversely, where orders negotiated 
by the local branch of the corporation with local 
buyers were filled by an out-of-state branch, it was 
held that the sales were properly classified as 
sales made within the state. 
"And it was held under such a statute, in Com. 
v. Electric Storage Battery Co. (1941) 51 Dauph 
Co. Eep. (PA) 90, that a sale is to be assigned to 
the out-of-state office which negotiated and con-
cluded it, even though the goods were manufac-
tured within the state and orders therefor were 
filled from several warehouses within and without 
the state. 
"But in California Packing Corp. v. State 
Tax Commission (1939) 97 Utah 367, 93 P. 2d 463, 
a three to two decision, the majority of the court 
practically rewrote the portion of the statute 
quoted, supra this sub-division, saying that it 
should read: 'Negotiated or effected in behalf of 
the corporation by agents or agencies chiefly situ-
ated at, connected with or sent out from premises 
owned or rented by the corporation, for the trans-
action of business outside of this state.' And the 
majority construed the statute, as thus rewritten, 
saying: ' I t excepts from sales the income of which 
is used in computing the tax those which may be 
handled from offices or premises within the state 
to a purchaser without the state for shipment out 
of the state, if made by an agent of the company 
chiefly engaged in out-of-state sales and business. 
Sales otherwise made of goods within the state 
for shipment out of the state are deemed to be 
sales made and business done within the state, 
and enter into the income from which the tax is 
computed. This construction makes the question 
of the exception of proceeds of a sale of goods 
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within the state depend upon where the sale is 
made rather than upon the home office of sales-
man. This more directly covers business done 
within the state.' But the minority thought that 
the legislature had clearly indicated its intention 
to make the locus of the sale depend upon the lo-
cation of the office out of which the salesmen 
work, and pointed out that ordinarily such a 
formula did rough justice. I t might be added that 
the construction adopted by the minority has the 
virtue of being practical from an administrative 
point of view, for the state has only to add up 
total sales of the local office and that is the end 
of i t ; but under the view of the majority the state 
must first determine whether each salesman is en-
gaged chiefly in work within or without the state 
and, if most of his work is without the state, 
whether each sale was made within or without the 
state, and the cost of such an administrative in-
vestigation may often exceed the tax to be col-
lected. The Pennsylvania Tax Court disapproves 
the majority opinion in this case in Com. v. Bayuk 
Cigars (1941) 50 Dauph Co. Rep. (Pa.) 243 (Re-
hearing denied (1941) 51 Dauph Co. Rep. 140, 
affirmed in (1942) 345 Pa. 348 28 A. 2d 134, af-
firmed in (1943) 318 US 746, . . .; and in Com. 
v. Charles S. Walton & Co. (1942) 53 Dauph Co. 
Rep. (Pa.) 279." 
A brief discussion of the California Packing Corp. 
Case appears unavoidable. It is cited by this Court in 
its opinion in No. 7298, and by plaintiff in its brief (pages 
26-27, 36 and 53) generally for the proposition that the 
Utah law seeks to avoid double taxation and to levy a tax 
with respect to business done only within the state, and 
that under neither the majority or minority opinions 
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should any sales be assigned to Utah which are not nego-
tiated by personnel operating from offices in Utah. 
We feel it necessary to point out that plaintiff relied 
primarily upon the California Packing Corporation case 
before this Court in No. 7298 in support of its claim to a 
calculation of tax on the basis of the statutory formula 
as applied to its total operations. This Court held, how-
ever, that this plaintiff's tax should be computed not on 
the basis of the statutory formula but on the basis of the 
separate accounts of plaintiff's Utah Division. This 
Court in its opinion in No. 7298 cited both the majority 
and minority opinions in the California Packing case as 
establishing the right of defendant to depart from the 
statutory formula and assess the tax under subdivision 8 
of the Utah statute on the separate business done by 
plaintiff's Utah Division. 
To see what, if any, relevance the California Packing 
case has to the allocation problem in the case at bar, it 
is necessary to turn to the facts of the case. I t appeared 
that the Packing Company in filing its franchise tax re-
turns used the three factor formula in the statute and 
allocated to Utah some property and some payroll. In the 
sales fraction, however, it showed $55,511,789.30 of total 
sales none of which were assigned to Utah. The sales 
fraction was thus zero as plaintiff contends it should be 
here in the case at bar. The Packing Company allocated 
no sales to Utah "since none of the goods were sold by 
salesmen or agents sent out from premises within the 
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state of Utah." In auditing the return the Tax Commis-
sion allocated to Utah sales in the amount of $2,122,110.26 * 
which represented "the sales of goods which were stored 
in Utah at the time of sale although such sales were made 
by agents sent out from the California offices of the 
company." The Tax Commission, before the Court, 
sought to justify this adjustment of the gross receipts 
fraction under subdivision 8 of the statute. The majority 
opinion states at page 372: 
"The amount shown as No. 3, total gross re-
ceipts in Utah, includes sales of goods which were 
stored in Utah at the time of sale regardless of 
whether the sales were made to Utah concerns or 
to concerns in other states. 
"Should the income from sales of produce 
manufactured or stored within this state be allo-
cated to income attributable to business carried 
on within this state when such sales are made for 
the company by an agent sent out from the Cali-
fornia office?" 
After construing the statute as indicated above in the 
A.L.K. annotation, the Court went on to state at page 374 
as follows: 
"This construction also puts into the income 
of business done within the state the proceeds 
of sales of goods manufactured or stored within 
the state but sold for shipment out of the state, 
where the sale is made through a broker or jobber 
within the state rather than through an out-of-
state agent or employee of the company. We re-
peat, the exception goes only to sales to an out-of-
state party when the agent of the company making 
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the sale is chiefly connected with out-of-state busi-
ness and such others made from premises main-
tained for out-of-state business as the Tax Com-
mission may determine to be attributable to busi-
ness done out of the state." 
Again at page 375, with the exception of an order by 
a St, George merchant on a Salt Lake warehouse filled 
by a delivery from a Las Vegas, Nevada, warehouse, the 
Court states: 
"The section thus provides that the receipts 
from business assignable to the state shall be de-
termined from three factors: (a) Sales of goods 
manufactured or stored within the state, less the 
exception noted above . . ." 
The result of the majority opinion was to yield "in 
the main results closely akin to those which the commis-
sion sought to accomplish by departing from the statu-
tory formula." (page 379) 
The dissent in the minority opinion was placed on the 
ground that the statute "means just what it says" (page 
390), and the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and 
Massachusetts have followed the construction of the 
statute as set forth in the dissenting opinion. 
In a strict sense the California Packing Corporation 
case is completely distinguishable from and has no ap-
plication to the case at bar whatsoever for the reason 
that the sales employees operating out of the California 
"offices of the company" were selling the goods manu-
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factured or stored in Utah "to Utah concerns or to con-
cerns in other states" in the name and in behalf of the 
company itself. In other words, the goods were not being 
sold by an affiliated sales subsidiary or by A. S. & B. or 
by some other separate and distinct company or by inde-
pendent brokers, factors or commission merchants. The 
Packing Company was thus manufacturing and selling its 
own goods in the regular course of its own business. 
Although the majority opinion seemed to indicate 
that the test under the statute should be, not the home 
office of the salesman, but whether the agent was "chiefly 
engaged in out-of-state sales and business," the opinion 
goes on to state that "this construction makes the question 
of the exception of proceeds of a sale of goods within the 
state depend upon where the sale is made rather than 
upon the home office of the salesman.7' 
Furthermore, the dissenting opinion in discussing 
this "drastic" revision of the statute, stated at page 386: 
"Before transposition the test of accepted 
sales was whether they could be credited to 
agencies outside of Utah, i.e., agencies or agents 
accredited to premises outside of Utah. After the 
transposition the test is whether the sales which 
are accepted were made out of the state." 
Although the minority raises certain constitutional 
doubts about certain possible applications of the gross 
receipts factor as contained in the law, the cases cited 
heretofore under defendant's Point 1 and the several 
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decisions in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and par-
ticularly the Bayuk Cigars case which was affirmed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States clearly and defi-
nitely sustain the constitutionality of the Utah statute 
both as it stands in the books and as applied here to 
plaintiff. 
If we assume that the California Packing Corpora-
tion case is still law in this state, under neither the ma-
jority nor the minority opinion would selling activities 
outside the state by independent brokers, factors or com-
mission merchants appear to require an apportionment 
of income outside Utah. However, to the extent that the 
California Packing case is interpreted as discarding the 
statutory test in the law and adopting in lieu thereof the 
sole test of whether the sale was made outside Utah, 
the decision has subsequently been clearly if not expressly 
over-ruled by this court in the J. M. and M. S. Browning 
Co. case. 
The opinion in American Investment Corporation 
v. State Tax Commission, 101 Ut. 189 (1941) points up 
clearly the conflict of view on this question within the 
Court. The majority opinion, page 201, states: 
"'Do the proceeds from the sale of the oil 
stocks represent receipts from business done in 
Utah? I t does not appear that anything with re-
spect to the sale of this stock was done in Utah. 
These stocks were sold on the New York stock 
exchange by a member of that exchange in New 
York. They were not sold in Utah nor under any 
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right of the plaintiff to do business in Utah. A 
sale made within the state is business done within 
the state. A sale is made without the state to an-
other person without the state and by an agent 
chiefly engaged in out-of-state business is not busi-
ness done within the state/' 
The opinion relies upon the California Packing case for 
the above and then continues: 
"The legislature adopted a method of taxation 
which meant to reach only the profits earned with-
in this state. The general criteria for determining 
the place of sale in cases of executed contracts of 
sale is the place where the title to the property 
passes to the buyer as between himself and the 
seller." 
The dissenting opinion at page 207 with respect to the 
point here involved states: 
"Further, by the prevailing opinion, if a local 
broker with New York connections sells stock for 
plaintiff, in N. Y., the income is not taxable, but 
if such broker consummated the deal in Utah, 
the income would be taxable. I t is clear that the 
opinion fails to understand that the business of 
the Idaho corporation or the oil companies in 
earning a surplus and declaring dividends is an 
entirely different business from plaintiff's busi-
ness of owning stock and receiving dividends, and 
that in this case the franchise covers the latter 
type of business. Equally clear is it that the 
opinion fails to distinguish the business done by 
the broker in New York and that done by plain-
tiff here in placing the stock with the broker for 
sale, and receiving the returns therefrom." 
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Except for its well substantiated position under 
Point 2 requiring the franchise tax to be based upon the 
income shown by a direct allocation of separate account-
ing which position is in accord with the mandate of this 
Court in No. 7298, defendant would here be having ob-
vious difficulties if the majority decision in the American 
Investment Corp. case in its interpretation of the Cali-
fornia Packing case and the statute were still law. If 
stock sent from Utah to a New York broker for sale by, 
the broker in New York is not business done within Utah 
solely because "title to the property passes to the buyer" 
in New York, plaintiff's argument here that sending its 
copper and molybdenite to New York for sale in New 
York by the sales subsidiary is not business done within 
Utah would have considerable merit. 
However, in J. M. & M. S. Browning v. State Tax 
Commission, 107 U. 457 (1945), the previous minority 
view became the law and insofar as defendant's position 
here or generally in administering the statute is con-
cerned, the statute "means what it says." On page 466 of 
the opinion it is stated : 
"The only thing that can be noted as having 
been done in another state is the holding of rental 
properties and possibly the buying and selling 
in other states of stocks and bonds." 
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Again, 
"It follows that all of the income from con-
ducting its investment business was derived from 
business done in Utah. The holding of the Tax 
Commission in this regard must be affirmed. In-
sofar as the American Investment Co. v. Tax 
Comm. case, supra, is to the contrary, it is hereby 
expressly over-ruled." 
Also of significance here is the statement of the 
court at page 463: 
"If in making the allocation of net income of 
the taxpayer to Utah, the tax commission is re-
quired to look, not at the business done by the 
taxpayer, but at the business done by some third 
corporation, this reasonable basis is almost totally 
destroyed." 
Again at page 465: 
"The test as to whether a corporation is doing 
business in states other than Utah under particu-
lar fact situations would therefore be: Would 
such conduct if carried on in Utah be held to con-
stitute doing business so as to subject the corpora-
tion to the Utah corporate franchise tax." 
Just as the Court in the Browning case felt the ques-
tion to be whether the plaintiff there was conducting an 
"investment" business in a state other than Utah, so here 
in the case at bar is the question whether plaintiff is 
conducting a "sales" business in a state other than Utah. 
We emphasize particularly the fact that some of the con-
solidated companies in the Browning case "did business in 
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Utah and Missouri, and had employees chiefly situated 
at, and carried on business from premises which were 
rented outside the state of Utah." Such business done 
outside Utah from premises outside Utah did not, how-
ever, require the apportionment outside Utah of any of 
the income from the investment business. The investment 
business was all done in Utah and all of the investment 
income thus became apportionable to Utah. The office 
outside Utah did not engage in any investment business. 
In the case at bar the office of plaintiff outside Utah is 
an administrative office and does not engage in any sales 
business whatsoever. That business is conducted in New 
York by separate and distinct companies. 
We invite the Court's attention to the following quo-
tations from the annotation in 167 A.L.R. and cases cited 
therein: 
"The fact that the purchaser is located outside 
the state does not require that the income from a 
sale to him be allocated to business done outside 
the state." (947) 
" 'Doing business' cannot be so identified with 
'receipt of income' that the business of the tax-
payer in making sales must be deemed to have 
been done at the place where the purchase price 
was received." (947) 
"It has been held that the fact that title to 
goods passes outside the state does not necessarily 
establish that the income from a sale of such goods 
arises from business done outside the state." (948) 
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The Court's particular attention is likewise invited 
to the case of Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 NC 
365, 168 SE 397; affirmed 291 U.S. 642 (1934). In this 
case it appeared that the taxpayer was a Delaware Cor-
poration carrying on a manufacturing business in North 
Carolina. 99.8% of the goods manufactured within 
North Carolina were sold outside the state, in the amount 
of $1,545,485.95. Sales within the state were $3,021.13 or 
00.2% of the total sales. In filing its tax return the tax-
payer allocated 58.538% of its net income to North Caro-
lina. The Commissioner of Revenue, however, allocated 
99.2% of the taxpayer's net income to North Carolina 
and assessed an additional tax on this basis. The Su-
preme Court of North Carolina sustained the assessment 
and stated: 
"The bare fact of sale produces no income. 
I t is merely the act by which the income is cap-
tured; the capital, the organization, or efforts 
which produce the sale, are the things to be con-
sidered in ascertaining the amount of income to be 
credited to the sale. Again 'no effort was made 
in the evidence to break up the business of appel-
lee into the separate or component elements of 
buying, manufacturing and selling, as was done 
in the Hans Rees' Sons Case . . . " 
We come now to a specific analysis and answer of 
plaintiff's argument as set forth in its brief that receipts 
from sales of products produced by the Utah Division 
were not gross receipts from business done in Utah and 
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cannot be attributed to business carried on within Utah. 
The discussion assumes, without conceding, that plaintiff 
is entitled to apply the statutory formula against its 
Utah Division's separate books of account. 
Plaintiff's main point that sales of the Utah products 
do not constitute gross receipts from business done in 
Utah appears at page 19 of its brief. The discussion 
from pages 19 to 23 is general and reference is made to 
the provisions of the Utah statute relating to the statu-
tory formula basis of allocation. At page 21 it is pointed 
out that the gross receipts from all sales of copper, 
molybdenite, platinum and palladium of the Utah Divi-
sion have been attributed to Utah business "although all 
of such sales wrere made outside of Utah to buyers located 
outside of this state by agents operating from offices out-
side of this state." Plaintiff's contention is stated on 
page 22 to be that "such gross receipts are the result of 
business carried on in a state other than Utah." It is 
stated that the gross receipts factor "should be substan-
tially zero and that the net income to be allocated to 
Utah should range from 63 to 65%." Plaintiff indicates 
its agreement with defendant's decision to the extent 
that the decision allocated the gross receipts from gold 
and silver outside Utah. The sales of platinum and pal-
ladium are indicated to be "but an infinitesimal par t" of 
the total and therefore the subsequent argument is ad-
dressed primarily to the sales of copper and molybdenite. 
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I t is urged that the subsequent argument demonstrates 
the error in defendant's application of the statute and if 
so applied the resulting tax is unconstitutional. 
The only point necessary to discuss here is the refer-
ence to the sales of platinum and palladium. True it is 
that these receipts may be infinitesimal when consider-
ing a total adjusted net income, before apportionment, 
of the Utah Division in the amount of $232,570,086.66. 
Such receipts are nevertheless in a substantial amount. 
Plaintiff has raised the propriety of assigning such 
receipts to Utah business and we suggest that such re-
ceipts should not be assigned outside the state merely 
because such receipts constitute a small proportion of 
total receipts. This is not a very good reason. The evi-
dence clearly shows and establishes that the sales of 
platinum and palladium were negotiated and effected by 
and in the name of A. S. & K. from A. S. & R.'s own sepa-
rate premises and in the regular course of its own busi-
ness. Plaintiff has established no basis whatsoever for 
the assignment of such receipts to business done by 
plaintiff outside Utah. 
Plaintiff urges on page 23 that the Utah tax statute 
is designed to tax net income attributable to Utah busi-
ness and that the decision of defendant it at variance with 
this purpose. 
Plaintiff's discussion from pages 23 to 29 is again 
general and to the effect that the so-called Massachu-
setts formula is only designed to impose a tax on the 
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corporation's net income fairly and reasonably attribut-
able to business done within the taxing state. It is 
pointed out that Massachusetts in adopting its three-
factor formula of property, payroll and gross receipts 
from sales first recognized that no single factor could 
be generally applied to give a fair allocation of income 
within and without the state. It is pointed out that the 
Massachusetts formula has been adopted by several 
states "with some differences in its specifications in one 
state or another." It is urged that the statute, its leg-
islative history and the opinions of this Court show that 
the statute only taxes such income as is reasonably 
attributable to business done in Utah. It is suggested 
that defendant has by a tortured construction of the 
statute violated its fundamental purpose and has man-
ifested no concern as to whether the result reached was 
fair or not. It is further suggested that the three factors 
must be applied "since each factor operates as a check 
and balance to the others" and that application of the 
formula is necessary in the case of a "single or unitary 
business conducted across state lines." At page 29, plain-
tiff indicates its acquiescence in the assignment of 6% 
of the property outside Utah, 3% of the payroll outside 
Utah, but objects that the assignment to Utah of receipts 
of sales of products, other than gold and silver, consti-
tutes a patent violation of the statute because none of 
the sales were negotiated in Utah, none of the persons 
concerned with sales worked out of offices in Utah, none 
of the products were delivered to customers in Utah 
and no sales activities occurred within Utah. 
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As heretofore indicated, the several states in adopt-
ing the Massachusetts formula have modified the statu-
tory test on the sales factor. The Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania and Utah laws do not however, arbitrarily 
allocate sales receipts to the state of production or manu-
facture or to a state in which the corporation is otherwise 
doing business if it appears that the sales are negotiated 
by the company in out-of-state premises. The statute 
pertaining to the sales factor simply assigns gross 
receipts to the state from sales unless the taxpayer cor-
poration itself conducts outside the state the selling 
business and activity from the corporation's own prem-
ises. The statute neither requires nor permits the ap-
portionment of net income to business conducted or the 
corporate franchise exercised outside the state by some 
other company. Furthermore, even on plaintiff's theory 
of the case, the formula is clearly and definitely inappli-
cable to the intercompany transfers of 25% of the copper 
produced by the Utah Division to the fabricating sub-
sidiaries, Chase Brass and Copper Co. and Kennecott 
Wire & Cable Co., separately accounted for. 
After pointing out on page 29 that no sales activities 
are conducted in Utah, plaintiff begins to move toward 
the heart of the problem on page 30 by referring to 
various administrative duties performed in the New 
York office as "evidence" of out-of-Utah activity and 
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then concludes on page 31 that the administrative acti-
vities of plaintiff in New York were so "necessary and 
substantial" that but for them "the operation of the 
Utah Copper Division would not have been carried on 
successfully over the years involved." It is further con-
cluded that the error of defendant lies in the fact that 
it has "inequitably attributed to Utah sales in no way 
related thereto." The answer of course to this conten-
tion is that defendant has not attributed to Utah sales 
in no way related to Utah. The only gross receipts from 
sales assigned to Utah are sales of the Utah molybdenite 
and blister copper products. These products are related 
to Utah because they were produced in Utah. These 
products were loaded on cars in Utah for shipment out-
side Utah in interstate commerce. The Utah Division 
started the product on its way for out-of-state sale by 
the sales subsidiary. This subsidiary did the selling, not 
plaintiff's New York administrative office. Administra-
tive liason with or even some supervision over the inde-
pendent sales subsidiary's activities does not make the 
business of the subsidiary business done by the New 
York administrative office any more than supervision 
over Utah production constitute production of molyb-
denite and copper in the New York administrative of-
fice. The discussion on pages 32 to 35 relates generally 
to the propriety of the statutory formula to a company 
which manufactures in one state and sells in another, 
but overlooks the fact that in plaintiff's case plaintiff 
conducts outside Utah no selling business. 
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On page 35 the point is made that defendant erred 
by assigning to Utah business carried on its entirety in 
other states. Pages 35 to 38 again emphasize that no 
selling activities are supposed to have occurred in Utah 
and that because the sales were out-of-state sales the 
defendant has violated the statute and the construction 
of the statute by this Court in the California Packing 
Case. I t is urged that the "except" clause in the Utah 
statute has been erroneously and too narrowly con-
strued and further that such construction disregards 
the clause in the statute which also excepts from assign-
ment to Utah "sales otherwise determined by the tax 
commission to be attributable to the business conducted 
on such premises." I t is urged that however technical 
the interpretation of the initial language of the "except" 
clause, the aforesaid concluding language clearly assigns 
outside Utah that business which is not fairly attribut-
able to Utah. Plaintiff concludes at 38: 
"I t thus becomes apparent that the real and 
substantive question under the statute is, in each 
case, whether the sales in question resulted from 
sales activity within or otherwise related to Utah 
or whether, on the contrary, they are in fact at-
tributable to sales activity permanently carried 
on outside of this state. I t is entirely inconsistent 
with the purpose of the statute to attribute to 
Utah gross receipts from sales which had no rela-
tion to any sales activity conducted in that state." 
Here seemingly is the outright contention that perma-
nent sales activity outside Utah automatically excludes 
sales receipts from Utah business, irrespective of 
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whether the sales activity outside the state is conducted 
by the taxpayer or some independent marketing instru-
mentality. This construction is clearly incorrect and 
does violence to the statute. Most certainly, to begin 
with, the business of producing and manufacturing mol-
ybdenite and blister copper in Utah is business assign-
able to Utah. The statute then by clear command as-
signs the receipts from its business to Utah unless 
and until the taxpayer can demonstrate that the sales 
fall within the "except" clause. This "except" clause 
under any reasonable construction only excepts those 
sales negotiated "in behalf of the corporation" by agents 
in out-of-state premises owned or rented "by the cor-
poration." The sales are not those of some other cor-
poration but "of the corporation." The corporation 
concerned is the taxpayer. Furthermore, plaintiff can 
place no reliance on the concluding portion of the lan-
guage under consideration for the reason that defend-
ant in its decision did not otherwise determine that 
the sales herein involved were attributable to the 
business of plaintiff conducted at plaintiff's admini-
strative office in New York. In fact, the evidence 
showed and defendant specifically found that the sell-
ing business of the sales subsidiary was the separate 
business of the subsidiary conducted on and attribu-
table to the subsidiary's premises. 
Plaintiff carries the main burden of its argument 
from pages 39 to 59 of the brief. By the point on 
page 39 it first undertakes to show that the sales by 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
262 
the sales subsidiary in New York were sales "in behalf 
of the corporation by agents." I t then undertakes by 
the point on page 54 to show that the sales subsidiary 
as agent was "chiefly situated at, connected with, or 
sent out from premises" of plaintiff outside Utah. 
There is thus presented the basic position of plain-
tiff that the sales were negotiated by an agent in be-
half of plaintiff from plaintiff's premises as contrasted 
with defendant's position that the sales were negotiated 
by the sales subsidiary in its own behalf and from its 
own premises. The two points, namely, first, whether 
the sales were negotiated in behalf of the corporation 
and, second, from the corporation's out-of-state pre-
mises, although to some extent intermingled, are sepa-
rate and distinct points and to justify exclusion of 
sales receipts from Utah under the Utah statute it is 
necessary for the taxpayer corporation to establish both 
points. 
We turn first to the question whether the sales 
of copper and molybdenite negotiated and effected by 
the sales subsidiary were sales made by an agent "in 
behalf of" plaintiff. Pages 39 to 46 of plaintiff's brief 
are devoted, first, to showing that the sales subsidiary 
was an "agent" even though it be a factor or commis-
sion merchant; second, that plaintiff's control over its 
wholly owned sales subsidiary precludes a finding that 
the sales subsidiary was a factor or commission mer-
chant; third, that the separate corporate entity of the 
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sales subsidiary should be ignored and "rather its ac-
tivities as they affect the Utah Copper Division should 
be taken into account to the same extent as though it 
were simply a division of Kennecott"; fourth, plain-
tiff's production activities and the sales subsidiary's 
sales activities "constitute a single unitary enterprise" 
and a separation of the two activities would "disre-
gard the essential economic facts of the case." The 
pages following from 46 to 54 are then devoted to the 
attempt to distinguish the Buyuk Cigars and Minds 
Coal Mining cases which involved the similar Pennsyl-
vania statute. 
True it is to begin with that a broker, factor or 
commission merchant is an "agent" but also equally 
true, as plaintiff's quotation from the Eestatement of 
the Law on page 42 shows, the "attorney at law, the 
broker, the factor, the auctioneer," are "independent 
contractors." When the broker, the factor, the com-
mission merchant functions, he functions not repre-
sentatively but individually in his own name and be-
half and in the regular course of his own business. As 
hitherto pointed out in the quotation from paragraph 
7501 Prentice-Hall All States Unit, while in one sense 
a factor or commission merchant is the "agent" of the 
consigning dealer or manufacturer, he nevertheless con-
ducts his own separate business of selling the goods 
to which he has been entrusted with the power of sale. 
The factor sells the goods to his own customers. He 
pays to the consignor a price fixed by the contract and 
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retains for himself the amount by which the price his 
customer pays him exceeds that which he is required 
to pay to the consignor. As the Prentice-Hall quotation 
points out "the business done in the state is entirely 
that of the factor. When he makes a sale of the con-
signor's goods in the state, what really takes place is 
this: The factor purchases the goods from the con-
signor and resells them to his customer." For sales 
tax purposes the factor is in the business of reselling 
the goods of the consignor. Doing business in Utah 
through a factor, broker or commission merchant is 
not doing business in the state. The business done 
here is that of the broker, factor, or commission mer-
chant. The sales negotiated and effected by a factor 
or commission merchant are not sales made "in behalf 
of" his consignor principal. The sales are negotiated 
and effected "in his own behalf." This phrase "in 
behalf of" in the Utah statute means and can only 
mean in whose name and pursuant to whose business 
are the sales made. To use the language of the Buich 
case, supra, the factor acts "individually" and not "re-
presentatively". The business of selling being thus 
the separate business of the factor or commission mer-
chant, it would, where the question is whose busi-
ness is it, make no difference whether the manu-
facturer and the factor were doing business in the same 
state. Business conducted by one person is not busi-
ness conducted by another person, unless it is done 
representatively. An overwhelming line of cases has 
established the rule contained in the Utah Regulations 
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heretofore quoted, that where the manufacturer is in 
one state but sells his product outside the state through 
a factor or commission merchant, he is not doing a 
sales business outside the state of production. 
Taxwise no net income is assignable outside to the 
state in which the sales business is conducted independ-
ently by a factor or commission merchant. Administrative 
control or supervision may be exercised by the con-
signing principal over his out-of-state broker, factor 
or commission merchant. The Utah sheep ranch with 
respect its Boston wool broker, the Utah cattle ranch 
with respect to its Denver or Omaha livestock agent, 
the Utah investment company with respect to its New 
York broker, the Utah fruit grower with respect to 
its Chicago produce broker may exercise an admini-
strative supervision over sales in the sense of outlining 
the basis and terms within which the agent may 
sell but the Utah product is sold out-of-state by these 
independent agents in their own name and in the regu-
lar course of their own business. Moving an admini-
strative office outside Utah, the state of production, 
to another state or even to the state in which the broker, 
factor or commission merchant is selling the goods 
can make no difference to the fundamental question 
raised by the Utah statute as to whether the sales busi-
ness conducted outside the state is business conducted 
by the corporation outside the state. To apportion 
sales receipts outside the state the statute requires a 
corporation to exercise its corporate franchise of sell-
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ing and negotiating and effecting contracts of sale 
outside the state. Although the legal authorities per-
tinent to the questions are considered here, the question 
whether a sale is negotiated "in behalf of the corpora-
tion" is largely a question of fact. Let us turn then 
to the record and to defendants findings of fact. 
Defendant has specifically found as a fact in this 
proceeding that the sales negotiated by the sales sub-
sidiary covering the Utah product were not sales ne-
gotiated on behalf of plaintiff, but in the subsidiary's 
own behalf. For example, the standard form of con-
tract of sale ( F p. 71) shows that all contracts were 
negotiated and executed by and in the name of the 
sales subsidiary as seller. Nowhere in this standard 
contract is plaintiff's name even mentioned. All cast-
ing, shipping and delivery instructions to A. S. & 
E. were given by and in the name of the sales subsid-
iary. The sales subsidiary dealt exclusively with the 
customers. The cash proceeds from sales were collected 
by and in the name of the sales subsidiary, such sums 
being deposited in its own name, in its own bank ac-
counts. The subsidiary periodically remitted the pro-
ceeds of sale to plaintiff after deducting its agreed 
commission of $1.00 per net ton of copper and $3.50 
per net ton of molybdenite together with certain other 
miscellaneous expenses connected with the sale. 
As Mr. Lenz testified (Tr. 609) (F p. 143) "It, 
of course, is the duty and obligation of Kennecott 
Sales Corporation to make proper contracts for the 
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protection of Kennecott Copper Corporation in mak-
ing the sales of Kennecott's products. It also has, as 
I previously testified, to given directions to the re-
fineries with regard to the casting of shapes, the ship-
ping of the copper as well as the shipment of molyb-
denite, and Kennecott Sales Corporation in its own 
name issues the bills or statements on the basis of 
which payment for the copper or molybdenite is made. 
Kennecott Sales also collects the money and pays over 
the net thereof to Kennecott Copper Corporation." 
Mr. Lenz further testified (Tr. 616) (F p. 142) 
that "The general business and the sales arrangements, 
however, are carried out by the Sales Corporation." 
Defendant found from this and other voluminous 
testimony that all of the details of the selling activity 
and the determination of the time, the place, the man-
ner and the price of sales were solely and exclusively 
all handled and determined by the sales subsidiary. 
Plaintiff's New York administrative office coordinated 
production with sales and determined or outlined the 
general policy to be followed and was consulted by 
officials of the sales subsidiary if "anything unusual" 
occurred in regard to sales matters (F. p. 142), but 
clearly and without doubt the business of selling was 
the separate and distinct business of the subsidiary. 
Plaintiff was held out to the trade as the producer 
and the sales subsidiary was held out as the seller. 
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The evidence made it abundantly clear and per-
fectly apparent that the sales of copper and molyb-
denite negotiated and effected from day to day dur-
ing the period here involved were negotiated and ef-
fected by officials of the sales subsidiary in behalf 
of the sales subsidiary. Of some interest in this con-
nection are the minutes of the special meeting of the 
Board of Directors of the sales subsidiary held on 
April 15, 1942 (F P. 49-50) which state: 
"The Chairman then stated that it was ad-
visable to continue the authorization of certain 
officers of the corporation to enter into and exe-
cute contracts covering the routine, day to day 
sale of copper and molybdenite. 
"Thereupon, after discussion and upon mo-
tion duly made, seconded and carried, it was 
"RESOLVED, that the president or any vice-
president or any assistant sales manager be and 
each of them hereby is authorized to enter into 
and execute in behalf of this corporation, when 
acting either as principal or agent, routine day 
to day contracts covering the sale of copper and 
molybdenite.'' 
This resolution under which the officials of the 
sales subsidiary were legally authorized to negotiate 
and effect sales of copper and molybdenite merely con-
firms again that the sales were entered into and exe-
cuted "in behalf of this corporation (the sales subsid-
iary), when acting either as principal or agent." 
The authority conferred was not to negotiate and exe-
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cute in behalf of plaintiff or some other corporation 
contracts covering the sale of copper and molybdenite, 
but only authority to negotiate and execute contracts 
"in behalf of" the sales subsidiary. 
Plaintiff argues here that the separate corporate 
entity of the sales subsidiary be ignored and its opera-
tion treated as a mere "department" of plaintiff. This 
argument is particularly interesting in the light of Mr. 
Lenz's testimony (Tr. 618) (F p. 52) to the effect that 
the very reason for incorporating and organizing the 
sales subsidiary was to prevent the sales activities from 
being a department of plaintiff. He testified: 
"Q. Can you explain to me why Kennecott 
Sales Corporation was created and why it ex-
ists ? 
A. There are number of reasons. In this 
way a somewhat sharper distinction is made be-
tween operations and sales than if the sales de-
partment w e^re merely a department of the oper-
ating company." 
The attention of the court is likewise invited to 
the historical statement (F. pages 66-68 and 105-109) 
which shows that the producing function has always 
been legally separated from the separate business of 
selling the product. In the year prior to 1920 A. S. & 
R. acted as sales agent. During the period from 1920 
to 1934 Gugenheim Brothers acted as sales agent, and 
since January 1, 1934 the sales subsidiary has conducted 
the selling function, first, under the Guggenheim agree-
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ment for the period from January 1, 1934, to midnight 
August 31, 1935, and thereafter under substantially the 
same arrangements as are set forth in the agreement 
dated September 3? 1935? between the sales subsidiary 
and plaintiff, Utah Copper Company and Mother Lode 
Coalition Mines Company. A copy of this agreement 
and the Guggenheim agreement are attached to defend-
ant's findings. 
I t likewise appeared that the sales subsidiary acts 
not only in selling the Utah product but also the product 
of the other three western mining divisions and Braden 
Copper Company (Chile). Likewise, (F. pages 34-36), 
the sales subsidiary conducted a world-wide business 
of selling with branch offices or agencies in various 
parts of the world, even having a wholly owned subsid-
iary itself in Great Britain. 
In the face of all these facts and many others, plain-
tiff's argument (See page 43) that the sales subsidiary 
sold as "agent" in plaintiff's behalf appears quite ten-
uous indeed. The subsidiary's sales were its own sales 
in its own name and in the regular course of its own 
world-wide business. When the sales subsidiary col-
lected and deposited from customers the cash receipts 
from sales it was conducting its own business in the 
same way and manner that a factor or commission mer-
chant regularly functions. The subsidiary's subsequent 
remittance of the funds to plaintiff less the agreed 
commission and other expenses was exactly the same 
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method of doing business as that conducted by any in-
dependent factor or commission merchant. Plaintiff 
insists, however, that this cannot be true for the reason 
(Page 43) that "the Sales Corporation never obtained 
possession of the products sold, possession remaining 
either in Kennecott or A. S. & R. on Kennecott's be-
half." 
The above statement appears contrary to the evi-
dence and the specific findings of defendant. The exact 
facts on this point are as follows, the Finding at page 
32-33 stating: 
"30. The intent of the contract between Ken-
necott and A. S. & R. dated November 29, 1940, 
as heretofore noted as regards the Baltimore Re-
finery, is that refined copper shall be returned 
to Kennecott as it is produced. (Ex. I l l (2) P. 
13). The contract provides that final return of 
copper shall be made by delivery thereof 'to Ken-
necott or its order/ at specified points in the re-
finery area. (Ex. I l l (2) (2), page 13). Also, as 
heretofore noted, A. S. & R. is obligated to store 
the refined copper without additional charge. 
When requested, A. S. & R. is obligated to issue 
transferable storage certificates for such copper 
of Kennecott as A. S, & R. shall store or arrange 
to store. (Ex. I l l (2) page 30). Physical posses-
sion of the copper at the refinery is thus by con-
tract in A. S. & R. subject to Kennecott's order. 
"31. By arrangements entered into between 
Kennecott and the Sales Corporation which have 
been accepted, recognized and followed by A. S. & 
R., Kennecott has entrusted the Sales Corporation 
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with authority to sell all of the refined copper 
produced at the Baltimore Eefinery of A. S. & 
E., or other refinery, and with the right to possess 
and control such copper for the purpose of sale 
and to issue instructions to A. S. & E. or others 
pertaining to the casting, storage, handling and 
shipment, sale or other disposition of such copper 
and with the right to receive payment from the 
customer of the purchase price thereof. (Tr. 168-
181)." 
The contractural arrangements in effect between 
plaintiff and the sales subsidiary are set forth from pages 
59 to 66 of the Findings. Under these arrangements plain-
tiff has appointed the sales subsidiary its exclusive agent 
for the sale on commission of the entire production of 
copper of each of plaintiff's producing units and this 
appointment has been accepted by the subsidiary which 
has agreed to use its best endeavors to procure the high-
est market price for the copper produced by plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has agreed to deliver to the sales subsidiary 
copper of standard grade and quality. More particularly 
(F. p. 64), it is stated: 
"The American Smelting and Eefining Com-
pany or anyone holding any copper of Kennecott 
for delivery is authorized, upon demand made 
by the Sales Corporation to make deliveries to the 
Sales Corporation or its order of such copper." 
(Tr. 663-4). 
Again (F . p. 65): 
"All premiums for special and unusual shapes 
as are currently charged by A. S. & E. or other 
refinery and as are paid to the Sales Corporation 
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by the buyers of special shapes are paid by 
the Sales Corporation directly to A. S. & E. or 
other refinery which has supplied such shapes. 
Allowances made by the refinery for cathodes are 
received by the Sales Corporation and duly credit-
ed to the buyers." (Tr. 667). 
Further, at page 74 of the Findings are shown typi-
cal specimens, following the execution of a contract of 
sale between the sales subsidiary and customer, of the 
shipping instructions from the sales subsidiary to A. S. 
& R. The shipping and casting instructions issued to 
A. S. & R. are issued by and in the name of the sales sub-
sidiary. 
On the basis of the above facts and others, defendant 
found (F. pages 143-4) that : 
"By appropriate directions to and arrange-
ments with the refinery or others, all control and 
the right to issue instructions as to the casting of 
shapes of copper and the storage or shipment of 
both copper and molybdenite to the persons having 
the actual possession or custody thereof, was vest-
ed by Kennecott exclusively in the Sales Corpo-
ration." 
Defendant further found (F. 147-8): 
"The Sales Corporation was employed by 
Kennecott as a commercial agent and vested and 
entrusted under appropriate instructions and ar-
rangements with the right of possession, disposal 
and control of all copper and molybdenite pro-
duced by Kennecott for the purpose of selling such 
property, at an agreed commission or compensa-
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tion, in the name of and pursuant to and in the 
usual course of trade or business of the Sales 
Corporation and authorized to receive payment 
for such sales from the purchaser thereof. We 
hold and find that the Sales Corporation was in 
fact and functioned as a factor or commission 
merchant with respect to all sales of copper and 
molybdenite during the period here involved." 
There can be no doubt that these findings of defend-
ant rest on the facts. Nor does plaintiff point to any evi-
dence in the record to show this Court any error in such 
findings. The authorities do not require a factor or com-
mission merchant to have actual physical possession of 
the goods entrusted to him for the purpose of sale. It is 
sufficient and in fact the normal situation for the goods 
to be held in storage under warehouse receipt or other-
wise providing that the person in actual physical posses-
sion of the goods holds the goods for and subject to the 
order of the factor or commission merchant. Upon pro-
duction of the refined copper in the Baltimore Refinery, 
A. S. & R. held the copper in its yard for the account 
and subject to the order of the sales subsidiary. A. S. & 
R. took no action whatsoever with respect thereto except 
as specifically directed and instructed to do so by the 
sales subsidiary. Upon shipment to the sales subsidiary's 
customer, the sales subsidiary would be shown as shipper. 
Similarly in the case of molybdenite upon production in 
Utah plaintiff held this product for the account and sub-
ject to the order of the sales subsidiary. Officials of plain-
tiff here in Utah took no action with respect thereto what-
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soever except as specifically instructed and directed to 
do so by the sales subsidiary with the sales subsidiary be-
ing shown as shipper when the molybdenite product was 
moved out of the state to market. 
We move on then to plaintiff's next argument, pages 
44-46 of its brief, that the separate corporate entity of the 
sales subsidiary should be set aside and its activities 
"taken into account to the same extent as though it were 
simply a division of Kennecott." 
I t is now far too late in the day to ignore the sepa-
rate entity of corporations in taxation as the numerous 
cases cited heretofore under Point 2 clearly establish. 
All of the cases cited by plaintiff at pages 44-5 of its brief 
in support of its plea to ignore the corporate entity are 
not pertinent precedent in a tax case. All these cases 
show is the old equity rule that the corporate form cannot 
be employed as a device to commit a fraud. A wholly 
owned subsidiary organized and employed to defraud 
creditors or improperly conceal assets can of course be 
set aside. In the case at bar, however, the sales subsidi-
ary has been organized and operated for no fraudulent 
purpose but for valid business reasons and under fair 
and reasonable contractural arrangements with its 
parent. 
Plaintiff's suggestion that the corporate entity of 
the sales subsidiary be ignored for the reason that plain-
tiff's business of production and the subsidiary's busi-
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ness of selling constitute from the economic point of view 
but a single unitary enterprise has been more than suffi-
ciently disposed of by the authorities heretofore cited 
under Point 2. These cases clearly show that in the ab-
sence of fraud or an intent to syphon income out of the 
taxing state to evade tax that a taxpayer is perfectly free 
to separately incorporate the manufacturing function 
from the selling function, and that the separate corporate 
entities of each function must be recognized and re-
spected where the intercompany arrangements are fair 
and reasonable. 
Plaintiff refers to and quotes from the decision of 
the California Supreme Court in Edison California 
Stores v. McColgan, which held that the taxing authorities 
could consolidate the business of parent and all of the 
subsidiaries owned and managed under one centralized 
system, where the separate accounts of the operations 
within California did not reflect the net income from the 
business done within California. The Court thus applied 
the same rule to the parent subsidiary relationship as had 
been applied in the earlier California case of Butler 
Brothers v. McGolgam, 315 U.S. 501 (1942), affirming 111 
Pac. 2d 334 (1941), which had permitted the California 
tax authorities to apply the statutory formula to country-
wide operations carried out not through subsidiaries but 
through various branch offices, where again the separate 
branch office accounts of operations carried on within 
California did not properly reflect the net income from 
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business done in California. In the case at bar the evi-
dence is that the separate accounting basis of the Utah 
Division clearly reflects net income from business done 
in Utah. If this were not the fact, then the Butler 
Brothers and Edison California Stores decisions, among 
others, might permit or furnish defendant with some au-
thority for rejecting a tax return based on the separate 
accounts of the Utah Division and insisting instead of a 
return based upon the formula as applied to country-
wide operations. The various difficulties, however, of 
attempting to consolidate under the circumstances of the 
case at bar the incomes of the sales and fabricating sub-
sidiaries not qualified to do business in Utah, are appar-
ent from the cases heretofore fully considered under 
Point 2. 
We turn now to additional authorities showing clear-
ly that the operations of plaintiff and its sales subsidi-
ary cannot be combined and consolidated together either 
on the ground of agency or ignoring the corporate entity. 
On the general problem we refer the Court to an ar-
ticle entitled "Income Tax Status of the Wholly Owned 
Subsidiary Corporation" contained in the Monthly Digest 
of Tax Articles, April 1951, published by Mathew Bender 
& Co. This article is a condensation of an article in 29 
Texas Law Review 88 (1950). The article considers the 
question whether the "one man" corporation and the 
wholly owned subsidiary may be ignored for tax pur-
poses and at whose behest—the commissioner's or the 
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taxpayer's. After referring to the early income tax laws 
of the Civil War period under which corporations were 
treated much as partnerships are today, the article moves 
on to modern Federal legislation and discusses the vari-
ous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States 
dealing with corporate entity under tax laws. Reference 
is made to Lynch v, Turrish, 247 U. S. 221 (1918), Lynch 
v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918), Southern Pacific Co, v. 
Lowe, 247 U.S. (1918), Gulf Oil Corp, v. Lewellyn, 247 
U.S. 71 (1918), Gregory v, Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 
(1935), Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940), Molme 
Properties, Inc., v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), 
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 
(1943), and finally the recent leading decision of the Su-
preme Court in National Carbide Corporation v. Com-
missioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). The article states: 
"I t is interesting to note that the Southern 
Pacific and Gulf Oil cases and Lynch v. Turrish 
are seemingly the only Supreme Court decisions 
where a taxpayer has succeeded in an effort to 
disregard his corporation so as to gain a tax bene-
fit. Since these early holdings, any effort by a 
taxpayer to employ the corporate form for busi-
ness convenience and then to abandon it tax wise 
has met with notable failure before the court." 
Reference is made to the statement of Mr. Justice Reed 
in the Higgins case as follows: 
"A taxpayer is free to adopt such organiza-
tion for his affairs as he may choose and having 
elected to do some business as a corporation, he 
must accept the tax disadvantages. On the other 
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hand, the government may not be required to ac-
quiesce in the taxpayer's election of that form for 
doing business which is most advantageous to him. 
The government may look at actualities and upon 
determination that the form employed for doing 
business . . . is unreal or a sham may sustain or 
disregard the effect of the fiction as best serves 
the purposes of the tax statute." 
Of significance to the case at bar is the reference to the 
Moline Properties case which held that the corporation 
was not the agent of its sole stockholder where the corpo-
ration held title to certain mortgaged realty. The Court 
held the gain taxable to the corporation but excepted the 
situation where a corporation was in fact serving as an 
agent. In the Interstate Transit Lines case the Court con-
sidered the agency argument to be the same as the argu-
ment of substantial identity in a different form and re-
fused to treat the parent and subsidiary as one. 
The article after referring to the National Carbide 
decision summarizes the law as follows: 
"The express words of the Court's opinion 
leave no doubt but that a parent corporation which 
organizes a subsidiary for the conduct of business 
on its own account will find the earnings of the 
subsidiary taxed to such subsidiary and not to the 
parent." 
Turning to the facts of the National Carbide case we 
find three taxpayers, wholly owned subsidiary corpora-
tions of Air Eeduction Corporation (Airco), operating 
under an agreement to act as "agent" for Airco in the 
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manufacture, distribution and sale of various products. 
Airco agreed to supply working capital, executive man-
agement and office facilities for its subsidiaries, who in 
turn agreed to maintain and operate the plants acquired 
by them, to manufacture and sell the products and to turn 
over all profits to Airco therefrom in excess of 6% of 
their outstanding capital stock. Title to all assets re-
mained in Airco, cost of assets acquired by the sub-
sidiaries was carried as an account payable to Airco. 
Such accounts were interest free and realizable only on 
dissolution. Transfers of assets between subsidiaries 
were reflected on intercompany accounts at cost with-
out the transfer of cash. Officers of Airco served the 
subsidiaries in similar capacities. The subsidiaries were 
under the complete domination, control and ownership 
of the parent corporation, Airco. 
The three subsidiaries, although showing sizable 
profits, reported as income only 6% of their capital stock, 
the balance being reported by Airco against which was 
offset a loss sustained by a fourth subsidiary. The com-
missioner asserted deficiencies against the three subsidi-
aries, contending that the amounts paid to the parent 
constituted the income of the subsidiaries. The Supreme 
Court by an unanimous decision, opinion by Chief 
Justice Vinson, refused to set aside the separate entity 
of the subsidiaries either on the ground of agency or 
substantial identity and held that the income having been 
earned by the subsidiaries should be taxable to the sub-
sidiaries. 
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The Court stated: 
" 'Agency' and 'practical identity', as those 
words are used in the Southern Pacific case are 
unquestionably opposite sides of the same coin." 
Again, 
"Ownership of a corporation . . . can have no 
different tax consequences when clothed in the 
garb of agency than when worn as a removable 
corporate veil." 
Again, 
"So far as control is concerned, we can see no 
difference in principle between Airco's control of 
petitioners and that exercised over Moline Prop-
erties, Inc. by its sole stockholder. Undoubtedly 
the great majority of corporations owned by 
sole stockholders are 'dummies' in the sense that 
their policies and day-to-day activities are de-
termined not as decisions of the corporation but 
by their owners acting individually." 
We come now to that portion of the National Carbide 
decision which deals with the specific issue of the case at 
bar, namely, whether the sales subsidiary of plaintiff 
negotiated and effected the sales of copper and molyb-
denite in its own behalf as defendant contends, or in 
behalf of plaintiff as plaintiff contends. I t is defendant's 
position that the phrase "in behalf of" means and can 
only mean "in the name of." 
Chief Justice Vinson continues: 
"What we have said does not foreclose a true 
corporate agent or trustee from handling the prop-
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erty and income of its owner-principal without 
being taxable therefor. Whether the corporation 
operates in the name and for the account of the 
principal, binds the principal by its actions, trans-
mits money received to the principal, and whether 
receipt of income is attributable to the services 
of employees of the principal and to assets belong-
ing to the principal are some of the relevant con-
siderations in determining whether a true agency 
exists." 
Here in specific language is precisely defendant's 
point in the case at bar. The agent referred to in the 
Utah statute is not the independent factor, broker or 
commission merchant, but the agent who "operates in the 
name and for the account of the principal, binds the 
principal by its actions." In other words, it is perfectly 
clear that "in behalf of" means exactly the same thing as 
"in the name and for the account of." Unless the business 
is done "in the name and for the account of" of plaintiff, 
the business done is not the business of plaintiff. 
Of general interest is the annotation in 10 A.L.E, 2d 
576 entitled "Income of Subsidiary as Taxable to I t or to 
Parent Corporation." Attention is likewise invited to 
annotation in 165 A.L.B. 996 entitled "Eight of Owner 
of all Shares of Corporation or Association Taxable as 
Corporation to Have Its Income Taxed as His Personal 
Income." Preceding the latter annotation is the case of 
Titus v. United States at page 991, 150 Fd 2d 508 (CCA 
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10) (1945). Here the Circuit Court refused to permit the 
sole stockholder or owner of a "trust taxable as a corpo-
ration" to have it set aside for tax purposes. The opinion 
by Judge Huxman states: 
"But we are asked to disregard the express 
provisions of the trust agreement and look to the 
actualities of the situation. In substance, it is ar-
gued that then thus viewed it becomes apparent 
that not only was Titus the king-bee but also that 
he was the only bee in this hive. Parties are not 
at liberty to say that their purpose in perfecting 
an organization was different or narrower than 
that which they formally set forth in their solemn 
instrument of writing. 
"Whether the government could challenge the 
nature of the trust is quite a different question. 
That matter is not before us. Titus himself cannot 
do so." 
As Judge Cordozo pointed out in People ex rel. 
Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 244 New York 114, 155 
N.E. 68 (1926): 
"The subsidiary in these transactions, if it had 
any genuine autonomy, . . . was either a buyer or 
an agent. If in truth and in good faith it was a 
buyer of the parent's products, its operations were 
its own. By the very terms of the hypothesis, they 
are not to be identified with the operations of the 
seller." 
"On the other hand if the sale is to be disre-
garded as nothing but a cover for an agency, 
the value of the privilege of doing business in a 
corporate form as agent for another is not to be 
confused with the value to the principal of acting 
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through the agent. The position of the subsidi-
ary may be no better than if its certificate of in-
corporation had stated that the purpose of its 
business was to act as factor or intermediary for 
the products of the parent. The position may be 
no better, but it can also be no worse." 
When it is recalled that the Utah corporation fran-
chise tax is a tax on the exercise of the corporate fran-
chise, it is apparent that neither under the Utah law nor 
under the similar New York law is plaintiff exercising 
any corporate franchise in New York of selling the Utah 
product from day to day to customers. Although under 
its charter it has the legal authority to "sell" its metals, 
it does not under this authority sell or purport to sell 
or exercise any franchise to sell any product of the Utah 
Division in New York. The sale of the Utah product in 
New York is negotiated and effected by the sales subsidi-
ary under and pursuant to its charter and the corporate 
franchise granted by the state of New York to the sales 
subsidiary. I t sells the Utah product by exercising its 
own corporate franchise in New York and not the cor-
porate franchise of plaintiff. Thus, it is apparent that 
even if the existence of an administrative office of plain-
tiff in New York is here assumed to constitute the doing 
of business in New York, the business exercised and done 
is not that of engaging in sales or negotiating or effecting 
in its own corporate behalf and name any sales of the 
Utah product whatsoever. Frequent or periodic consulta-
tion by plaintiff's officials with the officials of the sales 
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subsidiary and supervision of the activities of the sales 
subsidiary does not make the activities of the subsidiary 
plaintiff's activities. As stated by Judge Learned Hand 
in Proctor and Gamble Co. v. Newton, 289 Fd. 1013 (1923) 
"In the case at bar, it does not appear that 
the organization of the plaintiff is not quite sepa-
rate from that of the Proctor and Gamble Manu-
facturing Company and of the Proctor and Gam-
ble Distributing Company. I must assume that 
each subsidiary has its own set of officials, who 
actually conduct its business." 
As stated by the Court in Pacific Magnesium v. 
Westover, 86 Fd. Sup. 644 (1949): 
"The difficulty with the argument is that a 
corporation and its stockholders are distinct en-
tities. And the taxpayer who has chosen to use the 
corporate form for business purposes is not free 
to disregard it, in order to receive the tax benefit 
to which he might have been entitled as an indi-
vidual." 
Again, as stated in United States Rubber Co. v. 
Query, 19 Fed. Sup. 191 (1937): 
"It is the Eubber Products Company, a corpo-
ration separate and distinct from plaintif, which 
is carrying on business in South Carolina; and the 
mere fact that plaintiff owns the stock in that cor-
poration and that the two have to a large extent 
the same officers and directors is no reason for 
disregarding the corporate entity of either." 
Keference is again made here to the Palmolive case, 
supra, and that part of the decision relating to the out-
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of-state subsidiary known as the "Buckingham Agency" 
and whose separate income consisted of collecting com-
missions from the placing of advertising of the parent 
company with respect to the goods produced within the 
state of Wisconsin, the taxing state. Notwithstanding 
that the out-of-state administrative office of the Palm-
olive Company undoubtedly exercised a considerable 
degree of supervision over the activities of the ad-
vertising subsidiary, this was nevertheless not suffi-
cient in the court's view to make its out-of-state business 
attributable to the out-of-state administrative office of 
the Palmolive Company and permit its separate income to 
be included with the parent's for apportionment purposes. 
The District Court's opinion states: 
"Its activities were all outside of the state; 
they had no connection with the manufacture, but 
consisted of placing advertising of the parent 
company with advertising houses and collecting 
commissions thereon. No part of its income was 
directly or indirectly earned in the state of Wis-
 | 
consin; no part of it is taxable within the state; 
and to the extent of the allocation thereof by the 
tax commission to Wisconsin there should be an i 
injunction as prayed." 
The above decision is pertinent here for the reason that | 
plaintiff insists on its right to consolidate and combine < 
the separate operations of the sales subsidiary with the ! 
production and administrative operations of plaintiff and ; 
thereby establish a basis of claim under our statute j 
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to apportion outside Utah net income attributable both 
to the administrative work and the selling work outside 
the state. 
Although the facts and the foregoing authorities 
definitely establish that the sales subsidiaries business is 
its own business and does not become attributable to or 
a part of plaintiff's separate business of producing metal, 
whether plaintiff's administrative office is in Utah, Wy-
oming or New York, we refer the Court at this point to 
a line of cases specifically holding that if plaintiff had 
no administrative office in New York it would not be 
doing business in New York by reason of marketing its 
copper and molybdenite product in New York through 
the sales subsidiary. Plaintiff would not be entitled or 
permitted to assign to New York sales receipts derived 
from sales negotiated and effected in New York by a 
factor or commission merchant conducting the selling 
business in New York. 
In Irvine Co. v. McColgan, 26 Cal. 2d 160, 157 Pac. 
2d 847 (1945), the Supreme Court of California had be-
fore it the question whether a West Virginia corporation 
authorized to transact business in California and engaged 
in California in the business of raising and preparing 
for market horticultural and agricultural products could 
apportion outside the state sales receipts where the prod-
ucts were marketed outside California through the med-
ium of independent produce brokers, commission mer-
chants and a cooperative marketing association of which 
the taxpayer was a member. 
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The Court pointed out that cooperative marketing 
agreements have been generally classified in law as con-
tracts of "agency" and definitely and expressly on the 
assumption that an agency relationship in fact existed, 
the Court nevertheless held that the taxpayer was not 
doing business outside California and was not entitled 
to apportion any sales receipts outside the state. The 
Court in its opinion at page 850-1 of the Pacific Keporter 
stated: 
"Transactions engaged in for a foreign cor-
poration in a state are not necessarily engaged in 
by the corporation in that state. As stated in 
Union Internationale De Placements v. Hoey, 2 
Cir., 96 Fd. 2d 591, 592, 'business transactions 
within the taxing jurisdiction for the account of a 
foreign corporation do not necessarily involve the 
doing of business within the jurisdiction.' Thus, 
although factors or commission merchants are 
agents, it has been held that their activities in a 
state do not constitute the doing of business there-
in by the foreign principals they represent within 
the purview of statutes imposing franchise or li-
cense taxes. (Citing cases) Support for this posi-
tion is found in the analogy afforded by decisions 
to the effect that foreign corporations are not 
doing business so as to be subject to the qualifica-
tion laws of, or amendable to process in, states to 
which their products have been consigned for sale 
and sold by factors or commission merchants. 
(Citing cases) The decisions reason that since fac-
tors or commission merchants are independent 
contractors, the disposition of goods in their pos-
session in accordance with the direction of their 
foreign principals constitutes a part of their busi-
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ness rather than the business of the individual 
or corporations whose products they sell . . . In 
other words, jurisdiction of foreign corporations 
for purposes of process and regulation, as well 
as taxation, is dependent upon their presence or 
the exercise of their corporate franchises, and the 
sale of products of such corporations by independ-
ent contractors does not involve corporate pres-
ence or the exercise of corporate franchises . . ," 
"It would si-riii to follow that if a foreign 
corporation marketing its products in a state 
through factors is not thereby 'doing business' in 
that state, it is not thereby 'doing business' out-
side of the state in which it engages in production 
act iv i t ies . . . . 
u
 We are of the opinion that cooperative mar-
keting associations are factors, or so closely akin 
thereto that the question whether plaintiff was 
doing business outside of California by reason of 
their sales transactions in other states is gov-
erned by the foregoing authorities. Section 2026 
of the Civil Code defines a factor as an 'agent who, 
in the pursuit of an independent calling, is em-
ployed by another to sell property for him, and 
is vested by the latter with the possession or 
control of the property, or authorized to receive 
payment therefor from the purchaser.' Clearly 
cooperatives which market the produce of their 
grower members in the manner disclosed by the 
facts of this case are embraced in that definition, 
and it has been so held in this state . . . Plaintiff 
argues, however, that the members of a nonprofit 
cooperative association in legal effect constitute 
the association, that the acts of the latter are the 
acts of the former, and that therefore the coop-
eratives in this case did not act as factors or in 
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dependent contractors in selling plaintiff's pro-
duce. The argument is in reality a plea to disre-
gard the corporate entity of the cooperatives for 
tax purposes. Similar pleas in comparable situa-
tions have been rejected, as where, for example, 
a foreign corporation employed a wholly owned 
and dominated subsidiary as an instrumentality 
to market its products in the taxing jurisdiction. 
The Irvine Company case as is apparent from the 
above is from plaintiff's point of view uncomfortably 
close and parallel to the case at bar. Plaintiff does its 
best to attempt to distinguish the case from pages 47 to 
50 of its brief. Plaintiff argues that the California deci-
sion is predicated solely on the fact that the taxpayer's 
only office and place of business was in California which 
marketed the greater portion of its products out of Cali-
fornia through commission merchants or factors. Plain-
tiff seeks to confine the ruling to the proposition that 
where the corporation's only office and place of business 
is in the state where its products are produced and the 
factor has its authority from and responsibility to that 
office, the sales will be attributable to such office in the 
state of production. Conversely, it is argued that if the 
corporation has an office and place of business outside 
the state of production, the sales made by factor having 
its authority from and responsibility to such office are to 
be assigned to that out-of-state office. I t is further ar-
gued that the "vital distinction" between the Irvine Co. 
case and the present case is that in the Irvine Co. case, 
the taxpayer's entire activities were confined to the tax-
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ing (producing) state, whereas, in the case at bar plain-
tiff admittedly has a permanent office in New York. It 
is then claimed to follow that plaintiff "conducted its own 
sales activities and directed and supervised those of 
its agents from such outof-state office." 
Plaintiffs "vital distinction" outlined above appears 
to be without merit although ingenuous. All of the argu-
mentative scenery present in the case at bar was present 
in the Irvine Company case, namely, the cooperative mar-
keting association of which the taxpayer was a member 
was claimed not to be a "factor"; the marketing associa-
tion and the outside produce brokers or commission mer-
chants were claimed to be merely "agents"; corporate 
entity of the cooperatives was asked to be disregarded; 
the business done outside California by the marketing 
association and the produce brokers and commission mer-
chants w a^s claimed to constitute sales business done hy 
the taxpayer outside California so as to permit it to ap-
portion sales receipts outside California 
Both on the reasoning and on the facts the Irvine 
Co. decision is squarely applicable to the case at bar. 
The court points oni <ml\ too clearly that the jurisdic-
tional problem involved is dependent upon (IK* corpora-
tion's presence or the exercise of the corporation's corpo-
rate franchise outside* (lie stale. The Court states: 
" . . . The sale of products of such corporation 
fay independent contractors does not involve cor-
porate presence or the exercise of corporate fran-
chise." 
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This means and can only mean that the sale of products 
is assigned to the state of production unless the corpora-
tion is present and doing business outside the state in a 
selling capacity or exercising its corporate franchise to 
sell outside the state. The decision stands squarely for 
the proposition that the business done by the factor or 
commission merchant is not the business of the produc-
ing corporation. Nothing in the opinion supports the 
view that the separate business conducted by the factor 
is completely identified with the "administrative office" 
to the exclusion of the producing state. The existence of 
an out-of-state administrative office in the Irvine Com-
pany case might have entitled the taxpayer to appropriate 
adjustments in the property and payroll fractions to re-
flect the net income attributable to such out-of-state office 
activity, but nothing in the opinion would assign to an 
out-of-state administrative office sales business conduc-
ted by a separate and distinct corporation functioning 
independently as a factor or commission merchant. Fur-
thermore, the case meets squarely plaintiff's contention 
here that the sales subsidiary although a factor is never-
theless an "agent" whose acts and transactions constitute 
the acts and transactions of plaintiff. The Court rejected 
this argument as "in reality a plea to disregard the cor-
porate entity." Significantly the court concluded that 
"plaintiff's activity in the marketing of its produce ceased 
when it delivered the same to the local cooperatives in 
California, and that plaintiff did not determine the man-
ner, place or time of sale, nor the prices and quantities of 
produce sold." Just as clearly in the case at bar did plain-
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tiff's activity in the marketing of its copper and molyb-
denite cease when it loaded the same on cars in Utah for 
out-of-state independent processing and sale. The sales 
subsidiary and not plaintiff determined the manner, place, 
time and price of sale. 
In the case at bar plaintiff points h» nn iacLs what-
soever which show or even tend to show any activities 
of plaintiff's New York administrative officials which 
resulted in sales. All of the testimony, evidence and find-
ings of defendant is to the effect that the only activities 
which resulted in sales were the activities of the sales sub-
sidiary. No official or employee of plaintiff's New York 
administrative office conducted any activity whatsoever 
in behalf of plaintiff which resulted in the negotiation, 
effecting or the execution of a contract covering the sale 
of a single pound of copper or molybdenite. To apportion 
sales receipts outside the state, it is necessary for the 
producing corporation to have its own salesmen negotiat-
ing and effecting the sales in the name and in behalf of 
the corporation outside the state. Sales negotiated and 
effected by factors or commission merchants inside the 
state does not constitute business done by the principal 
and if done outside the state does not constitute business 
done outside the state by the principal. 
!
 : interest in the present connection we refer me 
C<»iiti to the following: 
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In the Matter of Markt and Hammacher Company, 
258 Appellate Div. 363, 16 N.Y. Sup. 2d 774, affirmed 
283 New York 693, 28 N.E. 2d 412 (1940), the opinion 
of the Appellate Division states: 
"In none of this testimony, however, did it ap-
pear that the petitioner actually maintained of-
fices or bank accounts, or operated in its own 
name anyplace outside of New York State except 
possibly Canada." 
In People ex rel. Southern Cotton^Oil Company v. 
Roberts, Controller, 48 N.Y. Sup. 1028 (1898), the court 
states: 
uThe goods consigned to the commission mer-
chants were in their possession and control, and 
their disposition in accordance with the directions 
of the relator was a part of their business, not the 
business of the relator." 
In Union Internationale Be Placements v. Hoey, 96 
F . 2d 591, the Court stated: 
"Independent banks and brokerage houses 
within the jurisdiction transacting business, as 
here, do not become such an agent merely because 
the foreign corporation is one of their customers." 
In Bank of America v. Whitney Central Bank, a proc-
ess case, 261 U.S. 171 (1923), the Court speaking through 
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated: 
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"Its regular New York business was trans-
acted for it by its correspondents—the six inde-
pendent New York banks. They, not the Whitney 
Central, were doing its business in New York. In 
this respect their relationship is comparable to 
that of a factor acting for an absent principal." 
The foregoing cases holding that the business of the 
factor is not the business of his principal and that when 
the factor acts he acts in his own behalf and not in behalf 
of his principal, we tuni t<» iln* pertinent cases involving 
the construction oi* the similar statutory provisions in the 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts tax laws. We also take 
up here the other branch of plaintiff's argument con-
tained in pages 54-59 that the sales subsidiary as "agent" 
was chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent out from 
premises of plaintiff owned or rented outside the state. 
It will be remembered that the Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania and Utah statutes provide for the exclusion of 
receipts from the sales numerator only where the sales 
are negotiated and effected by agents in behalf of the cor-
poration and also where it appears that such agents are 
connected with the corporation's out-of-state premises. 
No exclusion is permitted unless both of these factors 
are present. 
We refer first to the leading case of Commonwealth 
v. Bayuk Cigars, Inc., 345 Penn. 348, 28 Atl. 2d 134 
(1942), affirmed 318 U.S. 746 (1943). This case affirmed 
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute which, 
as applied, assigned to Pennsylvania receipts from sales 
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negotiated and effected out-of-state by a mobile sales 
force of 42 employees known as "territorial men." These 
salesmen were all non-residents of Pennsylvania, devoted 
their time exclusively to the taxpayer's business, per-
formed all of their sales services outside the state and 
in fact only came into the state of Pennsylvania once a 
year to attend a general sales meeting. The men traveled 
constantly calling on various jobbers. They were on a 
salary basis with all of their traveling and hotel expenses 
paid by the taxpayer. Much of their business was trans-
acted from hotel rooms. All cigars and tobacco sold by 
these territorial men outside Pennsylvania were shipped 
by the taxpayer from its plant in Pennsylvania. 
Although clearly and admittedly the "territorial men" 
were sales employees on salary, negotiating and effecting 
sales in the name of the taxpayer and performing all of 
this sales activity outside Pennsylvania, the sales receipts 
were nevertheless assigned to Pennsylvania for the 
reason that such employees were not connected with or 
operating out of premises maintained by the taxpayer 
outside Pennsylvania. This is, of course, a perfect ex-
ample of the somewhat restrictive effect of the Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah statute. Such sales acti-
vities outside the producing state would under several 
states' tax statutes constitute the "doing of business" out-
side the state so as to require an apportionment of income 
outside the state. However, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, with the Supreme Court of the United States 
affirming, held that out-of-state hotel rooms from which 
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the sales employees mainly operated did not constitute 
premises maintained outside the state by the taxpayer 
and on this one ground permitted the assignment of a11 
the sales receipts to Pennsylvania. The state court's opin-
ion states: 
"Appellant also 'denies that suds a tax may 
be measured by income attributable to the business 
activity outside the commonwealth' on the ground 
of violation of due process. This contention must 
be rejected for the reason clearly stated in Butler 
Bros. v. McColgan . . .: 'One who attacks a for-
mula of apportionment carries a distinct burden 
of showing by "clear and cogent evidence" that 
it results in extra-territorial values being taxed.' " 
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed 
the judgment of the state court. 
.Plaintiff on pages 4647 of its brief seeks to distin-
guish the Bayuk Cigars case on the ground that the sell-
ing activities of the salesmen were "supervised, directed 
and controlled by the home office in Pennsylvania." It is 
stated that plaintiff "has no quarrel with this decision" 
and that it supports plaintiff's theory that the sales are 
to be assigned to the head office of the corporation from 
which the selling activities are directed and controlled 
and to which those making the sales are responsible. The 
case, however, cannot be brushed aside so easily. It meets 
squarely that part of plaintiff's argument that the sales 
of copper and molybdenite should not be assigned to 
Utah because the sales are made outside the state. The 
case flatly holds that production within and sale without 
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the state is business done entirely within the production 
state. Even if plaintiff's sales subsidiary were selling 
as the "territorial men" were selling, that is, in the name 
of plaintiff, plaintiff still would not be entitled to assign 
the sales receipts outside Utah for the reason, as we will 
hereafter show, that the premises of the sales subsidiary 
are maintained by itself. The Bayuk Cigars case does 
not hold that administrative "supervision" over the inde-
pendent selling business conducted by factors or commis-
sion merchants is business done or sales negotiated and 
effected by the administrative office. The case holds 
definitely that under a statute like that of Utah, if a cor-
poration is doing business within the state producing and 
manufacturing cigars therein, sales of such goods are 
assignable to business within the state unless the tax-
payer can fit his case squarely within the statutory ex-
ception. Plaintiff in the case at bar cannot do this. The 
sales are negotiated by and in the name of its sales sub-
sidiary and from the subsidiary's own premises. 
We refer next to the case of Commonwealth v. Minds 
Coal Mining Corp., 360 Pa. 7, 60 At. 2d 14 (1948). The 
following facts are quoted from page 16, Atlantic Re-
porter : 
"The defendant is a corporation of the state 
of West Virginia duly authorized to engage in 
business in this state and actually so engaged dur-
ing the tax year in question. I t owns and operates 
a coal mine in West Virginia, maintains a mine 
office there, and has a mailing address at P. 0 . 
Box 1086, Elkins, West Virginia. I t mines no coal 
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in Pennsylvania. It does, however, maintain its 
only executive and administrative office at Kamey, 
Pennsylvania, and two of its officers are chiefly 
situated there. The defendant made a contract 
with the Bulah Coal Mining Corporation, herein-
after referred to as 'Bulah/ whereby the latter 
agreed to act as sales agent of the defendant. 
Bulah maintains its own offices in New York, 
had its own salesmen and sub-agents, and procured 
sales totaling $1,585,847.27 during the year 1941. 
By the contract Bulah agreed to act as sales agent 
and authorized representative of defendant for the 
sales of bituminous coal and to observe certain 
price limitations and federal regulations. It 
agreed to make contracts with purchasers; to in-
voice all shipments of coal direct to the customer 
or other agent; to collect for sales; and to assume 
the credit risk. Orders for coal were forwarded 
by Bulah to the mines of the defendant in West 
Virginia, where coal was allotted by the superin-
tendent of the defendant to fill the several orders. 
The coal was shipped from West Virginia, Bulah 
being the consignor. The defendant billed Bulah 
for the coal and paid it the stipulated commission. 
Bulah alone collected from the purchaser and was 
responsible to the purchaser." 
Fvivin the above statement it is apparent that the 
relationship between Minds < V»al and Bulah, its sales 
agent in New York, was essentially the same as the sales 
relationship between plaintiff and its sales subsidiary 
with the minor difference, not here material, that Bulah 
functioned not only as a factor bn! as a delcredere factor 
by its assumption of the crodh risk. Buiah made the con-
tracts, issued the invoic-, ••• l|<\"tf>d I'M-- the sales and in 
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all respects dealt as did the plaintiff's sales subsidiary 
solely and exclusively with the customer. The only dif-
ference between the facts of the two cases is as plaintiff 
points out the fact that the mine was located not in Penn-
sylvania, the taxing state, but in West Virginia. I t is on 
this lone fact that plaintiff at pages 50-51 of its brief 
seeks to distinguish the Minds Coal case and would have 
this Court believe that "sales business" is invariably at-
tached to the "administrative office" regardless of who 
actually conducts the selling business and irrespective, 
of the special and unique claim of the state of produc-
tion to the sales receipts where the products are sold out-
of-state through independent marketing instrumentali-
ties. 
Leaving aside for the moment this fact that the goods 
were produced outside the taxing state, we proceed into 
the opinion of the court which after referring to the statu-
tory provisions relating to the gross receipts factor, 
stated: 
"It is admitted that the appellant does not 
transact all its business in Pennsylvania. By vir-
tue of the above provision, therefore, its gross 
receipts from sales of coal are assignable to Penn-
sylvania, unless the defendant comes within the 
exception. The only sales excepted are those 'ne-
gotiated or effected in behalf of the corporation 
by agents or agencies chiefly situated at, connect-
ed with, or sent out from premises for the trans-
action of business maintained by the taxpayer 
outside the commonwealth. (Italics ours.) The 
sales negotiated by Bulah were not obtained by 
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agents 'working out of premises maintained by 
the defendant outside the commonwealth. Under 
the statute they are, therefore, assignable to Penn-
sylvania. But, says the defendant, Bulah was an 
independent contractor and its activities must be 
disregarded (see brief, page 9). We know of no 
case where it has been so held. The Continental 
Rubber case, 347 Pennsylvania, 514, 32 At. 2d 878, 
879 referred to by counsel does not so hold. In 
fact the opinion of the Supreme Court, in discuss-
ing the contention that sales were made by an in-
dependent contractor, stated T h i s would affect the 
terms of the last twTo fractions.' We think the 
difference is thus: If sales are negotiated or ef-
fected through an agency maintained by the tax-
payer outside of this commonwealth they are not 
assignable to Pennsylvania; but if they are nego-
tiated or effected by other means, as for example, 
by an independent contractor serving as a sales 
agent in another state, maintaining its own offices 
there, and having its own salesmen or subagents, 
they are assignable to Pennsylvania. Without 
prejudging any future case, we may say that we 
definitely so hold in this instance." 
The above opinion when read in the light of the lower 
court's opinion and the Continental Rubber case and other 
Pennsylvania cases makes plaintiff's statement on page 
52 of its brief, that the Minds Coal decision assigns gross 
receipts from sales to the state wThere the executive offices 
are maintained and not to the state of production, clearly 
incorrect and nn in accord with the decision. The other 
case involving i^ Continental Rubber Company 
dealt specifically v iiii the collateral issue under the stat-
ute as to whether the out-of-state agent was negotiating 
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and effecting the sales in behalf of the corporation where 
such sales were made by the agent in the name of the cor-
poration. In the Minds case, both in the lower court, 59 
Dau. C. E. 95, and in the Supreme Court the decision in 
favor of the commonwealth was placed on the same 
ground as that in the Bayuk Cigars case, namely, that the 
sales were not negotiated and effected from premises 
maintained by the corporation outside the commonwealth. 
The court itself italicized that portion of the statute re-
lating to the maintaining of premises by the taxpayer out-
side the state. It then stated: "The sales negotiated 
by Bulah were not obtained by agents working out of 
premises maintained by the defendant outside the com-
monwealth. Under the statute they are, therefore, as-
signable to Pennsylvania." As in the Bayuk Cigars case 
it was sufficient in sustaining the assignment of the re-
ceipts to Pennsylvania merely to show that the out-of-
state selling office was maintained by Bulah. The court 
did not nor was it necessary to do so make any detailed 
analysis of whether the sales negotiated by Bulah were 
sales negotiated and effected "in behalf of the corpora-
tion." 
Furthermore, the opinion of the court makes it quite 
clear that the sales receipts were assigned to Pennsyl-
vania, not because the sales business conducted by Bulah 
was not Bulah's separate, distinct and independent busi-
ness, nor that the existence of an administrative office in 
Pennsylvania constituted the conduct of a selling business 
in Pennsylvania, but by reason of the simple fact that 
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the corporation was doing business in Pennsylvania and, 
therefore, subject to tax as the statute directed. The cor-
poration, a West Virginia Corporation, was qualified 
to engage in business in Pennsylvania and was actually 
so engaged. I t was thus taxable in Pennsylvania. 11 was 
taxable under the Pennsylvania law. This law, in the ap-
portionment of the corporation's total net income as-
signed to Pennsylvania all of the sales receipts of the 
corporation, unless the corporation could fit within the 
statutory exception. I t was unable to do this for the 
reason that the sales business conducted by Bulah in New 
York was not business done outside Pennsylvania by the 
corporation within the purview of the Pennsylvania stat-
ute. The fact that its-mine was located in West Virginia 
and the bulk of its payroll in West Virginia would ap-
parently result in the assignment outside Pennsylvania of 
a large percentage (approaching two-thirds) of its total 
net income. Pennsylvania's only claim to tax under the 
formula, therefore, would be based on the extent to which 
the Pennsylvania statute assigned sales receipts to Penn-
sylvania and on the amount of administrative payroll in 
Pennsylvania. If it had established a branch sales office 
in New York and had negotiated and effected the sales to 
customers in its own name and for its own account, Penn-
sylvania's tax would have been negligible, if any, because 
all property, all payroll (except perhaps 3 per cent) ;MKI 
all gross receipts from sales would have been excluded 
from the Pennsylvania numerators of the three fractions. 
The mere existence of an administrative office in Penn-
sylvania, in these circumstances, could at most only as-
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sign that small proportion of the company's total net in-
come which would result by including the Pennsylvania 
administrative payroll in the numerator of the payroll 
fraction. 
It is quite true as plaintiff intimates (pages 52-53) 
that if West Virginia had exactly the same statute as 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Utah, all of the sales 
receipts would also have been under the formula assigned 
to West Virginia, the state of production. This is regret-
table, of course, but only another instance of the difficulty 
of using the sales factor at all. Sales receipts may be and 
frequently are assigned to two or more states if the 
statutory formulas are applied literally. The possibility, 
however, of double taxation does not invalidate the for-
mula. In fact to prevent the possibility of double taxa-
tion actually arising, most of the states have a provision 
similar to subdivision 8 of the Utah statute, which permits 
an alternative basis of apportionment if double taxation 
actually exists. 
If plaintiff, engaged in production activites in Utah, 
had its administrative and executive offices in Pennsyl-
vania, processed its blister copper at its own refinery in 
Massachusetts and marketed the copper and molybdenite 
through its sale subsidiary or an independent factor or 
commission merchant in New York? the sales receipts 
would be assigned to all three states, namely, Utah, Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts. Plaintiff's recourse, in these 
circumstances, would not likely be a constitutional attack 
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on the application of the tax statutes of the three states 
but would be a re-arrangement of its method of conduct-
ing business or by way of a re-arrangement of the method 
of keeping its accounts to permit a direct allocatioit? or 
by way of an application under subdivision 8 of the three 
statutes for such alternative basis of apportionment as 
would not result in double taxation. 
Although the Minds Coal case would appear to sub-
stantiate the claim of New York to nn assignment to 
New York of all of the sales receipts of t he Utah Division 
if the New York and Utah laws were identical on tin* 
sales factor, it is the fact here in the cast; ai bar that no 
claim or suggestion is made that even a tax on the full 
100% net income of the Utah Division would result in 
any double taxation. New York's statutory provision 
relating to the sales factor in fact differs from that of 
Utah, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts and it may only 
be concluded here that by reason of this fact or by reason 
of the separate accounting methods employed by plain-
tiff or otherwise that none of the net income which it 
alleges is attributable to the activities of the administra-
tive office in New York is so regarded for the purposes 
of New York franchise tax purposes. 
1 .ie decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
in Commonwealth v. Continental Rubber Works, 347 Pa. 
."d4, 32 At. ?d ^7<\ points up Hearly tin* distinction here 
being urged, and pointed mn in the opinion of defendant 
below, namely, "between the ea>e of sales in the name and 
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property, wages and salaries, and gross receipts 
of all of the subsidiary companies and add them 
to the same fraction of the taxpayer." 
Again, 
"The statute is plain. The allocation fractions 
are to be made of the tangible property, wages and 
salaries and gross receipts of the taxpayer. That 
does not authorize a hunt for something outside 
that may have some effect upon the value of the 
capital stock of the taxpayer." 
Plaintiff's argument here that administrative "super-
vision" over the sales activities of its sales subsidiary 
automatically converts the business done by the subsidi-
ary into business done by the administrative officials is 
directly contrary to the reasoning of the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in Commissioner v. Quaker Oats Com-
pany, reported in 350 Pa. 253, 38 At. 2d 325, appeal 
dismissed 324 U.S. 827 (1945). Unlike the case at bar, 
the Quaker Oats case dealt with a business operation 
which was admittedly unitary. The taxpayer company 
engaged in (1) purchase and storage of grains, (2) manu-
facture of cereals and cereal products and (3) selling and 
dealing in cereal products. The business of selling was 
not separately incorporated or conducted by an affiliated 
company, but all sales were conducted by and in the name 
of the taxpayer corporation. Its principal office was in 
Chicago, Illinois, and all of its manufacturing was done 
outside of Pennsylvania. "Throughout the United States 
and abroad it maintained a vast selling enterprise for the 
marketing of its own products and the products of its sub-
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•sidiaries." I t maintained in Pennsylvania two sales of-
fices, one at Pittsburg and the other at Philadelphia. The 
company was thus selling in its own name and behalf 
and from its own premises in Pennsylvania goods and 
products manufactured outside the state. The sales nego-
tiated by the salesmen in Pennsylvania were not finally 
consummated until approval and acceptance by the out-
of-state home office. The company contended that the 
gross receipts fraction of the formula was improperly 
computed and that such sales should be assigned to the 
out-of-state home office and not to Pennsylvania. The 
Court stated: 
"Appellant would have us construe this to 
mean that sales attributable to Pennsylvania must 
be only those which are both negotiated and ef-
fected within the state, using 'effected' in the 
sense of consummated, or completed. Such a con-
struction would, of course, enable this appellant, 
or any foreign corporation, to eliminate a third 
allocative fraction from the tax formula by so 
arranging its sales machinery that all contracts 
would be 'accepted' and, therefore, consummated 
at the home office. This is clearly contrary to the 
intention of the legislature, which was that the 
gross receipts fraction should reflect that portion 
of corporate activity conducted in this state re-
sulting in gross receipts to the corporation in the 
form of sales, rents and royalties. To assign to 
the word 'effected' the meaning urged upon us by 
appellant would controvert and frustrate the 
legislative purpose. 'Effected' has no technical 
meaning as a legal word of art. I t is used in dif-
ferent senses and, often loosely in contracts and 
statutes. Here, it is clear that it was intended to 
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mean 'accomplished' or 'brought about': See Web-
ster's New International Dictionary (Unabridg-
ed). Given that meaning, it is consistent with the 
context and purpose of the section. The case of 
Commonwealth v. Continental Rubber Works, 347 
Pa. 514, cited by appellant supports this construc-
tion and opposes the construction for which ap-
pellant contends. There we held that sales nego-
tiated by a branch sales office in Missouri but ap-
proved and accepted in Pennsylvania were assign-
able outside of Pennsylvania under Sec, 21 (d) 
above quoted. While it is true that the legislature 
excepted sales negotiated or effected outside of 
Pennsylvania, it is clear that it would not have 
intended the inclusion in the fraction of only those 
sales which were both negotiated and technically 
completed in this state, or by salesmen operating 
from agencies in this state." 
The above language again confirms the plain mean-
ing of the Utah statute that only sales negotiated and 
effected by salesmen in the name and in behalf of the 
corporation from the corporation's out-of-state premises 
are entitled to assignment outside the state. Not en-
titled to exclusion under any circumstances are sales 
negotiated and effected by independent brokers, factors 
or commission merchants and not by salesmen of the cor-
poration. Jus t as out-of-state home office control of the 
local sales activity even down to the point of acceptance 
and approval of individual orders does not constitute the 
negotiation or the effecting of the sale by the adminis-
trative home office, so also in the case at bar even more 
plainly would administrative control over the independ-
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ent activities of the sales subsidiary m>\ rwiistitute the 
negotiation or effecting of sales by tin* administrative 
office. 
As to whether the sales business conducted by the 
sales subsidiary is in law the conduct of a sales business 
by plaintiff as parent, we invite the Court's attention 
to Superior Coal Company v. Department of Fmance, 
36 N.E. 2d 354, (1941) decided by the Supreme Court of 
Illinois. Here a wholly owned subsidiary of a railway 
company was engaged in the business of mining coal and 
selling substantially all of the output to its parent com-
pany. The question was whether the subsidiary was en-
gaged in the business of selling within the meaning of the 
retailer's occupation tax law with respect to the sale of 
coal to the parent corporal inn. 
Bearing in mind tiiat m the case at bar plaintiff's en-
tire output of copper and molybdenite is transferred 
to the sales subsidiary for resale by the subsidiary, we 
Hiioio the argument of [Hamtiff in the Superior Coal Case: 
4
 . . Plaintiff maintains that it is, in fact, but 
a department or branch of the railway company; 
that it is merely an agent or instrumentality of 
the parent corporation; that coal mined by the 
plaintiff for use in the railway company's business 
is, in reality, mined by the railway company itself, 
and that the transactions in question between the 
plaintiff and its parent are no more 'sales' than 
would be any interdepartmental transfer, or the 
direct mining by the railway company of coal for 
its own use through an agent, under any circum-
stances to which the law of agency is applicable." 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
312 
With respect to the close inter-relationship, we quote 
the following: 
"It appears that the plaintiff's office has al-
ways been maintained at the general offices of the 
railway company. Fred S. Pfahler, president of 
the coal company, during the period involved in 
this litigation, was coal traffic manager of the 
railway company. Pfahler occupies offices im-
mediately adjacent to the railway company's stat-
istician and near the railway company's law of-
fices. The corporate records of the plaintiff 
are kept in the office of the secretary, who is also 
the secretary of the railway company, and are 
part of the regular files in the office of the secre-
tary of the railway company. Records relating to 
lands are kept in the office of the railway com-
pany's land commissioner. Records relative 
to taxes are kept by, and in, the office of the rail-
way company's tax commissioner. Likewise the ac-
counting records of the coal company are kept in 
the office of the controller of the railway com-
pany. The controller holds the same position in 
both companies and neither his salary nor the 
salary of the accountants, bookkeepers and clerks 
are paid by the plaintiff, with the exception of one 
accountant paid by the coal company for ' special 
work' at the mine. Plaintiff pays, in addition, $225 
per month out of its funds for accountant's travel-
ing expenses. The chief clerk of the coal com-
pany's president at Gillespie is an employee of the 
coal company and paid by it. Attorneys repre-
senting the coal company are members of the law 
department of the railway company. An attorney 
at Gillespie is employed independently for the pur-
pose of representing the coal company in work-
man's compensation proceedings . . . There are 
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other instances in which the two companies are 
intimately affiliated but which need not be narrat-
ed. In general, the coal company does not reim-
burse the expenses of the railway company de-
partments incurred in its behalf. The plaintiff 
coal company orders material and supplies from 
third parties in its own name and on its own sta-
tionery, apparently obtaining credit as a separate 
corporation and incurring a liability chargeable 
against its own assets. In communications among 
the officers of the two companies stationery 
without letterheads is used, the practice which ob-
tains in interdepartmental correspondence of the 
railway company, but which is not the practice of 
either company concerning outside correspond-
ence. The fact remains, inventory, property and 
funds of the two companies are kept separately, 
although often in the same offices and by the 
same individuals." 
i t further appeared that the subsidiary received 
checks from the railway company and "deposits them in 
its own bank account." The Court cites various authori-
ties including that of In iv Hush Terminal Company, 93 
F. 2d 661 (CCA 2), m which ihe Federal Court had per-
mitted the City of New York to tax the gross receipts 
derived from sales of steam by a wholly owned subsidi-
ary to its parent corporatioii. The • nrt rejected the 
argument of plaintiff and stated: 
"Having utilized separate corporate forms 
for nearly 40 years, having undoubtedly secured 
financial and economic advantages as a result 
during this period, and having consistently em-
ployed the legal habiliments incident to a sale in 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
314 
the transcations involved in this litigation, there-
by evidencing its real intent, we are of the opinion 
that the plaintiff is not now in a position to re-
nounce its separate corporate entity and ask that 
its separate corporate existence he disregarded 
at the expense of the state." 
Again with respect to plaintiff's contention in the 
case at bar that the sales subsidiary is merely an "agent" 
of plaintiff and that its business is the business of the 
administrative office in New York, we invite the court's 
particular attention to the case of Esmond Mills v. Com-
missioner, 132 Fd 2d 753 (1943) (CCA 1). Here the 
effort of the taxpayer was not directed at setting aside 
the separate corporate entity of its sales agent subsidi-
ary, but the separate corporate entity of its purchasing 
agent subsidiary. It appeared that the Esmond Mills, a 
Massachusetts corporation, located at Esmond, Khode 
Island, was engaged in the business of manufacturing 
and selling blankets and other products. I ts wholly owned 
subsidiary, the Smithf ield Company, also a Massachusetts 
corporation, located at Esmond, was engaged in the busi-
ness of buying cotton and wool for its parent on commis-
sion. The subsidiary "took title to the goods m its own 
name until transferred to Esmond." 
On transfer of title from the subsidiary to the parent, 
the subsidiary was credited with the cost of the same 
plus "Commissions" which was the only income of the 
subsidiary and which was reported on the subsidiary's 
separate income tax return for the year 1937. The market 
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price of cotton and wool declining in 1937, the subsidiary 
reduced the book value of its inventory by $33,904.95, but 
did not deduct such amount in its 1937 tax return. The 
parent, although it did not include the subsidiary's in-
ventory as a part of its own inventory nevertheless paid 
the subsidiary the above amount of $33,904.95 and de-
ducted such amount as a loss on its 1937 tax return. The 
subsidiary also in 1937 obtained the cancellation of cer-
tain contracts to buy cotton and wool, the prices in such 
contracts being higher than those then existing, upon pay-
ment in 1937 to certain brokers of the sum of $31,636.19 
which amount the parent advanced to the subsidiary with-
out reimbursement. Such amount was also deducted on 
the parent's tax return I'm- WCJ. 
The Circuit Court upheld ike deciM»»n »•! t!:i- l>o;inl 
of Tax Appeals that the parent could nor in its re I urn 
deduct the losses of its subsidiary and held that the sub-
sidiary was not an "agent" for the reason that in making 
purchases of cotton and wool in its own name it was in all 
respects conducting its own separate and distinct busi-
ness. The Court stated at page 755: 
"The Board held on the basis of the record 
that Esmond and Smithfield are separate entities 
for the purpose of taxation. We believe that there 
is sufficient evidence in the record to sustain the 
Board's conclusions. I t is true, as the findings in-
dicate, that Esmond owned all of the capital stock 
of Smithfield and that Smithfield's only activity 
was the purchase of cotton and wool for it. The 
court • I>M\\-Myv •• -il! nm disregard corporate en-
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titles merely because of a parent subsidiary re-
lationship . . .; they will look behind the intercor-
porate setup only if there is evidence of a purpose 
to evade a statute or to practice fraud upon 
third persons . . . 
"The record shows that Smithfield made pur-
chases of cotton and wool in its own name and re-
tained title until it transferred the same to Es-
mond. It carried its own inventory on its own 
books; it made contracts with third persons in its 
own name; it filed an income tax return in the 
year in question and reported commissions from 
Esmond as income, and the balance sheet included 
within its return lists as inventory the wool and 
cotton which it held in its own name. All of these 
facts show that the petitioners were of the opinion, 
and apparently good business dictated, that the 
two corporations should preserve their separate 
entities." 
Plaintiff's argument from pages 54 to 59 of its brief 
that the premises of the sales subsidiary were the prem-
ises of plaintiff appears to be clearly unsound and direct-
ly contrary to the facts of the case. Among the find-
ings of defendant with respect to this point is the follow-
ing (F. page 144): 
"d. The business of the Sales Corporation 
was conducted in its own name from its own 
office and premises at '120 Broadway, New York 
5, N. Y.', shared with its affiliated and parent com-
pany, Kennecott, under lease arrangements en-
tered into by Kennecott with the Equitable Office 
Building Corporation providing not for the exclu-
sive use and occupancy of the premises by Kenne-
cott alone, but for the joint use and occupancy of 
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the premises as executive and sales offices for it-
self and subsidiaries. The Sales Corporation was 
thus occupying and using the premises for an 
office and a place of business at '120 Broadway, 
New York 5, N.Y.', not illegally or unlawfully 
but under and by virtue of a lease entitling it to 
possession as a subsidiary of Kennecott. In pay-
ing and reimbursing the Disbursing Department 
of Kennecott for its proportionate share of 'New 
York Office expense,' including rent, separately 
itemized and computed, the Sales Corporation was 
paying for and renting its own office and premises 
from which its own business was conducted and 
transacted in its own name." 
We also refer the Court to pages 113-140 of the Find-
ings where the full and complete details with respect to 
the New York premises of the sales subsidiary and plain-
tiff are set forth. Defendant found that the offices and 
premises of plaintiff and the sales subsidiary in New 
York were joint offices and premises "in and from which 
the business and corporate functions of each corporation 
were separately performed and conducted." 
By plaintiff's Exhibit .^~ \2), referred to in pages 
46-47 of the Findings, Mr. C K. Lenz, President and 
Sales Manager of the sales subsidiary, and Mr. H. E. 
Westlake, Vice President and Assistant Sales Manager 
of the sales subsidiary, are shown during the period in-
volved to have held no position in plaintiff and were 
officials only of the sales subsidiary. The "Disbursing 
Department" of plaintiff for accounting convenience and 
control handled all disbursements and records pertaining 
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plies, and the other miscellaneous expenses 
that usually pertain to the maintaining of an 
office? 
A. That is right." 
In these circumstances defendant found that the sales 
subsidiary was leasing and renting its own premises from 
which its own separate business was being conducted. 
Any other finding would have been inconceivable and at 
variance with the testimony of record. Where a parent 
corporation takes out a lease of premises for use by itself 
and subsidiaries for executive and sales offices, where 
joint offices are in fact maintained from which the sepa-
rate business of each company is conducted, where the 
parent immediately on paying the rent in turn bills the 
subsidiary for its proportionate share of the rent and 
other office expense, the subsidiary is obviously and 
clearly paying its own rent and maintaining its own prem-
ises. 
On Pages 57-8 of its brief, plaintiff, although admit-
ting that the sales subsidiary was charged by plaintiff 
"for its appropriate portion of the cost of such services" 
and that among items p'aid each month by the sales sub-
sidiary was an item designated as "rent", is apparently 
at the same time attempting to suggest that the sales 
subsidiary had no premises or office of its own from 
which its own separate and distinct business was being 
conducted. The sales force actually engaged in the day-
to-day business of negotiating and effecting contracts of 
sale of copper and molybdenite in the name and in behalf 
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of the sales subsidiary was, according to the floor plan, 
in a largely segregated portion of the space jointly occu-
pied. Even so it would make little difference here that 
the total office space w1as n«it dearly marked, delineated 
and partitioned off between the t \\ u companies. -1 < -i nI use 
and occupancy of space by iwo separate and distinct 
companies, each paying their fair share of the rout, clear-
ly does not constitute being "situated at, connected \\ iih. 
or sent out from" premises of the other within the mean-
ing of mir statute. 
The liuiiai payment each month b) plamiiii of the 
entire rent covering the joint use of the premises fol-
lowed by the immediate reimbursement by the sales sub-
sidiary of its share of the rent is exactly the same as if 
two checks had been mailed and makes it -piite obvious 
that the sales subsidiary was paying its own rent and 
renting its own premises. In fact, when analyzed plain-
tiff's 'argument really simmers down to a plea that the 
sales subsidiary in effect was a mere phantom with n<< 
office or existence at ill ij: New YorU, the premises, 
offices and operations being those solely and exclusively 
of plaintiff. This is of course erroneous as Mr. Lenz 
testified (Tr .619 ,F .p . I:!!)): 
"Q. Where does Kennecott Sales Corporation con-
duct its sales? 
A. Its office is, as I have previously stated, in 
. New York City . . ." 
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Bearing in mind that the payroll factor in the Utah 
and Pennsylvania statutes has substantially the same 
language pertaining to the owning or renting of out-of-
state premises as that in the sales factor, the Pennsyl-
vania case of Commonwealth v. American Gas Company, 
352 Pa. 113, 42 At. 2d 161 (1945), involving not the parent 
but the subsidiary constitutes essentially the adjudication 
of the same question involved here with respect to the 
owning or renting of New York office premises by plain-
tiff's sales subsidiary. I t will be recalled that the Utah 
payroll numerator consists of "the compensation of em-
ployees not chiefly situated at, connected with, or sent 
out from, premises for the transaction of business owned 
or rented by the corporation outside this state." In the 
American Gras case it appeared that the taxpayer was a 
subsidiary of United Gas Improvement Co. In the wage 
and salary fraction the Commonwealth included the figure 
of $5,000 representing the "management fee" paid to the 
parent company for supplying five officers to the subsidi-
ary company, together with the personnel of the corre-
sponding departments of the parent company, at stated 
yearly compensations. 
The court stated (p. 162): 
"Appellant's first contention is that the 
Court below erred in using the management fee 
paid to the United Gas Improvement Company 
as the numerator and denominator of the wage 
and salary fraction. It contends that this was a 
corporate expense but not a payment of wages 
or salaries. The management agreement between 
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the United Gas Improvement Co. and appellant 
provided that the former should supply to appel-
lant 'from its organization the following officers 
for our company: vice-president (a financial ex-
ecutive), secretary, treasurer, controller, and 
general counsel, together witli the personnel of 
the corresponding departments of your company, 
to perform such routine duties incident to such 
offices as our company may direct,' I t was also 
provided 'that no salaries are to be paid by our 
company to these officers, but for their services 
and the services of their departments, we agree 
to pay you $5,000 per year in equal monthly in-
stallments as follows: vice-president . . . $1,500, 
secretary . . . $500, treasurer . . . $750, controller 
$1,000, general counsel . . , $1.L}.">(). 
"United Gas Improvement was also to be 
reimbursed for the traveling and living expenses 
of its employees while performing services for 
appellant away from the Philadelphia office of 
the Improvement Company. 
"This agreement was a contract fm* the serv-
ices of five officers and for clerical assistance. 
These officers under the law were officers of 
appellant, despite their relation to United Gas 
Improvement Company, who had definite statu-
tory obligations to appellant as its employees. 
The device of paying their salaries, through the 
parent corporation was ingenuous but not con-
clusive of their status. It is unlikely that the 
United Gas Improvement Co. would contend that 
it is engaged in the labor brokerage business, 
supplying trained personnel to other corpora-
tions. It is clear that the amounts designated 
for each of the officers of the appellant were 
salaries which the officers were to receive indi-
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rectly through the United Gas Improvement Co. 
The court below has held that these persons were 
employees of appellant engaged in appellant's 
business during the year 1935, and that the sums 
paid to the United Gas Improvement Co. for 
them were wages and salaries within the mean-
ing of the franchise tax act. The record sup-
ports this conclusion and it is affirmed." 
The above case constitutes clear authority for de-
fendant's contention here under the similar language of 
the sales or gross receipts factor that the rent paid by the 
sales subsidiary to plaintiff each month in fact consti-
tuted the payment of rent for its own premises, just as 
in the above case the annual payment of $5,000 by the 
subsidiary to the parent was held to constitute the pay-
ment by the subsidiary of salaries to its employees not-
withstanding that the services hired were to be performed 
by officers and departments of the parent company for 
the subsidiary. We emphasize also the pertinence of the 
American Gas case to plaintiff's suggestion (vigorously 
pressed during the hearing) that the sales subsidiary 
had no "employees" of its own at all? that all of its 
functions were performed by "employees" of plaintiff for 
which a monthly "service charge" was billed to the sales 
subsidiary, and that the "salaries" and "rent" were mere-
ly a couple of items which went into the calculation and 
measurement of a "service charge". Defendant, however, 
on the evidence found that the item "rent" was rent and 
that the item "salaries' was salaries, particularly where 
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100% of Mr. Lenz's staff and the sales force although 
initially paid by plaintiff's disbursing department for 
accounting convenience was immediately billed to and 
paid by the sales subsidiary. 
State v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 153 N W. 850 
(1915) (Minnesota), is likewise direct authority for the 
proposition that the work performed by plaintiff's legal, 
accounting and other departments for the sales subsidi-
ary at cost constituted the separate business of the sales 
subsidiary. 111 this case it appeared that Northern Pa-
cific, a common carrier, operated certain freight ware-
houses at Minneapolis and Duluth on its line of railway 
using them for the purpose of receiving and transferring 
freight to cars for shipment, temporarily storing freight, 
and receiving freight from its cars for delivery to con-
signees or connecting carriers. Certain other railway 
companies having lines of railway running into Hie two 
cities did not have freighthouse facilities at such points 
and the freight of such other companies was handled 
at the freight houses of the Northern Pacific and "by 
the employees and agents of" Northern Pacific. The 
agents and employees of Northern Pacific assumed "to 
deal ami treat with shippers as agents and employees 
of the said other railway companies." The other railway 
companies paid Northern Pacific "as compensation for 
the use of its freight warehouses and the services of its 
employees in performing such services a certain flat rate 
per ton for the freight so handled." It further appeared 
that M • Northern Pacific's MMMIMVC- kt:n performing 
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the services and in billing and collecting charges as be-
tween themselves and the public acted as the agent of 
such other companies. They reported and accounted di-
rectly to such other companies in all such matters but 
were paid wages by" the Northern Pacific only. The 
opinion further states: 
"The flat rate per ton received by defendant 
represented as nearly as possible the actual cost 
of the services performed, and was agreed upon 
for convenience and ease of accounting." 
It also appeared that Northern Pacific owned certain 
warehouses at Duluth which were situated in wharves 
or piers and so arranged that Northern Pacific's cars 
could be loaded or unloaded on one side of the ware-
house and freight boats plying to and from the port of 
Duluth could be loaded or unloaded on the other side. 
Freight was sometimes temporarily stored in such ware-
houses. The boat companies were required to unload in-
bound freight and by arrangement with Northern Pacific, 
the latter company employed stevedores to perform all 
the manual labor of handling the freight. The boat lines 
paid Northern Pacific a certain flat rate per ton for all 
freight handled in delivering said freight to and from the 
dock, which rate represented actual cost as nearly as 
could be determined. The question in issue was whether 
the sums received from the other railway companies and 
from the boat companies under the above arrangements 
represented gross earning to Northern Pacific from its 
own business or whether being done for the other railway 
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companies and boatlines constituted the separate business 
of the other railway companies and the boatlines. The 
opinion states at page 851: 
"The state contends that the monies received 
by defendant for handling freight of other roads 
through its warehouses represent earnings de-
rived from operation. Defendant asserts that such 
is not the case; that the services rendered are 
rendered by its agents as agents for the other 
lines; that the monies by it received represents 
the actual cost of the service rendered and no 
more; and that in effect it is merely the hiring and 
disbursing agent for the other roads." 
The opinioi] quotes from State v. Union Depot Com-
pany, 42 Minn. 14L\ wherein it was stated in part as fol-
lows: 
"We cannot see what difference it can make 
whether they hold the depot property as tenants 
in common, or put it in the name of a trustee to 
hold and manage for their common use, or, as in 
this case, organize a corporation for the same pur-
pose, as a more economical and convenient method 
of holding the property, managing the business, 
and apportioning the expenses among themselves." 
The ( Jourt further stated: 
"What has been said relative to monies re-
ceived by defendant for handling freight for other 
railway companies through its freight depots and 
warehouses applies in equal force to monies re-
ceived by it under its contract with the boat com-
panies. The defendant, in hiring the men to do the 
work really acted for the boat ''c-nipanios. It paid 
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for the actual cost of the work, made no profit, 
and received back from the boat companies only 
what it expended. 
"It merely undertook, for the convenience of 
all parties, to perform for the boat companies at 
actual cost a duty which the boat companies owed 
to shippers growing out of the operation, not of 
the railroad, but of the vessels." 
On page 58 of its brief, plaintiff seeks to illustrate 
the "lack of substance or reasonable basis" for defend-
ant's position on the premises question by speculating 
what the decision might have been if plaintiff had owned 
the building rather than leasing premises from the Equit-
able Office Building Company for itself and subsidiaries. 
I t is claimed "in such case, the space occupied by the 
employees of the sales corporation would have been in 
premises 'owned by Kennecott.' " This hypothetical possi-
bility is not involved here but even if plaintiff did own 
the building and leased premises to the sales subsidiary 
for the transaction of the subsidiary's sales business 
therein, the premises would still be "rented" by the sales 
subsidiary for the transaction of its own business and not 
the business of plaintiff. The sales subsidiary's rental 
of premises for its own business most certainly would 
not constitute ownership of premises by plaintiff for the 
transaction of a sales business in New York. Further-
more, under our statute such rent, like dividends, re-
ceived by plaintiff from the sales subsidiary would be 
specifically assigned and allocated to New York. 
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Aside therefore from any question pertaining to the 
property fraction, the payroll fraction and the assign-
ment of receipts from sales of gold and silver outside 
the state, defendant by its decision has correctly and in 
every respect fully applied the statutory formula by way 
of an adjustment to the separate accounts of plaintiff's 
Utah Division. Defendant's decision has not assigned 
to Utah any net income whatsoever which is not attribut-
able entirely to Utah. The facts and the pertinent author-
ities heretofore cited by defendant clearly establish that 
the sales of copper and molybdenite produced by the 
Utah Division and negotiated and effected by the sales 
subsidiary \v:>\->i its own offices and premises in New 
York do not constitute business done by plaintiff in New 
Y<>rk. Plaintiff has failed to establish that the gross 
receipts from the Utah molybdenite and copper product 
were within the statutory exception contained in the 
Utah statute. The sales of copper and molybdenite were 
not negotiated or effected in behalf of plaintiff but were 
negotiated and effected in behalf of the sales subsidiary 
acting in its own name and in the regular course of its 
own business. Nor was the sales subsidiary chiefly situ-
ated at, connected with or sent out from premises for 
the transaction of business owned or rented by plaintiff 
outside Utah. Mr. Lenz and his sales force were chiefly 
situated at, connected with and sent out from the sales 
subsidiary's own premises for the transaction of its own 
business in premises and offices rented and paid for by 
the sales subsidiary. The sales of copper and molybdenite 
have not otherwise been determined by the Tax Com-
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mission to be attributable to the administrative business 
of plaintiff conducted at its New York administrative 
office nor on the facts of the case could the separate busi-
ness of the sales subsidiary in negotiating and effecting 
the sales of copper and molybdenite in any way be deem-
ed to be attributable to, a part of or represent the busi-
ness of plaintiff conducted by plaintiff in its own prem-
ises. In these circumstances we ask under this Point 3 
that, in any event, defendant's decision be affirmed. 
Plaintiff's argument at pages 59-60 of its brief with 
respect to the "long standing administrative construc-
tion" is we submit without merit for the reason that even 
assuming the 1941 "settlement," covering the years 1935 
to 1941, inclusive, be regarded as "administrative con-
struction" such settlement in view of the facts now of 
light in the record would be invalid and directly contrary 
to the specific terms of our statute. 
With respect to the 1941 settlement, we quote from 
Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 48 Fd. 2d 801 
(1931) page 803: 
"It is insisted for appellant that the trans-
actions of 1920 and 1921 between appellant and 
the commission has estopped the commission from 
questioning returns made in pursuance of the un-
derstanding apparently then reached. Apart from 
any question of the right of the commission to 
bind the state by any understanding or contract, 
it does not appear that what was then done rose 
to the dignity of a contract, nor that there was 
a hearing and decision by the commission adjudi-
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eating the rights of the parties. In any event, it 
I seems plain that at that time all of the salient 
i facts bearing upon appellant's income were not 
j before the commission." 
I Furthermore, as stated in New Park Mining Com-
; pany v. State Tax Commission, 113 Utah 410 (1948): 
I "This is determinative of the case for even if 
\ there were an administrative interpretation such 
! as plaintiffs assert, this court could not permit 
i such an interpretation to stand in flat contradie-
[ tion to the clear terms of the statute." 
i 
i Also it should be noted that there is nothing in the 
| record to show or in any way tend to show that plaintiff's 
j construction of the statute ever constituted a general ad-
i ministrative practice or construction by defendant of the 
; Utah corporation franchise tax law as applied generally 
: to all corporations doing business within the state. In 
\ fact, plaintiff's suggested construction appears to be dia-
metrically opposed to the general construction of the law 
by defendant and particularly and especially as relates to 
I the complete disregard by plaintiff of the separate cor-
; porate entity of and the fair and reasonable intercompany 
! contracts with its sales subsidiary. Plaintiff's attempt 
i here to combine and consolidate the operations of its 
Utah Division with the operations of its sales subsidiary 
! for the purpose of attempting to apply the statutory 
formula to such combined and consolidated operations ap-
| pears to be completely without precedent and opposed 
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to the clear meaning and general administration of the 
tax law. See: Annotation in 84 L. Ed. 28 entitled "Ad-
ministrative or practical construction of statute as pre-
cedent for judicial construction." 
Plaintiff's brief discussion of the constitutional as-
pects of the Utah statute and defendant's decision herein 
contained on pages 61 to 66 of its brief, has been fully 
considered and answered under defendant's Point I and 
other cases heretofore cited. 
POINT IV. 
IN COMPUTING THE "NET INCOME FROM THE PROP-
ERTY" IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF $243,436,508.96 FOR 
DEPLETION PURPOSES, DEFENDANT ALLOCATED SOME 
OF THE NET INCOME OF PLAINTIFFS UTAH DIVISION 
TO POST-MINING OPERATIONS AND IN VALUING PLAIN-
TIFF'S COPPER AND MOLYBDENITE MILL CONCEN-
TRATES, DID NOT ERR IN ARRIVING AT A GROSS IN-
COME FROM THE PROPERTY OF $621,940,441.37, NOR DID 
IT ERR IN DEDUCTING THEREFROM THE SUM OF $108,-
653,459.48 REPRESENTING FEDERAL INCOME TAXES AT-
TRIBUTABLE TO THE MINE AND IN DEDUCTING THERE-
FROM THE FURTHER SUM OF $269,850,472.43 REPRESENT-
ING THE COST OF MINING, MILLING AND CONCENTRAT-
ING THE ORES. 
We turn now to the propriety of defendant's calcula-
tion of plaintiff's depletion deduction for the years here 
involved. By its decision defendant determined that the 
gross income from the property was in the total amount 
of $621,940,441.37. From this it subtracted $269,850,-
472.43, representing the total mining, milling and con-
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centrating costs for the period, and $108,653,459.48 of 
federal taxes attributable to the mine which left a balance 
of $243,436,508.96 of net income from the Bingham prop-
erty before depletion. The statute allowing a deduction 
for percentage depletion in the amount of 33%% of the 
net income from the property, plaintiff's depletion deduc-
tion as determined by defendant was in the total amount 
of $81,145,502.98. 
Plaintiff contends that in lieu of the net income fig-
ure of $243,436,508.96, the correct net income figure 
should be in the amount of $312,647,869.44. We are thus 
arguing about a difference in net income from the prop-
erty to which the 33%% allowance would be applied in 
the amount of $69,211,360.48. Thus, in round figures in-
stead of $81,000,000.00 of depletion deduction actually 
allowed by defendant, plaintiff contends that the deple-
tion deduction should be $104,000,000.00.
 ] 
Defendant's findings of fact with respect to deple-
tion are contained on pages 168-190 of the Findings. 
It is plaintiff's position that the term net income from 
the property "means the gross receipts from the sale of 
products less only cost and expenses," as set forth by its 
Point II on page 67 of its brief. Plaintiff's position is also 
set forth on pages 170-1 of the Findings as follows: 
"Kennecott renews and persists in its conten-
tion, considered by the Supreme Court in Case No. 
7298, 221 Pac. 2d 857, that it is entitled to deple-
tion on the entire net income of its Utah Divi-
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sion arrived at by taking the total gross cash re-
ceipts of the refined metals sold in the market 
and subtracting therefrom its total selling, refin-
ing, transportation, smelting, milling and mining 
costs, including applicable federal income and 
excess profits taxes. Put in another way? Kenne-
cott uses a formula under which the mill concen-
trates are valued by subtracting from the amount 
realized on sales of refined metals (and molyb-
denite) the costs beyond the concentrating stage, 
including costs of transportation to smelter, smelt-
ing, transportation to refinery, refining, selling 
and delivery. This resulting figure is the 'gross 
income from the property.' From the 'gross in-
come' so computed are subtracted the mining, 
transportation to mills, concentrating (or precipi-
tating) costs, including taxes, and the balance is 
the 'net income from the property.' 
"The effect of Kennecott's formula of com-
puting its depletion deductions is to place the en-
tire profit derived from all of the operations of 
mining, milling smelting, transportation, refining 
and selling back on the mining property for the 
depletion deduction. This method presupposes or 
assumes that no portion of the profit eventually 
realized on sale of the refined metals is in any 
applicable or attributable to the post-mining, 
smelting, transportation, refining or selling acti-
vities. All of the profit for depletion deduction 
purposes is on the mining operation, none on the 
post-mining operation." 
In support of this position, as outlined above and 
referred to in the Findings, plaintiff relies upon certain 
arguments including the following: 
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(A) I t hires the smelting, transportation 
and refining work done by independent concerns 
and any profit thereon is earned by such inde-
pendent concerns. 
(B) It is engaged in a unitary business and 
the successive stages of producing copper and 
other metal products represent mere cost accu-
mulations, accounting wise, and no profit is real-
ized until final sale. 
(C) There is no representative market or 
field price in Utah for its mill concentrates by 
virtue of their enormous volume. 
(D) Being mere cost accumulations there 
is no profit "attributable to" the post-mining 
operations and with no market price established 
in Utah for the mill concentrates, the Federal 
Regulation permitting the gross income to be 
determined by taking the market price of the first 
marketable product "minus the costs and propor-
tionate profits attributable to the transportation 
and processes" beyond the mining and concentra-
tion stage is inapplicable. 
(E) The "proportionate profits" referred to 
in the Federal Regulation and attributable to the 
post-mining operations only means proportionate 
profits if there are any, and there are alleged to 
be none here. The Federal Regulation is construed 
as if following the phrase "proportionate profits" 
the phrase "if any" were inserted. 
(F) Its construction is supported by the 
legislative history of the Utah statute pertaining 
to the depletion deduction. 
(G) The 1941 settlement constitutes "long 
administrative construction." 
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(H) Defendant used an "algebraic formula." 
As stated in the New Park Mining Co. Case, supra,, 
the theory behind the depletion deduction is that "wast-
ing assets corporations are allowed a deduction for de-
pletion on the theory that the taxpayer thus recoups its 
capital investment." 
On page 41 of the brief of defendant in Case No. 
7298 is the following: 
"1 . The fair value of the property as re-
ported by the taxpayer for corporation franchise 
tax purposes for the year 1931, and upon which 
the minimum tax of 1/20 of 1% of the fair value 
of the tangible property in Utah was computed, 
by the taxpayer and accepted by the commission, 
was for all Utah property $24,587,407.00, of which 
$11,419,540.00 was assigned to mining property 
as such, exclusive of improvements, machinery and 
equipment. (R. 95) 
"2. The book value of the property as of De-
cember 31, 1930, per balance sheet submitted as 
part of the 1931 Corporation Franchise Tax re-
turn was for depletive lands $8,001,786.53. The 
balance sheet as of that date also shows non-
depletive land in the amount of $1,566,801.62. (E. 
95) 
"3. The invested capital in Utah, represent-
ing the cost of Kennecott's acquisition in the year 
1936 of the Utah mining properties is shown to 
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be in the total amount of $108,588,198.09. (R. 118), 
of which $61,873,475.00 (R. 79, 80) was determined 
to be the cost assignable to the mining property. 
"4. Depletion claimed on the corporation 
franchise tax returns of this taxpayer for the 
years 1931 to 1947, inclusive has been in the total 
amount of $137,925,347.29. (R. 94) 
"5. Depletion claimed and allowed for corpo-
ration franchise tax purposes for the years 1931 
to 1941, inclusive, has been in the total amount 
of $52,240,744.01." 
If we add to the depletion claimed and allowed for 
the years 1931 to 1941, inclusive, in the amount of $52,-
240,744.01, the amount of depletion allowed by defendant 
below covering the years 1942 to 1950, inclusive, in the 
sum of $81,145,502.98, we see that plaintiff has been al-
lowed and granted a depletion deduction covering the 
years 1931 to 1950, inclusive, aggregating $133,386,246.99. 
We cite the above figures merely for the proposition 
that if the Legislature opens the weir an inch is no 
reason for defendant to let the flood come through. The 
early leading cases in the field of depletion, Stratton's 
Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), and Stan-
ton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916), established 
that no taxpayer engaged in the mining business has any 
constitutional right to depletion. The deduction is merely 
a matter of legislative grace and should not be tortured 
and misconstrued to the point where the allowance be-
comes unreasonable and contrary to the intention of the 
legislature. 
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The last two paragraphs of this Court's opinion in 
No. 7298 containing the Court's decision and its direction 
to defendant read as follows: 
"In disposing of this last contention, we hold 
that if Kennecott files its return on an allotted 
basis that it must allocate some of its net income 
to post-mining operations before computing de-
depletion. 
"The case is remanded with instructions to de-
termine and enter a deficiency judgment in ac-
cordance with the views herein expressed." 
The Court's opinion also stated: 
"Undoubtedly, each of the post-mining proc-
esses appreciates the value of the product and this 
is reflected in increasing the net income to Ken-
necott." 
Under the Court's mandate covering the year 1942, 
defendant was thus directed in computing plaintiff's de-
pletion deduction to allocate some of its net income to 
post-mining operations. Defendant has followed this 
mandate and has allocated some net income to the post-
mining operations of smelting, transportation, refining 
and selling. Upon remand of the case for rehearing de-
fendant used the same formula which had been reviewed 
by this Court in No. 7298, but merely as a means of ar-
riving at a reasonable starting or tentative figure which 
if it allocated too much net income to plaintiff's post-
mining operations could be at the hearing shown as 
erroneous by plaintiff. Defendant's formula assigned as 
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net income to the property that proportion of the Utah 
Division's net income which the mining costs (in-
cluding depletion and federal taxes as costs) bore to total 
costs. By this formula the net income actually known 
and ascertained was spread back to the costs of the suc-
cessive operations. The formula because "algebraic" is 
not invalid for that reason. An artilleryman is not judged 
on the mathematical calculations used in firing his piece 
but on whether his shell lands in the target area. Alge-
graic formulas are frequently used in taxation as, for 
example, in the calculation of interdependent taxes. See: 
Altman and Keesling, supra, where on page 221 it is 
stated: 
"There are other methods, however, which 
may be more easily learned by those whose algebra 
the years have dulled.'5' 
Defendant concluded that the mining and milling 
dollars spent by plaintiff did not differ in kind or purpose 
from the smelting, transport, refining, selling and execu-
tive and administrative dollars spent by plaintiff. The 
Findings at page 177 state: 
"The contention that as the mineral product 
moves through the successive stages of crude ore, 
mill concentrate, blister copper, and refined 
copper, only costs but no profits accumulate leads 
not to the conclusion that all of the profits are 
applicable to the mining costs but to the act of 
final sale. If profits are to be allocated back at 
all there appears to be considerably more logic 
and reason for allocating them back proportion-
ately to all costs than exclusively to the mining 
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costs. We see nothing particularly unique about 
the mining costs to establish their claim to all the 
profits. The incurring of the other costs is equally 
necessary to the ultimate realization of any 
profit." 
The Findings at pages 178-9 further state: 
"To the known and admitted costs in the 
amount of $269,850,472.43 must be added some 
profit. But how much! Should a 'reasonable' 
profit of say 6%, 10% or even 20% be added! The 
Auditing Division in determining the gross income 
from the property arrived at a value of the mill 
concentrates for the period here involved of $621,-
940,441.37. This figure, as averaged for the period 
here involved, equals 70.0091629% of the net re-
covered metals (after deduction for losses in 
milling, smelting and refining) and the molyb-
denite concentrate recovered to the extent of the 
actual sales of such product. The total value of 
the net recovered metals as aforesaid for the nine 
year period was $888,370,057.52. In other words, 
the fair market value as represented by actual 
sales of the finished electrolytic copper, gold, sil-
ver, platinum, palladium and molybdenite product 
after mining, milling, smelting, transportation 
and refining was $888,370,057.52. The Auditing 
Division took slightly over 70% of this figure on 
the average or $621,940,441.37 as being the fair 
value of the mill concentrates back at the mining 
and milling stage. Kennecott says this is un-
reasonable and that the increase in the cost figure 
of $269,850,472.42 (exclusive of federal taxes) to 
only $621,940,441.37 of fair value is not enough. 
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Such increase, according to Kennecott, does not 
put enough profit on the mill concentrates. Or, on 
the other hand, is it possible that the figure is in 
fact to high?" 
Defendant carefully considered, analyzed and weigh-
ed all of the facts and various contentions of plaintiff in 
arriving at the gross income and net income from the 
property. The facts showed clearly that: "Undoubtedly, 
each of the post-mining processes appreciates the value 
of the product and this is reflected in increasing the net 
income to Kennecott." The foregoing statement of this 
Court carries the same idea as that expressed by the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina in the Maxwell v. Kent-
Coffey Manufacturing Co. case, supra, as follows: 
"The bare fact of sale produces no income. It 
is merely the act by which the income is captured." 
The same thought is likewise contained in the statement 
of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Underwood Typewriter Co. 
v. Chamberlain, supra, where he stated: 
"The profits of the corporation were largely 
earned by a series of transactions beginning with 
jnanufacture in Connecticut and ending with sale 
in other states." 
It was obvious on the facts that the "profit" of 85c 
per ton of copper concentrate given by plaintiff to A. S. 
& E. for smelting the mill concentrate into blister copper 
could not conceivably or under any circumstances possibly 
be regarded as constituting the entire or total profit at-
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tributable to the conversion of a mineral concentrate into 
the blister copper metal product. Nor did it follow that 
as the blister copper moved on railroad cars closer to 
market that the only value attributable to this closer 
proximity to market was represented only by the cost of 
freight. Nor did it follow that the "profit" of $1.50 per 
ton of returnable refined copper given to A. S. & E. for 
refining the blister copper constitute the only profit at-
tributable to the conversion of the blister copper into its 
constituent components of gold, silver, platinum, palladi-
um and electrolytic copper. Nor did it follow that the 
selling commission to the sales subsidiary of $1.00 per net 
ton of copper and $3.50 per net ton of molybdenite, al-
though fair, represent the only profit attributable to the 
conversion of the finished metal products into cash pro-
ceeds. As stated by Mr. Justice Brandeis the profits 
"were largely earned by a series of transactions" and 
clearly if earned by a series the net income or profits are 
to some extent attributable to each of the series of trans-
actions. 
Plaintiff's basic contention that the value of the 
product at each stage has only been enhanced to the ex-
tent of the cost to that stage is clearly erroneous. Fur-
thermore, plaintiff's contention is at variance with the ad-
ministration of the depletion provisions by defendant 
generally as applied in other mining industries such as 
coal, iron, oil, gas and the various non-ferrous metals sold 
to smelters on a net smelter return basis. A smelting 
profit is generally recognized in the non-ferrous industry 
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l and the mere fact that plaintiff by reason of its tre-
mendous and enormous tonnage is able to hire its smelt-
ing and refining work done very reasonably by A. S. & E. 
in no way precludes a finding that plaintiff itself has a 
smelting and refining profit on the work over and above 
that dervied by A. S. & E. 
1
 The fact that the A. S. & K.'s Garfield, Utah, smelter 
is practically dedicated entirely to the smelting of plain-
tiff's mill concentrates and that there is no other sub-
stantial production of copper ores or concentrates in 
Utah also does not preclude a finding that plaintiff's mill 
concentrates have a fair value in Utah to plaintiff, even 
though there be no established "representative" market 
or field price. Plaintiff as an integrated producer of 
copper is its own market. The mill concentrates have 
value to plaintiff. There is no showing in the record 
whatsoever that the values determined by defendant are 
arbitrary, unreasonable or erroneous. 
There is also nothing in the evidence submitted by 
plaintiff concerning the legislative history of the deple-
tion provision which adds anything pertinent to what 
this Court has already considered in No. 7298. 
Plaintiff's argument (pages 106-116), attempting to 
show the Court did not really mean to say plaintiff "must 
allocate some of its net income to post-mining operations," 
is quite misleading and assumes the very point in issue. 
The Tables on pages 113-114 demonstrate nothing except 
that 67% of net income is the same as the sum of 67% of 
each item of deduction when subtracted from the sum of 
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67% of each item of income. In both computations plain-
tiff first assumes it is entitled to a depletion deduction of 
1/3 of total Utah Division net income ($8,000,000). 
In the case at bar, plaintiff cites the net proceeds and 
occupation tax laws as authority for allocating 100% of 
the Utah Division's net income to the "mine" for deple-
tion purposes. Defendant, on the other hand, cites these 
two laws and the federal cases involving this plaintiff as 
authority for the proposition that the net income of plain-
tiff's Utah Division is entirely attributable to business 
done in Utah by plaintiff. A reading of the net proceeds 
and occupation tax laws will show that the state has 
separately classified in these laws integrated mining op-
erators conducting their business as plaintiff does here. 
The separate and additional post-mining profit is in the 
case of an integrated producer added back into the tax 
base. In other words the legislature has said that a mine 
has greater value and the mining occupaion tax shall 
be greater if instead of selling his mine product at the 
mouth of the mine or selling it to a custom smelter on a 
net smelter return basis, the operator undertakes himself 
and for his own account to carry the raw ore up through 
the various stages into the finished marketable product. 
Relating the profit attributable to the post-mining 
operations of extracting the metal from the mineral back 
to the mine or mine output rests upon a perfectly 
sound constitutional basis as the cases cited heretofore 
under Defendant's Point I clearly show. 
The legislative wisdom of putting the metal extrac-
tion profit back in the net proceeds and occupation tax 
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base in plaintiff's circumstances is not in issue in this 
proceeding. The point here is that the corporation fran-
chise tax law requires defendant in determining the net 
income from the property to separate the post-mining 
metal extraction profit from the profit attributable to the 
mining operation for the purpose of computing the de-
pletion deduction. The statute gives defendant no rule or 
formula to follow in effecting this segregation. The 
"gross" income has to be determined, in arriving at net in-
come, because the statute says so. The problem thus is 
one of fact to determine what the fair market value of 
the mine product is. 
The net proceeds and occupation tax laws and federal 
cases involving this plaintiff, do, however, constitute very 
clear and persuasive authority that the gross proceeds 
from out-of-state sales less out-of-state expenses consti-
tute the proper tax base of plaintiff in arriving at net 
income from business done in Utah. Jus t as the out-of-
state enhancement of value from refining is brought back 
into Utah for tax purposes under the net proceeds and 
occupation tax laws, so also is it brought back into Utah 
for taxation under the corporation franchise tax law, be-
cause the out-of-state enhancement of value from the re-
fining by A. S. & B. does not constitute business done by 
plaintiff or its Utah Division outside Utah. I t does not 
follow, however, that the recall of this out-of-state ap-
preciation in value to Utah serves to swell plaintiff's 
depletion base. This value is taxable because it is from 
post-mining business of smelting and refining. It is not 
depletable because it is not gross income from the mine. 
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Plaintiff in its argument on the depletion question 
cites only the New Park Mining Co. case. Reference 
to the New Park Mining Co. case will show that that case 
involved the sale of ores and not metals. Furthermore, 
the opinion of the Court shows very clearly that net in-
come from the property means net income from the mine 
and not other income derived from and attributable to 
other operations either completely independent of min-
ing or subsequent to the mining operation itself. The 
capital investment to be recouped by a wasting assets 
corporation is that portion of the value which is lost by 
bringing the ore to the mouth of the mine. To allow addi-
tional recoupment of capital investment in the mine with 
respect to income attributable to post-mining or other 
independent operations would completely thwart and 
frustrate the legislative purpose. That this was the mean-
ing of the Court is quite clear from the following on 
page 414: 
"But a wasting assets corporation may have 
income other than that derived from the sale of 
its capital. On such other income it is not entitled 
to a deduction for depletion" 
This Court in its opinion in No. 7298 drew the same 
distinction as the federal authorities do between mining 
activity and post-mining activity. This Court stated: 
"Generally speaking, the phrase 'income from 
the property' means the income from mining. The 
latter term is usually understood to mean not 
merely the extraction of ores or minerals from the 
ground, but also the ordinary treatment processes 
normally applied by operators in order to obtain 
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the commercially marketable mineral products. 
In those cases where the operator sells direct to 
the smelter and payment is made on the net smel-
ter returns, little difficulty is encountered. Here, 
however, we go far beyond that as Kennecott is 
the owner from the time of digging to the day of 
selling." 
Turning to Section 114 (b) (4) (B) of the Federal 
Internal Eevenue Code we find the term "gross income 
from the property" defined to mean the gross income 
from mirnmg. Mining in turn is defined to include not 
merely the extraction of the ores from the ground, but 
also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied 
in order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral 
product. The term "ordinary treatment processes" is 
specifically defined to include in the case of copper, gold 
and silver ores, the crushing, grinding and concentration 
of such ores. The smelting and refining of such ores, how-
ever, are not included but are expressly excluded as with-
in the term "ordinary treatment processes." Thus, mining 
includes extraction of the ores from the ground and mill-
ing but nothing else. Smelting, refining, transportation 
and selling are surface post-mining activities not asso-
ciated with mining. 
The Federal Regulations, Reg. I l l Sec. 29.23 (m) 
1 (f)? deals with the problem and provides in part that 
where there is no representative market or field price for 
the ores or concentrates there shall then be used "the rep-
resentative market or field price of the first marketable 
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product . . . minus the costs and proportionate profits 
attributable to the transportation and processes beyond 
the ordinary treatment processes." 
Cases involving the federal depletion allowance in 
the case of both mines and oil and gas wells all show 
clearly that surface activities beyond the mouth of the 
mine or well must be segregated and a gross value of 
the output at the mouth of the mine or well estimated or 
arrived on a basis which will apportion a proportionate 
part of the total realized profit to the surface processing 
activities which take place beyond the mouth of the mine 
or well. 
In Brea Cannon Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 11 F. 2d 67 
(1935), certiorari denied, 296 U.S. 604, the Circuit Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the market 
value of the wet content of natural gas from the well con-
stituted the income from the property and not the gross 
proceeds derived from the sales of gasoline to customers. 
The Court stated at page 68: 
"Petitioner's wells, produced what is known 
as casing head gasoline, that is, a very volatile 
gasoline wThich comes from the well in the form of 
gas mixed with the more stable gas known as 
natural, or dry, gas. The mixture is called wet 
gas. After separation the merchantable products 
consist of casinghead gasoline and dry gas. The 
respondent contends and petitioner admits, that 
the process of extraction of the casinghead gaso-
line from* the wet gas is a manufacturing process. 
The respondent, in estimating the basis upon 
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which the percentage of 27%% should be allowed 
for depletion took 40% of the gross receipts from 
the casing head gasoline as the market value of 
the casinghead gasoline content of the wet gas as 
it emerged from the well, and held that the remain-
ing 60% of the gross receipts from casinghead 
gasoline was attributable to the manufacturing 
process and, consequently, did not constitute 'in-
come from the property' within the meaning of the 
Eevenue Act 1926 . . . 
"It is conceded by the petitioner that if the 
gross proceeds derived from the sale of casing-
head gasoline should be apportioned at all, the 
apportionment of 40% of the gross proceeds from 
casinghead gasoline as the value of the gasoline 
content of the wet gas is correct. The sole ques-
tion for our consideration then is whether or not 
the amount actually received from the sale of 
casinghead gasoline by the petitioner is subject to 
the allowance of 27%% for depletion, or whether 
the depletion should be estimated upon the market 
value of the gasoline content of the wet gas." 
The Court upheld the commissioner and held that the 
plant for the extraction of the casinghead gasoline from, 
the wet gas should not be regarded as a part of the prop-
erty, and that the market value of the wet content of the 
natural gas rather than the gross income derived from 
the sale of gasoline should be used in computing the gross 
income from the property for depletion purposes. 
Again in Consumers Natural Gas Company v. Com-
missioner, 78 F. 2d 161 (1935) (CCA 2), certiorari de-
nied 56 Sup. Ct. 157, the problem was dealt with in 
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an opinion by Judge Learned Hand. The Court held that 
depletion, in the case of a gas well, should be arrived at 
not on the basis of the gross income from the sales of gas 
to consumers, but on the basis of an estimated value of 
the gas at the mouth of the well. The Court stated, pages 
161-2: 
"Because the formula is rude and imperfect, 
we are not justified in injecting into the 'basis' the 
added value imparted to the output by work done 
upon it after it reaches the surface. That cannot 
fail to make the deviation greater and to intro-
duce a variable which adds a quite unnecessary 
discrimination to a result arbitrary enough at best. 
True, its correction involves some computations; 
the sales price must be broken down into two 
component parts, the value contributed by the 
later services, and the remainder of the gross 
price." 
Again, in Greensboro Gas Company v- Commissioner, 
79 F. 2d 701 (1935), the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit held that a taxpayer which produced and 
distributed natural gas was only entitled to an allowance 
for depletion based on the gross value of the gas at the 
mouth of the well and not when distributed and sold to 
consumers. The Court stated at page 701: 
"If, as the taxpayer contends, the allowance 
was based on the value of its sales of gas to its 
consumers, the taxpayer would in effect enjoy an 
allowance for depletion on its distributing system 
which is already subject to an allowance for depre-
ciation, and it would, since it both produces and 
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distributes natural gas at retail, enjoy an unusual 
advantage over the mere producer of gas in the 
fields 
The above cases are directly applicable to the case 
at bar. This Court in its opinion in No. 7298 stated that 
"Undoubtedly, each of the post-mining processes appre-
ciates the value of the product and this is reflected in in-
increasing the net income to Kennecott" and refused to 
permit plaintiff to charge back as a depletion deduction 
against the mining operation % of this post-mining ap-
preciation of value. So also does Judge Learned Hand's 
opinion in the Consumers Natural Gas Case refuse to per-
mit the taxpayer to take depletion on "the added value 
imparted to the output by work done upon it after it 
reaches the surface." Just as this Court, in No. 7298, re-
quired defendant to allocate some of the net income to 
the post-mining operations before computing depletion, 
so also did Judge Learned Hand in the Consumers Natu-
ral Gas case require that "the sales price must be broken 
down into two component parts, the value contributed by 
the later services, and the remainder of the gross price." 
Furthermore, just as defendant by its decision allo-
cated approximately 30% of the net income to post-
mining or manufacturing appreciation in value, so also 
in the Brea Cannon Oil Case did the Court hold that "the 
remaining 60% of the gross receipts from casinghead 
gasoline was attributable to the manufacturing process 
and, consequently, did not constitute income from the 
property." 
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The Greensboro Gas Company case is particularly 
significant to the case at bar by its insistence that deple-
tion should be based on the gross value of the gas at the 
mouth of the well and not on the "value of its sales of 
gas to its consumers." The Court indicated that to do 
otherwise would in effect give the taxpayer a double de-
duction on the post-mining operation, one "allowance for 
depreciation" and another "allowance for depletion on its 
distributing system." 
Acceptance of plaintiff's contention in the case at bar 
would likewise result in a double deduction, one deduction 
for the full amount of the expenses incurred for smelting, 
transportation and refining, and another deduction with 
respect to % of the added value imparted to the mill con-
centrates by such post-mining expenses. 
Plaintiff below and during the hearing sought to dis-
tinguish the foregoing cases on the ground that the post-
mining services of smelting, transportation and refining 
were hired and that plaintiff itself did not own the smel-
ter, the railroad and the refinery, so that it is not entitled 
to take depreciation on the physical facilities involved 
in such post-mining operation. Furthermore, it contended 
that the present 85c per ton smelting fee, the $1.50 re-
fining fee and the profit earned by the railroad on freight 
represented the only profit involved in the post-mining 
operations. The tremendous net income earned by the 
Utah Division from its integrated operation shows clear-
ly, however, that the smelting and refining fees and 
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profit earned by the railroad by no means represented 
all of the post-mining profits. The post-mining opera-
tions added values to plaintiff's Utah Division product 
far in excess of the mere costs of such operation. Defend-
ant in its decision allowed as expense all of the smelting, 
t ransportat ion and refining costs, including plaintiff's 
periodic amortization payments to A. S. & E. covering 
plaintiff's share of capital improvements at the smelter 
and refinery in connection with the smelting and refining 
of plaintiff's product. Thus if, as plaintiff contends, 
the allowance was based on the value of the sales of cop-
per and other metal products to customers of the sales 
subsidiary, plaintiff would in effect enjoy an allowance 
for depletion on its post-mining system of operations 
which is already subject to an allowance for expense 
and would thus enjoy an unusual advantage over the 
mere producer of mill concentrates. In fact plaintiff's 
method of operation permitting it to expense rather than 
depreciate the facilities of its post-mining operations, 
which it has under contract, makes it even more impera-
tive that the depletion deduction in the Utah statute be 
construed fairly and reasonably and within the proper 
limits. The added value imparted to the output of mill 
concentrates from the Bingham Mine by work done upon 
such concentrates after they reach the surface is not de-
pletable. 
See also Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Company Inc. v. 
Relvering, 125 Fd 2d 42 (1941); New Idria Quicksilver 
Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 144 Fd. 2d 918 (1944). 
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POINT V. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE YEAR 1942, UNDER THIS 
COURTS MANDATE IN CASE NO. 7298, DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT REQUIRED TO USE THE ARBITRARY ALLOCATION 
FACTOR OF 66.926% BUT TO THE CONTRARY WAS RE-
QUIRED TO COMPUTE THE TAX ON THE SEPARATE AC-
COUNTS OF PLAINTIFFS UTAH DIVISION AND ON A 
BASIS FAIRLY CALCULATED TO ASSIGN TO THIS STATE 
THE PORTION OF NET INCOME REASONABLY AT-
TRIBUTABLE TO THE BUSINESS DONE WITHIN THIS 
STATE AND TO AVOID SUBJECTING THE TAXPAYER TO 
DOUBLE TAXATION. 
By its Point I I I plaintiff contends that any alloca-
tion factor in excess of 66.926% to Utah would exceed the 
mandate of this Court in No. 7298. Plaintiff states on 
page 124 of his brief: 
"The matter of assigning 100% of sales out-
side Utah for the calendar year 1942 was settled 
in favor of such assignment by agreement of the 
parties and its adoption accordingly by this court. 
When the commission was reinvested wTith juris-
diction of that cause by the decision and mandate 
of this court, a limited power was restored to the 
commission to find the correct amount of deple-
tion for that year and to do only that." 
Plaintiff, it is suggested, is in a somewhat inconsistent 
position in arguing that by this Court remanding the 
case to defendant for a "rehearing," defendant was re-
invested with no jurisdiction over any issue, and par-
ticularly the issue of "allocation," except depletion. 
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The large group of authorities cited heretofore un-
der defendant's Point I I show clearly that plaintiff's posi-
tion is without merit. Both in the case of defendant and 
the Tax Court of the United States when a case is re-
manded for "rehearing" a claim for an increased defi-
ciency in tax may be made by either defendant or the 
Commissioner of Internal Kevenue, as the case may be, 
provided under the law a claim therefor is made at 
the rehearing. The Utah Statute provides that the same 
rules are applicable to the "rehearing" as are applicable 
to initial proceedings. The only limitation on defendant's 
statutory right to make an increase of deficiency at the 
rehearing is that such increase should not be incon-
sistent with the decision and mandate of this court. 
To put some weight into its argument plaintiff seems 
to infer that there was some sort of "agreement" between 
plaintiff and defendant with respect to the arbitrary allo-
cation factor of 66.926% and that such factor had been 
adopted accordingly by this Court in its decision in No. 
7298. 
It must be that plaintiff is referring to the 1941 set-
tlement under which the years 1935 to 1941, inclusive, 
were compromised by use of the 66.926% factor which as-
signed all sales of the Utah Division product outside 
Utah. The 1941 settlement "agreement" was not regarded 
by this Court in No. 7298 to be such a binding adjudica-
tion of the rights of the parties as to preclude this Court 
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from making a determination on the issue of depletion 
contrary to the terms of the "agreement." Such settle-
ment should be accorded no greater dignity in the present 
connection, particularly where even plaintiff admits that 
such allocation factor is arbitrary and not consistent with 
the true facts even on its own theory of the case. For ex-
ample, in its brief before defendant below plaintiff stated 
at page 3: 
". .. the taxpayer's contention as to the correct 
determination of the tax is set forth in Schedule 2 
of petitioner's Exhibit 56 (2)." 
This exhibit shows plaintiff using for the year 1942 an al-
location factor of 64.676%. A review of the record in No. 
7298 which is contained as Exhibit QQ (2) in the present 
proceeding fails to disclose any "agreement" with respect 
to the allocation factor of 66.926%. Page 16 of the record 
shows no specific decision or determination by defendant 
with respect to such factor. Furthermore, the Agreed 
Record stipulated to by counsel for both plaintiff and de-
fendant, states as follows (pages 109-110 Exhibit QQ 
(2) ) : 
"IV. 
"As to Allocation of Kennecott's Income to Utah, 
"1 . Section 80-13-21 requires a taxpayer en-
gaged in business in several states to assign a por-
tion of the net income of its total business to busi-
ness done within the state of Utah. A formula 
for determining this allocation is provided with 
authority under subsection (8) for the commis-
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sion to depart from this formula, where its ap-
plication is deemed unfair or inequitable, and to 
'make such allocation as is fairly calculated to as-
sign to this state a portion of net income reason-
ably attributable to the business done within this 
state and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer with 
double taxation/ 
"2. The principles under which Kennecott 
was to make its allocation of part of its Utah 
Copper Division net income to the state of Utah 
were a specific issue in the controversy settled by 
the mutual agreement of May 27, 1942. By that 
settlement it was agreed that 66.926% of Kenne-
cott's Utah Copper Division income alone was 
to be assigned to the state of Utah. These princi-
ples were applied to the tax returns through and 
including 1941, and Kennecott has consistently 
followed these principles in its returns for the 
years 1942,1943 and 1944. 
"3. Inasmuch as the commission will not now 
accept for the year 1942 the corporation franchise 
tax return of Kennecott on the same basis ac-
cepted prior to 1942 and as established by the 
agreement of May 27, 1942, Kennecott now as-
serts its right to file its returns for its entire op-
erations, and to allocate income to Utah on the 
basis of the allocation formula of Section 80-13-
21." 
The stipulated record thus shows on its face that 
defendant did not "accept for the year 1942 the corpo-
ration franchise tax return of Kennecott on the same 
basis accepted prior to 1942 and as established by the 
agreement of May 27, 1942." It is therefore apparent 
that the figure of 66.926%, although it may have been 
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used at one stage by defendant as many other figures 
were used in the calculation of the deficiencies, can have 
no greater binding force or precedent than any other 
figure and if wrong stood to be corrected. The basis, 
furthermore, on which Case No. 7298 was presented to 
this Court was that not "figures" but only "principles" 
were in issue. As stated in plaintiff's brief: 
"The parties hereto have cooperated below in 
endeavoring to shape an inherently complicated 
tax record in such manner that there could be pre-
sented concisely for the determination of this 
court six questions of principle. The mathematical 
results to follow when these principles are de-
termined may then be worked out without, it is 
expected, subjecting the court to such detail." 
Or as stated by defendant in its brief: 
"If we attempt to arrive at tax liability for 
the year in question in terms of dollars and cents, 
we may find that the legal principles at issue 
would become obscured by reason of the multitude 
of accounting problems involved. However, as 
indicated in plaintiff's brief we are concerned with 
the establishment of principles and, thereafter, a 
correct mathematical result can be arrived at by a 
correct application of those principles." 
Also as stated by this Court in its opinion: 
"Because of the arithmetical difficulties to 
be encountered in computing the final tax, the par-
ties have assumed the responsibility of making the 
final determination based on the principles we en-
unciate." 
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The issue on allocation was stated by this Court in its 
opinion to be whether the statute "would permit Kenne-
cott to allocate to Utah a proportionate part of its total 
income from all sources as distinguished from allocating 
a proportionate part of the Utah Division's income to 
this state." This first assignment of error was considered 
by the Court and in over-ruling plaintiff's contention, 
the Court held that the tax should be computed not on 
the basis of the Utah statutory formula, but on the basis 
of the Utah Division's separate accounts under the au-
thority of subdivision 8 of the statute. The decision of 
the Court when read in connection with the specific provi-
sions of subdivision 8 show that the remand required de-
fendant to determine what, if any, "proportionate par t" 
of the net income of the Utah Division was attributable 
to business done outside Utah. Nothing in the decision 
appears to approve, sanctify or adjudicate the validity 
of the arbitrary allocation factor of 66.926%. Nothing 
in the opinion even suggests that if upon the rehearing, 
additional facts came to light which showed the complete 
error of the arbitrary allocation factor, that the true 
and correct factor could not be used by defendant. All 
that was decided or that this Court directed defendant to-
do was to calculate the tax on the basis, not of the statu-
tory formula, but on the basis of the Utah Division's 
separate accounts and by reference to subdivision 8 of the 
statute to make such allocation of the net income, sepa-
rately computed of the Utah Division, "as is fairly calcu-
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lated to assign to this state the portion of net income rea-
sonably attributable to the business done within this state 
and to avoid subjecting the taxpayer to double taxation." 
POINT VI. 
THE WAIVER BY DEFENDANT OF STATUTORY IN-
TEREST ON ANY DEFICIENCIES TO BE FOUND HEREIN 
WOULD UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE DISCLOSED 
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF STATUTORY DUTY AND PUB-
LIC TRUST. 
Although Section 80-13-58, U.C.A. 1943, authorizes 
defendant upon making a record of its reasons therefor 
to waive in its discretion any interest provided in the law 
or to compromise the same, there is in the present pro-
ceeding no showing whatsoever of undue hardship or 
other adequate grounds for a waiver of statutory interest. 
If the tax is owing it should have been paid and if paid 
now should be paid with interest as provided by law. 
Defendant below found (F pg. 191): 
"72. We find that there is no showing of 
undue hardship or other valid reason which would 
properly justify this commission to waive or re-
duce the interest imposed by the statute on the tax 
deficiencies determined herein." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully requested that the decision of de-
fendant should either be affirmed or modified by recom-
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puting the tax on the basis of the full 100% net income 
shown and reflected on the separate books of account of 
plaintiff's Utah Division as to the Court may seem right 
and proper in the premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. GILMOUR 
FRANK A. JOHNSON, 
DEY, HOPPAUGH, MABK, JOHNSON 
& GILMOUR 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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